Reading section 46

Thus the Kâpâlas say, 'He who knows the true nature of the six mudrâs, who understands the highest mudrâ, meditating on himself as in the position called bhagâsana, reaches Nirvâna. The necklace, the golden ornament, the earring, the head-jewel, ashes, and the sacred thread are called the six mudrâs. He whose body is marked with these is not born here again.'--Similarly the Kâlâmukhas teach that the means for obtaining all desired results in this world as well as the next are constituted by certain practices--such as using a skull as a drinking vessel, smearing oneself with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar and using it as a platform for making offerings to the gods, and the like. 'A bracelet made of Rudrâksha-seeds on the arm, matted hair on the head, a skull, smearing oneself with ashes, &c.'--all this is well known from the sacred writings of the Saivas. They also hold that by some special ceremonial performance men of different castes may become Brâhmanas and reach the highest âsrama: 'by merely entering on the initiatory ceremony (dîkshâ) a man becomes a Brâhmana at once; by undertaking the kâpâla rite a man becomes at once an ascetic.'

With regard to these views the Sûtra says 'of pati, on account of inappropriateness.' A 'not' has here to be supplied from Sûtra 32. The system of Pasupati has to be disregarded because it is inappropriate, i. e. because the different views and practices referred to are opposed to one another and in conflict with the Veda. The different practices enumerated above, the wearing of the six mudrâs and so on, are opposed to each other; and moreover the theoretical assumptions of those people, their forms of devotion and their practices, are in conflict with the Veda. For the Veda declares that Nârâyana who is the highest Brahman is alone the operative and the substantial cause of the world, 'Nârâyana is the highest Brahman, Nârâyana is the highest Reality, Nârâyana is the highest light, Nârâyana is the highest Self'; 'That thought, may I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1), and so on. In the same way the texts declare meditation on the Supreme Person, who is the highest Brahman, to be the only meditation which effects final release; cp. 'I know that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). And in the same way all texts agree in declaring that the works subserving the knowledge of Brahman are only those sacrificial and other works which the Veda enjoins on men in the different castes and stages of life: 'Him Brâhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. Wishing for that world only, mendicants wander forth from their homes' (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 22). In some texts enjoining devout meditation, and so on, we indeed meet with terms such as Prajâpati, Siva, Indra, Âkâsa, Prâna, &c., but that these all refer to the supreme Reality established by the texts concerning Nârâyana--the aim of which texts it is to set forth the highest Reality in its purity--, we have already proved under I, 1, 30. In the same way we have proved under Sû. I, 1, 2 that in texts treating of the creation of the world, such as 'Being only this was in the beginning,' and the like, the words _Being_, _Brahman_, and so on, denote nobody else but Nârâyana, who is set forth as the universal creator in the account of creation given in the text, 'Alone indeed there was Nârâyana, not Brahmâ, not Isâna--he being alone did not rejoice' (Mahopanishad I).--As the Pasupati theory thus teaches principles, meditations and acts conflicting with the Veda, it must be disregarded.

37. And on account of the impossibility of rulership.

Those who stand outside the Veda arrive through inference at the conclusion that the Lord is a mere operative cause. This being so, they must prove the Lord's being the ruler (of the material cause) on the basis of observation. But it is impossible to prove that the Lord is the ruler of the Pradhâna in the same way as the potter e.g. is the ruler of the clay. For the Lord is without a body, while the power of ruling material causes is observed only in the case of embodied beings such as potters. Nor may you have recourse to the hypothesis of the Lord being embodied; for--as we have shown under I, 1, 3--there arise difficulties whether that body, which as body must consist of parts, be viewed as eternal or as non-eternal.

38. If you say, as in the case of the organs; we deny this, on account of enjoyment and so on.

It may possibly be said that, in the same way as the enjoying (individual) soul, although in itself without a body, is seen to rule the sense-organs, the body, and so on, the great Lord also, although without a body, may rule the Pradhâna. But this analogy cannot be allowed 'on account of enjoyment,' and so on. The body's being ruled by the soul is due to the unseen principle in the form of good and evil works, and has for its end the requital of those works. Your analogy would thus imply that the Lord also is under the influence of an unseen principle, and is requited for his good and evil works.--The Lord cannot therefore be a ruler.

39. Finiteness or absence of omniscience.

'Or' here has the sense of 'and.' If the Lord is under the influence of the adrishta, it follows that, like the individual soul, he is subject to creation, dissolution, and so on, and that he is not omniscient. The Pasupati theory cannot therefore be accepted.--It is true that the Sûtra, 'but in case of conflict (with Scripture) it is not to be regarded' (Pû. Mî. Sû. I, 3, 3), has already established the non-acceptability of all views contrary to the Veda; the present adhikarana, however, raises this question again in order specially to declare that the Pasupati theory _is_ contrary to the Veda. Although the Pâsupata and the Saiva systems exhibit some features which are not altogether contrary to the Veda, yet they are unacceptable because they rest on an assumption contrary to the Veda, viz. of the difference of the general, instrumental and material causes, and imply an erroneous interchange of higher and lower entities.-- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Pasupati.'

40. On account of the impossibility of origination.

The Sûtras now proceed to refute a further doubt, viz. that the Pañkarâtra tantra--which sets forth the means of attaining supreme beatitude, as declared by the Lord (Bhagavat)--may also be destitute of authority, in so far, namely, as belonging to the same class as the tantras of Kapila and others. The above Sûtra raises the doubt.

The theory of the Bhâgavatas is that from Vâsudeva, who is the highest Brahman and the highest cause, there originates the individual soul called Sankarshana; from Sankarshana the internal organ called Pradyumna; and from Pradyumna the principle of egoity called Aniruddha. Now this theory implies the origination of the individual soul, and this is contrary to Scripture. For scriptural texts declare the soul to be without a beginning--cp. 'the intelligent one is not born and does not die' (Ka. Up. II, 18), and other texts.

41. And there is not (origination) of the instrument from the agent.

'The internal organ called Pradyumna originates from Sankarshana,' i. e. the internal organ originates from the individual soul which is the agent. But this is inadmissible, since the text 'from him there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) declares that the mind also springs from none else but the highest Brahman. As the Bhâgavata doctrine thus teaches things opposed to Scripture, its authoritativeness cannot be admitted.--Against these objections the next Sûtra declares itself.

42. Or, if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on, there is no contradiction to that (i.e. the Bhâgavata doctrine).

The 'or' sets aside the view previously maintained. By 'that which is knowledge and so on' [FOOTNOTE 524:1] we have to understand the highest Brahman. If Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are of the nature of the highest Brahman, then truly there can be no objection to a body of doctrine which sets forth this relation. The criticism that the Bhâgavatas teach an inadmissible origination of the individual soul, is made by people who do not understand that system. What it teaches is that the highest Brahman, there called Vâsudeva, from kindness to those devoted to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render itself accessible to its devotees. Thus it is said in the Paushkara- samhitâ, 'That which enjoins that Brahmanas have to worship, under its proper names, the fourfold nature of the Self; that is the authoritative doctrine.' That this worship of that which is of a fourfold nature means worship of the highest Brahman, called Vâsudeva, is declared in the Sâtvata-samhitâ, 'This is the supreme sâstra, the great Brahmopanishad, which imparts true discrimination to Brahmawas worshipping the real Brahman under the name of Vâsudeva.' That highest Brahman, called Vâsudeva, having for its body the complete aggregate of the six qualities, divides itself in so far as it is either the 'Subtle' (sûkshma), or 'division' (vyûha), or 'manifestation' (vibhava), and is attained in its fulness by the devotees who, according to their qualifications, do worship to it by means of works guided by knowledge. 'From the worship of the vibhava-aspect one attains to the vyûha, and from the worship of the vyûha one attains to the "Subtile" called Vâsudeva, i.e. the highest Brahman'--such is their doctrine. By the 'vibhava' we have to understand the aggregate of beings, such as Rama, Krishna, &c., in whom the highest Being becomes manifest; by the 'vyûha' the fourfold arrangement or division of the highest Reality, as Vâsudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha; by the 'Subtle' the highest Brahman itself, in so far as it has for its body the mere aggregate of the six qualities--as which it is called 'Vâsudeva.' Compare on this point the Paushkara, 'That body of doctrine through which, by means of works based on knowledge, one fully attains to the imperishable highest Brahman, called Vâsudeva,' and so on, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are thus mere bodily forms which the highest Brahman voluntarily assumes. Scripture already declares, 'Not born he is born in many ways,' and it is this birth--consisting in the voluntary assumption of bodily form, due to tenderness towards its devotees--which the Bhâgavata system teaches; hence there lies no valid objection to the authoritativeness of that system. And as Sankarshana. Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual souls, internal organs and organs of egoity, there can be no objection to their being themselves denoted by those latter terms, viz. individual soul, and so on. The case is analogous to that of Brahman being designated, in some texts, by terms such as ether, breath, and the like.

[FOOTNOTE 524:1. Or 'by that which is knowledge and cause.']

43. And on account of contradiction.

The origination of the jîva is, moreover, distinctly controverted in the books of the Bhâgavatas also. Thus in the Parama-samhitâ 'The nature of Prakriti consists therein that she is non-sentient, for the sake of another, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself the three gunas and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all agents. With her the soul (purusha) is connected in the way of inseparable association; that soul is known to be truly without beginning and without end.' And as all Samhitas make similar statements as to the eternity of the soul, the Pañkarâtra doctrine manifestly controverts the view of the essential nature of the jiva being something that originates. How it is possible that in the Veda as well as in common life the soul is spoken of as being born, dying, &c., will be explained under Sû. II, 3, 17. The conclusion, therefore, is that the Bhâgavata system also denies the origination of the soul, and that hence the objections raised on this ground against its authoritativeness are without any force. Another objection is raised by some. Sândilya, they argue, is said to have promulgated the Pañkarâtra doctrine because he did not find a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines, and this implies that the Pañkarâtra is opposed to the Veda.--his objection, we reply, springs from nothing else but the mere unreasoning faith of men who do not possess the faintest knowledge of the teachings of the Veda, and have never considered the hosts of arguments which confirm that teaching. When the Veda says, 'Morning after morning those speak untruth who make the Agnihotra offering before sunrise,' it is understood that the censure there passed on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering after sunrise. We meet with a similar case in the 'bhûma-vidyâ' (Ch. Up. VII, 2). There at the beginning Nârada says, 'I know the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sâma-veda, the Âtharvana as the fourth, the Itihâsa- purâna as the fifth,' and so on, enumerating all the various branches of knowledge, and finally summing up 'with all this I know the mantras only, I do not know the Self.' Now this declaration of the knowledge of the Self not being attainable through any branch of knowledge except the knowledge of the Bhûman evidently has no other purpose but to glorify this latter knowledge, which is about to be expounded. Or else Nârada's words refer to the fact that from the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines he had not obtained the knowledge of the highest Reality. Analogous to this is the case of Sândilya's alleged objection to the Veda. That the Bhâgavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense of the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared in the Paramasamhita,'I have read the Vedas at length, together with all the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot see a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to blessedness, whereby I might reach perfection'; and 'The wise Lord Hari, animated by kindness for those devoted to him, extracted the essential meaning of all the Vedânta-texts and condensed it in an easy form.' The incontrovertible fact then is as follows. The Lord who is known from the Vedânta-texts, i.e. Vâsudeva, called there the highest Brahman--who is antagonistic to all evil, whose nature is of uniform excellence, who is an ocean, as it were, of unlimited exalted

qualities, such as infinite intelligence, bliss, and so on, all whose purposes come true--perceiving that those devoted to him, according as they are differently placed in the four castes and the four stages of life, are intent on the different ends of life, viz. religious observances, wealth, pleasure, and final release; and recognising that the Vedas--which teach the truth about his own nature, his glorious manifestations, the means of rendering him propitious and the fruits of such endeavour--are difficult to fathom by all beings other than himself, whether gods or men, since those Vedas are divided into Rik, Yajus, Sâman, and Atharvan; and being animated by infinite pity, tenderness, and magnanimity; with a view to enable his devotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas, himself composed the Pañkarâtra-sâstra. The author of the Sûtras (Vyâsa)--who first composed the Sûtras, the purport of which it is to set forth the arguments establishing the Vedânta doctrine, and then the Bhârata-samhitâ (i.e. the Mahâbhârata) in a hundred thousand slokas in order to support thereby the teaching of the Veda--himself says in the chapter called Mokshadharma, which treats of knowledge, 'If a householder, or a Brahmakârin, or a hermit, or a mendicant wishes to achieve success, what deity should he worship?' and so on; explains then at great length the Pañkarâtra system, and then says, 'From the lengthy Bhârata story, comprising one hundred thousand slokas, this body of doctrine has been extracted, with the churning-staff of mind, as butter is churned from curds--as butter from milk, as the Brahmana from men, as the Âranyaka from the Vedas, as Amrita from medicinal herbs.--This great Upanishad, consistent with the four Vedas, in harmony with Sânkhya and Yoga, was called by him by the name of Pañkarâtra. This is excellent, this is Brahman, this is supremely beneficial. Fully agreeing with the Rik, the Yajus, the Sâman, and the Atharvân-giras, this doctrine will be truly authoritative.' The terms Sânkhya and Yoga here denote the concentrated application of knowledge and of works. As has been said, 'By the application of knowledge on the part of the Sânkhya, and of works on the part of the Yogins.' And in the Bhîshmaparvan we read, 'By Brahmanas, Kshattriyas, Vaisyas and Sûdras, Mâdhava is to be honoured, served and worshipped--he who was proclaimed by Sankarshana in agreement with the Sâtvata law.'--How then could these utterances of Bâdarâyana, the foremost among all those who understand the teaching of the Veda, be reconciled with the view that in the Sûtras he maintains the non- authoritativeness of the Sâtvata doctrine, the purport of which is to teach the worship of, and meditation on, Vâsudeva, who is none other than the highest Brahman known from the Vedânta-texts?

But other passages in the Mahâbhârata, such as 'There is the Sânkhya, the Yoga, the Pañkarâtra, the Vedas, and the Pasupata doctrine; do all these rest on one and the same basis, or on different ones?' and so on, declare that the Sânkhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard, while yet in the Sârîraka Sûtras those very same doctrines are formally refuted. Why, therefore, should not the same hold good in the case of the Bhâgavata doctrine?--Not so, we reply. In the Mahâbhârata also Bâdarayana applies to the Sânkhya and other doctrines the same style of reasoning as in the Sûtras. The question, asked in the passage quoted, means 'Do the Sânkhya, the Yoga, the Pasupata, and the Pañkarâtra set forth one and the same reality, or different ones? If the former, what is that reality? If the latter, they convey contradictory doctrines, and, as reality is not something which may be optionally assumed to be either such or such, one of those doctrines only can be acknowledged as authoritative, and the question then arises which is to be so acknowledged?'--The answer to the question is given in the passage beginning, 'Know, O royal Sage, all those different views. The promulgator of the Sânkhya is Kapila,' &c. Here the human origin of the Sânkhya, Yoga, and Pâsupata is established on the ground of their having been produced by Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and Pasupati. Next the clause 'Aparântatamas is said to be the teacher of the Vedas' intimates the non- human character of the Vedas; and finally the clause 'Of the whole Pañkarâtra, Nârâyana himself is the promulgator' declares that Nârâyana himself revealed the Pañkarâtra doctrine. The connected purport of these different clauses is as follows. As the systems of human origin set forth doctrines mutually contradictory, and, moreover, teach what is in conflict with the matter known from the Veda--which, on account of its non-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other imperfections--they cannot be accepted as authoritative with regard to anything not depending on human action and choice. Now the matter to be known from the Veda is Nârâyana, who is none other than the highest Brahman. It hence follows that the entities set forth in those different systems--the pradhâna, the soul (purusha), Pasupati, and so on--have to be viewed as real only in so far as Nârâyana, i.e. the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedânta-texts, constitutes their Self. This the text directly declares in the passage, 'In all those doctrines it is seen, in accordance with tradition and reasoning, that the lord Narayawa is the only basis.' This means--'To him who considers the entities set forth in those systems with the help of argumentation, it is evident that Nârâyana alone is the basis of all those entities.' In other words, as the entities set forth in those systems are not Brahman, any one who remembers the teaching of texts such as 'all this indeed is Brahman,' 'Nârâyana is all,' which declare Brahman to be the Self of all, comes to the conclusion that Nârâyana alone is the basis of those entities. As thus it is settled that the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedânta- texts, or Nârâyana, himself is the promulgator of the entire Pañkarâtra, and that this system teaches the nature of Nârâyana and the proper way of worshipping him, none can disestablish the view that in the Pañkarâtra all the other doctrines are comprised. For this reason the Mahâbhârata says, 'Thus the Sânkhya-yoga and the Veda

and the Âranyaka, being members of one another, are called the Pañkarâtra,' i.e. the Sânkhya, the Yoga, the Vedas, and the Âranyakas, which are members of one another because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth one Truth, together are called the Pañkarâtra.--The Sânkhya explains the twenty-five principles, the Yoga teaches certain practices and means of mental concentration, and the Âranyakas teach that all the subordinate principles have their true Self in Brahman, that the mental concentration enjoined in the Yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman, and that the rites and works which are set forth in the Veda are means to win the favour of Brahman--thus giving instruction as to Brahman's nature. Now all these elements, in their inward connexion, are clearly set forth in the Pañkarâtra by the highest Brahman, i.e. Nârâyana, himself. The Sârîraka Sâstra (i.e. the Vedânta) does not disprove the principles assumed by the Sânkhyas, but merely the view of their not having Brahman for their Self; and similarly in its criticism on the Yoga and Pâsupata systems, it merely refutes the view of the Lord being a mere instrumental cause, the erroneous assumptions as to the relative position of higher and lower entities, and certain practices not warranted by the Veda; but it does not reject the Yoga itself, nor again the lord Pâsupati. Hence Smriti says,' The Sânkhya, the Yoga, the Pañkarâtra, the Vedas, and the Psupata doctrine--all these having their proof in the Self may not be destroyed by arguments.' The essential points in all these doctrines are to be adopted, not to be rejected absolutely as the teaching of Jina. or Sugata is to be rejected. For, as said in the Smriti text quoted above, in all those doctrines it is seen, according to tradition and reasoning, that the lord Nârâyana is the only basis.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of origination.'

THIRD PÂDA.

1. Not Ether; on account of the absence of scriptural statement.

We have demonstrated that the Sânkhya-system and other systems standing outside the Veda are untenable since they rest on fallacious reasoning and are self-contradictory. In order to prove that our own view is altogether free from all objections of this kind, we shall now explain in detail the mode in which this world, with all its sentient and non- sentient beings, is produced by Brahman, whom we hold to be the general creator.

The first doubt here presenting itself is whether Ether be something produced or not.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains that it is not produced, since there is no scriptural statement to that effect. A scriptural statement may be expected with regard to what is possible; but what is impossible--as e.g. the origination of a sky-flower or of Ether--cannot possibly be taught by Scripture. For the origination of Ether, which is not made up of parts and is all pervasive, cannot be imagined in any way. For this very reason, i.e. the impossibility of the thing, the Chandogya, in its account of creation, mentions the origination of fire, water, &c. only (but not of Ether)--'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' 'It sent forth fire,' and so on. When therefore the Taittirîya, the Atharvana, and other texts tell us that Ether did originate--'From that Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'From him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, Ether, air, light, water,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1, 4)--such statements are contrary to sense, and hence refute themselves.-- To this the Sûtra replies.