Reading section 45

Hence it is impossible to deny in any way the permanency of things as proved by the fact of recognition. He who maintains that recognition which has for its object the oneness of a thing connected with successive points of time has for its objects different things, might as well say that several cognitions of, let us say, blue colour have for their object something different from blue colour. Moreover, for him who maintains the momentariness of the cognising subject and of the objects of cognition, it would be difficult indeed to admit the fact of Inference which presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general propositions. He would in fact not be able to set forth the reason required to prove his assertion that things are momentary; for the speaker perishes in the very moment when he states the proposition to be proved, and another person is unable to complete what has been begun by another and about which he himself does not know anything.

25. Not from non-entity, this not being observed.

So far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views of the Vaibhâshikas as well as the Sautrântikas--both which schools maintain the reality of external things.--Now the Sautrântika comes forward and opposes one of the arguments set forth by us above, viz. that, on the view of general momentariness, nothing can ever become an object of cognition, since the thing which enters into connexion with the sense- organ is no longer in existence when the cognition originates.--It is not, he says, the persistence of the thing up to the time of cognition which is the cause of its becoming an object of cognition. To be an object of cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the origination of cognition. Nor does this definition imply that the sense- organs also are the objects of cognition. For a cause of cognition is held to be an object of cognition only in so far as it imparts to the cognition its own form (and this the sense-organs do not). Now even a thing that has perished may have imparted its form to the cognition, and on the basis of that form, blue colour, and so on, the thing itself is inferred. Nor can it be said (as the Yogâkâras do) that the form of subsequent cognitions is due to the action of previous cognitions (and not to the external thing); for on this hypothesis it could not be explained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of blue colour there all at once arises the cognition of yellow colour. The manifold character of cognitions must therefore be held to be due to the manifold character of real thing.--To this we reply 'not from non-entity; this not being observed.' The special forms of cognition, such as blue colour, and so on, cannot be the forms of things that have perished, and therefore are not in Being, since this is not observed. For it is not observed that when a substrate of attributes has perished, its attributes pass over into another thing. (Nor can it be said that the thing that perished leaves in cognition a reflection of itself, for) reflections also are only of persisting things, not of mere attributes. We therefore conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result from the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the thing persisting at the time of cognition.--The Sûtras now set forth a further objection which applies to both schools.

26. And thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active people also.

Thus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness, origination from the non-existent, causeless cognition, and so on, it would follow that persons also not making any efforts may accomplish all their ends. It is a fact that the attainment of things desired and the warding off of things not desired is effected through effort, and so on. But if all existences momentarily perish, a previously existing thing, or special attributes of it, such as after-effects (through which Svarga and the like are effected) or knowledge (through which Release is effected) do not persist, and hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort. And as thus all effects would be accomplished without a cause, even perfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends to be reached in this and in the next life, including final release. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the aggregates.'

27. Not non-existence, on account of consciousness.

Here now come forward the Yogâkâras, who hold that cognitions (ideas) only are real. There is no reasonable ground, they say, for the view that the manifoldness of ideas is due to the manifoldness of things, since ideas themselves--no less than the things assumed by others--have their distinct forms, and hence are manifold. And this manifold nature of ideas is sufficiently explained by so-called vâsanâ. Vâsanâ means a flow of ideas (states of consciousness--pratyaya) of different character. We observe, e.g., that a cognition which has the form of a jar (i.e. the idea of a jar) gives rise to the cognition of the two halves of a jar, and is itself preceded and produced by the cognition of a jar, and this again by a similar cognition, and so on; this is what we call a stream or flow of ideas.--But how, then, is it that internal cognitions have the forms of external things, mustard-grains, mountains, and so on?-- Even if real things are admitted, the Yogâkâra replies, their becoming objects of thought and speech depends altogether on the light of knowledge, for otherwise it would follow that there is no difference between the objects known by oneself and those known by others. And that cognitions thus shining forth to consciousness have forms (distinctive characteristics) must needs be admitted; for if they were without form they could not shine forth. Now we are conscious only of one such form, viz. that of the cognition; that this form at the same time appears to us as something external (i.e. as the form of an outward thing) is due to error. From the general law that we are conscious of ideas and things together only, it follows that the thing is not something different from the idea.

As, moreover, the fact of one idea specially representing one particular thing only, whether it be a jar or a piece of cloth or anything else, requires for its explanation an equality in character of the idea and the thing, those also who hold the existence of external things must needs assume that the idea has a form similar to that of the thing; and as this suffices for rendering possible practical thought and intercourse, there is nothing authorising us to assume the existence of things in addition to the ideas. Hence cognitions only constitute reality; external things do not exist.

To this the Sûtra replies, 'Not non-existence, on account of consciousness.' The non-existence of things, apart from ideas, cannot be maintained, because we are conscious of cognitions as what renders the knowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to particular _things_. For the consciousness of all men taking part in worldly life expresses itself in forms such as 'I know the jar.' Knowledge of this kind, as everybody's consciousness will testify, presents itself directly as belonging to a knowing subject and referring to an object; those therefore who attempt to prove, on the basis of this very knowledge, that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit subjects for general derision. This point has already been set forth in detail in our refutation of those crypto-Bauddhas who take shelter under a pretended Vedic theory.--To maintain, as the Yogâkâras do, that the general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the non-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self-contradiction; for 'going together' can only be where there are different things. To hold that it is a general rule that of the idea--the essential nature of which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into common thought and intercourse--we are always conscious together with the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different from the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed. And as, according to you, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any permanently persisting aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions form a series in which each member colours or affects the next one (vâsanâ); for how is the earlier cognition, which has absolutely perished, to affect the later one, which has not yet arisen? We conclude therefore that the manifoldness of cognitions is due solely to the manifoldness of things. We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas) as rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with by ordinary thought and speech, and the specific character of each cognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a particular thing. This relation is of the nature of conjunction (samyoga), since knowledge (cognition) also is a substance. Just as light (prabhâ), although a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation of an attribute (guna), so knowledge stands in the relation of an attribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance.--From all this it follows that external things are not non-existent.

The next Sûtra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to the cognitions of a dreaming person.

28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams.

Owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it cannot be said that, like them, the cognitions of the waking state also have no things to correspond to them. For dream-cognitions are originated by organs impaired by certain defects, such as drowsiness, and are moreover sublated by the cognitions of the waking state; while the cognitions of the waking state are of a contrary nature. There is thus no equality between the two sets.--Moreover, if all cognitions are empty of real content, you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your inferential cognition also is devoid of true content. If, on the other hand, it be held to have a real content, then it follows that no cognition is devoid of such content; for all of them are alike cognitions, just like the inferential cognition.

29. The existence (is) not, on account of the absence of perception.

The existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things is not possible, because such are nowhere perceived. For we nowhere perceive cognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to objects. That even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we have explained in the discussion of the different khyâtis (above, p. 118).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'perception.'

30. And on account of its being unproved in every way.

Here now come forward the Mâdhyamikas who teach that there is nothing but a universal Void. This theory of a universal Nothing is the real purport of Sugata's doctrine; the theories of the momentariness of all existence, &c., which imply the acknowledgment of the reality of things, were set forth by him merely as suiting the limited intellectual capacities of his pupils.--Neither cognitions nor external objects have real existence; the Void (the 'Nothinj') only constitutes Reality, and final Release means passing over into Non-being. This is the real view of Buddha, and its truth is proved by the following considerations. As the Nothing is not to be proved by any argument, it is self-proved. For a cause has to be assigned for that only which _is_. But what _is_ does not originate either from that which is or that which is not. We never observe that which is to originate from Being; for things such as jars, and so on, do not originate as long as the lump of clay, &c., is non- destroyed. Nor can Being originate from Non-being; for if the jar were supposed to originate from Non-being, i.e. that non-being which results from the destruction of the lump of clay, it would itself be of the nature of Non-being. Similarly it can be shown that nothing can originate either from itself or from anything else. For the former hypothesis would imply the vicious procedure of the explanation presupposing the thing to be explained; and moreover no motive can be assigned for a thing originating from itself. And on the hypothesis of things originating from other things, it would follow that anything might originate from anything, for all things alike are _other_ things. And as thus there is no origination there is also no destruction. Hence the _Nothing_ constitutes Reality: origination, destruction, Being, Non- being, and so on, are mere illusions (bhrânti). Nor must it be said that as even an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must assume something real to serve as a substrate; for in the same way as an illusion may arise even when the defect, the abode of the defect, and the knowing subject are unreal, it also may arise even when the substrate of the illusion is unreal. Hence the _Nothing_ is the only reality.--To this the Sûtra replies, 'And on account of its being in everyway unproved'--the theory of general Nothingness which you hold cannot stand. Do you hold that everything is being or non-being, or anything else? On none of these views the Nothingness maintained by you can be established. For the terms _being_ and _non-being_ and the ideas expressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular states of actually _existing_ things only. If therefore you declare 'everything is nothing,' your declaration is equivalent to the declaration, 'everything is being,' for your statement also can only mean that everything that _exists_ is capable of abiding in a certain condition (which you call 'Nothing'). The absolute Nothingness you have in mind cannot thus be established in any way. Moreover, he who tries to establish the tenet of universal Nothingness can attempt this in so far only as,--through some means of knowledge, he has come to know Nothingness, and he must therefore acknowledge the truth of that means. For if it were not true it would follow that everything is real. The view of general Nothingness is thus altogether incapable of proof.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'unprovedness in every way.'

31. Not so, on account of the impossibility in one.

The Bauddhas have been refuted. As now the Jainas also hold the view of the world originating from atoms and similar views, their theory is reviewed next.--The Jainas hold that the world comprises souls (jîva), and non-souls (ajîva), and that there is no Lord. The world further comprises six substances (dravya), viz. souls (jîva), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), bodies (pudgala), time (kâla), and space (âkâsa). The souls are of three different kinds-bound (in the state of bondage), perfected by Yoga (Yogasiddha), and released (mukta). 'Merit' is that particular world-pervading substance which is the cause of the motion of all things moving; 'demerit' is that all-pervading substance which is the cause of stationariness, 'Body' is that substance which possesses colour, smell, taste, and touch. It is of two kinds, atomic or compounded of atoms; to the latter kind belong wind, fire, water, earth, the bodies of living creatures, and so on. 'Time' is a particular atomic substance which is the cause of the current distinction of past, present, and future. 'Space' is one, and of infinite extent. From among these substances those which are not atomic are comprehended under the term 'the five astikâyas (existing bodies)'--the astikâya of souls, the astikâya of merit, the astikâya of demerit, the astikâya of matter, the astikâya of space. This term 'astikâya' is applied to substances occupying several parts of space.--They also use another division of categories which subserves the purpose of Release; distinguishing souls, non-souls, influx (âsrava), bondage, nijara, samvara, and Release. _Release_ comprises the means of Release also, viz. perfect knowledge, good conduct, and so on. The soul is that which has knowledge, seeing, pleasure, strength (vîrya) for its qualities. Non-soul is the aggregate of the things enjoyed by the souls. 'Influx' is whatever is instrumental towards the souls having the fruition of objects, viz. the sense-organs, and so on.--Bondage is of eight different kinds, comprising the four ghâtikarman, and the four aghâtikarman. The former term denotes whatever obstructs the essential qualities of the soul, viz. knowledge, intuition, strength, pleasure; the latter whatever causes pleasure, pain, and indifference, which are due to the persistence of the wrong imagination that makes the soul identify itself with its body.--'Decay' means the austerities (tapas), known from the teaching of the Arhat, which are the means of Release.--Samvara is such deep meditation (Samâdhi) as stops the action of the sense-organs.--Release, finally, is the manifestation of the Self in its essential nature, free from all afflictions such as passion, and so on.--The atoms which are the causes of earth and the other compounds, are not, as the Vaiseshikas and others hold, of four different kinds, but have all the same nature; the distinctive qualities of earth, and so on, are due to a modification (parinâma) of the atoms. The Jainas further hold that the whole complex of things is of an ambiguous nature in so far as being existent and non-existent, permanent and non-permanent, separate and non-separate. To prove this they apply their so-called sapta-bhangî-nyâya ('the system of the seven paralogisms')--'May be, it is'; 'May be, it is not'; 'May be, it is and is not'; 'May be, it is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is not predicable'; 'May be, it is not, and is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is not, and is not predicable.' With the help of

this they prove that all things--which they declare to consist of substance (dravya), and paryâya--to be existing, one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite in so far as they are paryâyas. By paryâya they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence, and so on.--With regard to this the Sûtra remarks that no such proof is possible,'Not so, on account of the impossibility in one'; i.e. because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it--and (by the Jainas), called paryâya--are different things (padârtha), one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by one particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e. non-existence. The non-permanency, further, of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (bhinnatva) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. We have explained this matter at length, when--under Sûtra I, 1--refuting the bhedâbheda-theory. Time we are conscious of only as an attribute of substances (not as an independent substance), and the question as to its being and non-being, and so on, does not therefore call for a separate discussion. To speak of time as being and non-being in no way differs from generic characteristics (jâti), and so on, being spoken of in the same way; for--as we have explained before--of jâti and the like we are conscious only as attributes of substances.--But (the Jaina may here be supposed to ask the Vedântin), how can you maintain that Brahman, although one only, yet at the same time is the Self of all?--Because, we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on. And that the body and the person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that Brahman is not touched by the defects of his body), we have explained likewise.--Moreover, as your six substances, soul, and so on, are not one substance and one paryâya, their being one substance, and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one, and so on.--And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on), each owing to its own paryâya and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being of an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical.--Hence the theory of the Jainas is not reasonable. Moreover it is liable to the same objections which we have above set forth as applying to all theories of atoms constituting the universal cause, without the guidance of a Lord.

33. And likewise non-entireness of the Self.

On your view there would likewise follow non-entireness of the Self. For your opinion is that souls abide in numberless places, each soul having the same size as the body which it animates. When, therefore, the soul previously abiding in the body of an elephant or the like has to enter into a body of smaller size, e. g. that of an ant, it would follow that as the soul then occupies less space, it would not remain entire, but would become incomplete.--Let us then avoid this difficulty by assuming that the soul passes over into a different state--which process is called paryâya,--which it may manage because it is capable of contraction and dilatation.--To this the next Sûtra replies.

34. Nor also is there non-contradiction from paryâya; on account of change, and so on.

Nor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of the soul assuming a different condition through contraction or dilatation. For this would imply that the soul is subject to change, and all the imperfections springing from it, viz. non-permanence, and so on, and hence would not be superior to non-sentient things such as jars and the like.

35. And on account of the endurance of the final (size), and the (resulting) permanency of both; there is no difference.

The final size of the soul, i.e. the size it has in the state of Release, is enduring since the soul does not subsequently pass into another body; and both, i.e. the soul in the state of Release and the size of that soul, are permanent (nitya). From this it follows that that ultimate size is the true essential size of the soul and also belongs to it previously to Release. Hence there is no difference of sizes, and the soul cannot therefore have the size of its temporary bodies. The Ârhata theory is therefore untenable.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility in one.'

36. (The system) of the Lord (must be disregarded), on account of inappropriateness.

So far it has been shown that the doctrines of Kapila, Kanâda, Sugata, and the Arhat must be disregarded by men desirous of final beatitude; for those doctrines are all alike untenable and foreign to the Veda. The Sûtras now declare that, for the same reasons, the doctrine of Pasupati also has to be disregarded. The adherents of this view belong to four different classes--Kâpâlas, Kâlâmukhas, Pâsupatas, and Saivas. All of them hold fanciful theories of Reality which are in conflict with the Veda, and invent various means for attaining happiness in this life and the next. They maintain the general material cause and the operative cause to be distinct, and the latter cause to be constituted by Pasupati. They further hold the wearing of the six so-called 'mudrâ' badges and the like to be means to accomplish the highest end of man.