Reading section 14

Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as the universal self.

The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of Brahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld; for as bondage is something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can any one assert that bondage--which consists in the experience of pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of various kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions--is something false, unreal? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be obtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the devout meditation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of things directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts such as 'But different is the highest Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 17), and 'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate' (Svet. Up. I, 6), teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different from the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i.e. final release. And, further, as that 'bondage-terminating' knowledge which you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for another act of cognition to put an end to it.--But may it not be said that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away itself, because being of a merely instantaneous nature?--No, we reply. Since its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike fictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of destroying that avidyâ which is the cause of the fiction of its destruction!--Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman itself is the destruction of that cognition!--From this it would follow, we reply, that such 'terminating' knowledge would not arise at all; for that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not originate!--Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising subject in a cognition which has for its object the negation of everything that is different from Brahman?--That cognising subject is himself something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman!--This may not be, we reply: he himself would in that case be something to be negatived, and hence an object of the 'terminating' cognition; he could not therefore be the subject of cognition!--Well, then, let us assume that the essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject!--Do you mean, we ask in reply, that Brahman's being the knowing subject in that 'terminating' cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman? In the latter case that superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist, because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a further terminating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of knowing subjects. If, on the other band, the essential nature of Brahman itself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with the one held by us. [FOOTNOTE 146:1] And if you should say that the terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is to be terminated by

that knowledge, your statement would be no less absurd than if you were to say 'everything on the surface of the earth has been cut down by Devadatta with one stroke'--meaning thereby that Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the things cut down!--The second alternative, on the other hand--according to which the knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower superimposed upon it--would imply that that subject is the agent in an act of knowledge resulting in his own destruction; and this is impossible since no person aims at destroying himself. And should it be said that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very nature of Brahman itself [FOOTNOTE 147:1], it would follow that we can assume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor avidyâ as the root of that erroneous view.--All this confirms our theory, viz. that since bondage springs from ajnâna in the form of an eternal stream of karman, it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind maintained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only through the due daily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste and âsrama, such performance being sanctified by the accompanying thought of the true nature of the Self, and having the character of propitiation of the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited and non-permanent results only, and that on the other hand works not aiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest Person, bring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation, and thereby the unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman being the Self of all--these are points not to be known without an insight into the nature of works, and hence, without this, the attitude described-- which is preceded by the abandonment of mere works--cannot be reached. For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be entered upon _after_ the enquiry into the nature of works.

[FOOTNOTE 146:1. According to which Brahman is not jñânam, but jñâtri.]

[FOOTNOTE 147:1. And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's highest aim.]

The Vedântin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture, need not be disconcerted by the Mîmâmsâ-theory of all speech having informing power with regard to actions only.

Here another primâ facie view [FOOTNOTE 148:1] finally presents itself. The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but by observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done (kârya), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to be done; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things to be done. From this it follows that the Vedânta-texts cannot claim the position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact.--Against this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive of accomplished facts--as e.g. that a son is born to somebody--the idea of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of certain outward signs--such as e.g. a pleased expression of countenance-- which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object; for the possible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in number, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth having taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one, &c., may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word from the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element; for the fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words known to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some particular constituent of that group may be.--Nor, again, when a person, afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is observed to dismiss his fear on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non- existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account for the cessation of his fear--he may think, e.g., 'this is a thing incapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness'--the particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to determine.--The truth is that from the fact of all activity being invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All words thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a sentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting their own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words of the sentence.--(Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not the idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it; for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action only through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is evident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even present (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does not prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect 'the means towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of mine; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'; so long he does not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of things to be done; and as hence words denote such

things only, the Veda also can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and permanent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished entity. The Veda does, on the other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result ('Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the kâturmâsya-sacrifices,' and so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an enquiry into Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent, is an altogether unjustified proceeding.

To this we make the following reply.--To set aside the universally known mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in the following way. The father and mother and other people about him point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first, have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes acquainted with the meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons.

And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various gestures, and thus knows on what errand the messenger is sent, follows him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message: he therefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a meaning.--We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedânta-texts tell us about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.

We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken. For 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He is to be searched out, him we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a Brâhmana having known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'What is within that small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,1); 'What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon' (Mahânâr. Up. X, 7)--these and similar texts enjoin a certain action, viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read 'He who knows Brahman attains the highest,' we understand that the attainment of Brahman is meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such meditation. Brahman itself and its attributes are thus established thereby only--that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation. There are analogous instances in the Karmakânda of the Veda. When an arthavâda-passage describes the heavenly vorld as a place where there is no heat, no frost, no grief, &c., this is done merely with a view to those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of the heavenly world. Where another arthavâda says that 'those who perform certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,' such 'firm establishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, 'Let him perform the râtri-sattras' (Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a person threatening a Brâhmana is to be punished with a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, 'Let him not threaten a Brâhmana'(Pû. Mî. Sû. III, 4, 17).

We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words depending on their connexion with 'things to be done,' since this is not even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done '(kârya). You understand by 'kârya' that which follows on the existence of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action (according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be accomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment depending on activity; for it is this which moves to action.--Nor can it be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is 'agreeable' (anukûla) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is 'agreeable' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable (pratikûla), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable: absence of pain means that a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor does it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve of undertaking it.--Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by action as that to which action is auxiliary or supplementary (sesha), while itself it holds the position of something principal to be subserved by other things (seshin); for of the sesha and seshin also no proper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a sesha is that which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to something else, and that the correlate of such a sesha is the seshin; for on this definition the action is not a sesha, and hence that which is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative seshin. And moreover a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action proceeding with a view to--i. e. aiming at--something else; for it is just this 'being aimed at' of which we require a definition, and moreover we observe that also the seshin (or 'pradhâna') is capable of action proceeding with a view to the sesha, as when e.g. a master does something for--let us say, keeps or feeds--his servant. This last criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own advantage); for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a view to himself.--And as, further, we have no adequate definition of 'kârya,' it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that which is correlative to kârya, and seshin as that which is correlative to sesha.-- Nor, finally, may we define 'that which is aimed at by

action' as that which is the final end (prayojana) of action; for by the final end of an action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes the action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus 'what is aimed at by action' cannot be defined otherwise than what is desired, kârya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and stands to action in the relation of principal matter (pradhâna or seshin).

(Let it then be said that the 'niyoga,' i.e. what is commonly called the apûrva--the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces the sensible result--constitutes the prayojana--the final purpose--of the action.--But) the apûrva also can, as it is something different from the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain, be viewed only as a means of bringing about these direct objects, and as something itself to be effected by the action; it is for this very reason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the action itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing to be effected by the action-which is expressed by means of optative and imperative verbal forms such as yajeta, 'let him sacrifice'--is, in accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as svargakâmah, 'he who is desirous of heaven', understood to be the means of bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world; and as the (sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is assumed an altogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' (apûrva) effect of it which (later on) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called 'apûrva' can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of bringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to assert that the apûrva, which is assumed to the end of firmly establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first recognised as such (i.e. independent), later on becomes the means of realising the heavenly world; for as the word expressing the result of the action (yajta) appears in syntactical connexion with 'svargakâmah' (desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an independent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation of pain, or the means to bring about these two results.--What, moreover, do you understand by the apûrva being a final end (prayojana)?-You will perhaps reply, 'its being agreeable like pleasure.'--Is then the apûrva a pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!--Well, let us then define the apûrva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by that name!--But what proof, we ask, have you for this? You will, in the first place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any pleasure springing from consciousness of your apûrva, which could in any way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the objects of the senses.--Well, let us say then that as authoritative doctrine gives us the notion of an apûrva as something beneficial to man, we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on.--But, we ask, what is the authoritative doctrine establishing such an apûrva beneficial to man? Not, in the first place, ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic doctrine; for such has for its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in the next place, Vedic texts; for those also enjoin action only as the means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor again the Smriti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional obligation; for those texts always convey the notion of an apûrva only on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the apûrva as intimated by Vedic texts containing terms such as svargakâmah. And we, moreover, do not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this life, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure

called apûrva, in addition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the work and are enjoyed here below, as e.g. abundance of food or freedom from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apûrva being a pleasure. The arthavâda-passages of the Veda also, while glorifying certain pleasurable results of works, as e.g. the heavenly world, do not anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called apûrva.

From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the meaning of the root--as known from grammar--is to be effected by the effort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of roots, viz. the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other divinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that through the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is accomplished, we shall show later on, under Sû. III, 2, 37--It is thus finally proved that the Vedânta-texts give information about an accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on Brahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand, Scripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the kâturmâsya- sacrifices, as something imperishable, we have to understand this imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.

We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere works is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman is infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an enquiry into Brahman--the result of which enquiry will be the accurate determination of Brahman's nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Enquiry.'

What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should be enquired into?--To this question the second Sûtra gives a reply.

[FOOTNOTE 148:1. This view is held by the Prâbhâkara Mîmâmsakas.]

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c., of this (world proceed).