Reading section 4

From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first pâdas of the Vedánta-sûtras comprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important doubtful--passages from the Chândogya Upanishad. These passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain Chândogya passage is followed by a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sûtras into adhikara/n/as adopted by Râmânuja, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sûtras.

The fourth pâda of the first adhyâya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sâ@nkhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the /S/rî-bhâshya than by /S/a@nkara--in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world.

Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sûtrakâra of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the passages referred to in the first adhyâya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras are throughout Mîmâ/m/sâ i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a primâ facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their meaning. Here and there we meet with Sutrâs which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutrâs to assume that a whole adhyâya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara/n/as; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/n/as of the first adhyâya are occupied. That the Vedânta-sûtras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sâ@nkhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth adhikara/n/a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhâna, and the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya returns to an express polemic against Sâ@nkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyâya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sûtrakâra, to guard his own doctrine against Sâ@nkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sâ@nkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious--and actually attempted--to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages. The Sâ@nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedântin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhâna or some product of the pradhâna, or else to the purusha in the Sânkhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedântin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyâya of the Vedânta-sûtras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sûtrakára; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sûtras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the intricacies of the Mîmâ/m/sâ, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.

Notes:

[Footnote 1: The only 'sectarian' feature of the Srî-bhâshya is, that identifies Brahman with Vish/n/u or Nârâya/n/a; but this in no way affects the interpretations put on the Sûtras and Upanishads. Nârâya/n/a is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.]

[Footnote 2: The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara/n/a; the figures in parentheses state the Sûtras comprised in each adhikara/n/a.]

[Footnote 3: Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage conveying the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by all commentators; in the second place, /S/a@nkara in the passage immediately preceding Sûtra 12 quotes the adhikara/n/a 'ânandamayo s bhyâsàt' as giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in that part of the bhâshya which sets forth the former explanation, but only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates the latter interpretation.]

[Footnote 4: Eva/m/ jij/ñ/anasya brahma/nas/ /ko/tanabhogvabhutaga/d/arupsattvara, istamomayapradhânâd vyâv/ri/ttir uktâ, idânî/m/ karmava/s/vat trigu/n/atmakaprik/ri/u sa/m/sangammittanâmâvidhân intadukhasagaranimajjaonî/s/addhâ/h/. /k/i pratya gaumano nyan nikhilaheyapratauîka/m/ miatimyanandam brahmeti pratipadyate, anandamayo bhyásât.]

[Footnote 5: There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra ke/k/it' in /S/a@nkara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p. 30). It simply contains a criticism passed by /S/a@nkara on other commentators.]

[Footnote 6: To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the remark made in the preceding note.]

[Footnote 7: Gîvaysa iva parasyâpi brahma/n/a/h/ /s/arîrantarvaititvam abhyupagata/m/ /k/et tadvad eva /s/arîrasainbandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir hi /k/en na, hetuvai/s/eshyat, na hi /s/arîrântarvartitvam eva sukhadukhopabhogahetu/h/ api tu pu/n/yapàparnpakarmaparavasatva/m/ ta/k/ /K/àpahatapâpmana/h/ parahâtmano na sambhavati.]

[Footnote 8: The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the Sanskrit text (beginning with apara âha) Deussen considers to be an interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi upanishad in /S/a@nkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason whatsoever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that /S/a@nkara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only in case of its having been quoted before by /S/a@nkara himself.--That the 'apara' quotes the B/ri/hadára/n/yaka not according to the Ka/n/va text--to quote from which is /S/a@nkara's habit--but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the circumstance of his being an 'apara,' i.e. not /S/a@nkara.]

[Footnote 9: Ita/s/ /k/aitad evam. Anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/a. Tasya daharâkâsasya parabrahma/n/o snukârâd ayam apahatapâpmatvâdigu/n/ako vimuktabandha/h/ pratyagâtmâ na daharakâ/s/a/h/ tadanukâras tatsâmya/m/ tathâ hi pratyagâlmanozpi vimuktasya parabrahmânukâra/h/ srûyate yadâ pa/s/ya/h/ pa/s/yate rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartâram î/s/a/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tadâ vidvân pu/n/yapâpe vidhûya nira/ñg/ana/h/ parama/m/ sâmyam upaitîty atos'nukartâ prajâpativâkyanirdish/t/a/h/ anukârya/m/ para/m/ brahma na daharâkâ/s/a/h/. Api /k/a smaryate. Sa/m/sâri/n/oszpi muktâvasthâyâ/m/ paramasâmyâpattilaksha/n/a/h/ parabrahmânukâra/h/ smaryate ida/m/ j/ñ/ânam upâsritya, &c.--Ke/k/id anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/âpi smaryate iti /k/a sûtradvayam adhikara/n/ântara/m/ tam eva bhântam anubhâti sarva/m/ tasya bhâsâ sarvam ida/m/ vibhâtîty asyâ/h/ /s/rute/h/ parabrahmaparatvanir/n/ayâya prav/ri/tta/m/ vadanti. Tat tv ad/ris/yatvâdigu/n/ako dharmokte/h/ dyubhvâdyâyatana/m/ sva/s/abdâd ity adhi kara/n/advayena tasya prakara/n/asya brahmavishayatvapratipâdanât jyoti/sk/ara/n/âbhidhânât ity âdishu parasya brahma/n/o bhârûpatvâvagates /k/a pûrvapakshânutthânâd ayukta/m/ sûtrâksharavairûpya/k/ /k/a.]

[Footnote 10: Yadi paramâtmâ na bhoktâ eva/m/ taihi bhokt /i/tayâ pratîyamâno jîva eva syâd ity âsankyâha attâ.]

[Footnote 11: Sthânâdivyapade/s/â/k/ /k/a ity atra ya/h/ /k/akshushi tish/th/ann ity âdinâ pratipâdyamâna/m/ /k/akshushi sthitiniyamanâdika/m/ paramâtmana eveti siddha/m/ k/ri/tvâ akshipurushasya paramâtmatva/m/ sâdhitam idâni/m/ tad eva samarthayate antaryâû.]

[Footnote 12: Ânandamaya/h/ I, 1, 12; anta/h/ I, i, 20; âkâ/s/a/h/ I, 1, 22; prâna/h/ I, 1, 23; jyoti/h/ I, 1, 24; prâna/h/ I, 1, 28; attâ I, 2, 9; guhâ/m/ pravish/t/au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2,13; antaryâmî I, 2, 18; ad/ris/yatvâdigu/n/aka/h/ I, 2, 21; vai/s/vânara/h/ I, 2, 24; dyubhvâdyâyatanam I, 3, 1; bhûmâ I, 3, 8; aksheram I, 3, 10; sa/h/ I, 3, 13; dahara/h/ I, 3, 14; pramita/h/ I, 3, 24; (jyoti/h/ 40;) âkâ/s/a/h/ I, 3,41.]

SECOND ADHYÂYA.

The first adhyâya has proved that all the Vedânta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedânta, more especially the Sâ@nkhya system. The task of the two first pâdas of the second adhyâya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedânta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedânta can be satisfactorily established.

PÂDA I.

Adhikara/n/a I refutes the Sâ@nkhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedânta system involves the rejection of the Sâ@nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Sm/ri/ti, and as such has claims on consideration.--To accept the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, the Vedântin replies, would compel us to reject other Sm/ri/tis, such as the Manu-sm/ri/ti, which are opposed to the Sâ@nkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of Sm/ri/tis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, but rather those Sm/ri/tis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause.

Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-sm/ri/ti.

Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby become simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those causes.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal substance participating in the same characteristics.

Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the preceding adhikara/n/a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.

The one Sûtra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to /S/a@nkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.--The /S/rî-bhâshya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sûtra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Râmânuja's view, the Sûtra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Râmânuja puts on the Sûtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sûtra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears from a quotation made by Râmànuja from the Drami/d/abhâshyakâra[13].

Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedânta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause.--The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sûtrakîra remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sûtras constituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Râmânuja on the other is characteristic. Râmânuja throughout simply follows the words of the Sûtras, of which Sûtra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sûtra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sûtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to /S/a@nkara, because the world is unreal; according to Râmânuja, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.

PÂDA II.

The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.--The first adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vij/ñ/ânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.--The last Sûtra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Râmânuja as a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikara/n/a of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas or Pâ/ñk/arâtras. But /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja totally disagree as to the drift of the Sûtrakâra's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.--Sûtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sûtra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to /S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42 against the Bhâgavata doctrine).'--According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the Sûtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/ñk/arâtra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pâ/ñk/arâtra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the Sûtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'vâ' and of the 'tat,' implied in Râmânuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of objections--has to be viewed as the true one.

PÂDA III.

The third pâda discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the pâda is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the jîva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This Sûtra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Râmânuja on the other. According to the former, the jîva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Râmânuja, the jîva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakâra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikâsa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarûpânyathâbhâva) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.