Reading section 7

Sûtras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Râmânuja, the question when the vidyâ, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises. Sûtra 51 treats of that vidyâ whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmântara (in which latter case the vidyâ arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various passages).'--Sûtra 52, 'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an obstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sûtras as two adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyâs.

Notes:

[Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them 'anuvâdena,' and finally negative them.]

[Footnote 17: Râmânuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a mâtâpit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sâstra/m/ pratârakavad apâramârthikau nirasanîyau gu/n/au pramâ/n/ântarâpratipannau âdare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sâra/k/akraparivartanena pûrvam eva bambhramyamânân mumukshûn bhûyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']

[Footnote 18: The /S/rî-bh­âshya as well as several other commentaries reads tadbhâvabhâvitvât for /S/an@kara's tadbhâvâbhâvitvât.]

FOURTH ADHYÂYA. PÂDA I.

Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Âtman enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be repeated again and again.

Adhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the so-called pratîkopâsanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety upâsîta) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to consider the pratîka as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. IV (5).--In the pratîkopâsanas the pratîka is to be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the pratîka.--Râmânuja takes Sûtra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived at under Sûtra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new adhikara/n/a.

Adhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evâsau tapati tam udgîtham upâsîta) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance, the udgîtha is to be viewed as Âditya, not Âditya as the udgîtha.

Adhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a sitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sûtra gives no hint to that effect.

Adhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until death.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.

Adhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvân is no longer affected by the consequences of either past or future evil deeds.

Adhik. X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal translation of the Sûtra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the vidvân) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place).' The last words of the Sûtra, 'but on the fall,' are separated by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sûtra and interpreted to mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvân, who through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of works).'--According to Râmânuja the whole Sûtra simply means, 'There is likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is reached), but on the death of the vidvân[19].'

Adhik. XI (15).--The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anârabdhakârya works, i.e. those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend to the ârabdhakârya works on which the present existence of the devotee depends.

Adhik. XII (16, 17).--From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so, for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of knowledge.

Adhik. XIII (18).--The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the upâsanas referring to the different members of those works.

Adhik. XIV (19).--The ârabdhakârya works have to be worked out fully by the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvân becomes united with Brahman.--The 'bhoga' of the Sûtra is, according to /S/a@nkara, restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would lead to future embodiments. According to Râmânuja a number of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the ârabdhakârya works are exhausted.

PÂDA II.

This and the two remaining pâdas of the fourth adhyâya describe the fate of the vidvân after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to distinguish the vidvân who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvân who knows only the lower Brahman, and have to refer certain Sûtras to the former and others to the latter. According to Râmânuja the vidvân is one only.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).--On the death of the vidvân (i.e. of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (prâ/n/a), the vital air in the individual soul (jîva), the soul in the subtle elements.--According to Râmânuja the combination (sampatti) of the senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a merging (laya).

Adhik. IV (7).--The vidvân (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvân, i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle elements, and so on into the nâ/d/îs.--The vidvân also remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet completely destroyed avidyâ, so that the immortality which Scripture ascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvân abhya/s/nute) is only a relative one.--Râmânuja quotes the following text regarding the immortality of the vidvân:

'Yadâ sarve pramu/k/yante kâmâ yessya h/ri/di sthitâ/h/ atha martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,'

and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvân as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the destruction--mentioned in the preceding pâda--of all the effects of good and evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.

Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with the highest deity (teja/h/ parasyâ/m/ devatâyâm) are completely merged in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on the other hand, as long as the sa/m/sâra state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new bodies for the soul.

According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 8-11 do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul from the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sâra, i.e. embodiedness up to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tâvad eva /k/ira/m/ yâvan na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).--That the soul after having departed from the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority[20] (9).--Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the body (10).

Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.--According to /S/a@nkara the Sûtras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidyâ) the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman.--Against this latter implied doctrine Sûtra 12 is supposed to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the prâ/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, na tasya prâ/n/a utkrâmanti, of him the prâ/n/as do not pass out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "tasya" has the sense of the ablative "tasmât," so that the sense of the passage is, "from him, i.e. from the jîva of the dying sage, the prâ/n/as do not depart, but remain with it."'--This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed of in Sûtra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure of the prâ/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 11, where Yâj/ñ/avalkya instructs Ârtabhâga that, when this man dies, the prâ/n/as do not depart from it (asmât; the context showing that asmât means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not 'from him,' viz. the jîva).--The same view is, moreover, confirmed by Sm/ri/ti passages.

According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into two Sûtras. The topic continuing to be discussed is the utkrânti of the vidvân. If, Sûtra 12 says, the utkrânti of the prâ/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to be contained in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the tasya there is '/s/ârîrât' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e. the jîva, the prâ/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. the Mâdhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmât.'--With reference to the instruction given by Yâj/ñ/avalkya to Ârtabhâga, it is to be remarked that nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows Brahman.--And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the sage also when dying departs from the body.

Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his prâ/n/as, elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from it in any way.

According to Râmânuja the two Sûtras continue the teaching about the prâ/n/as, bhûtas, &c. of the vidvân in general, and declare that they are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction (sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21]

Adhik. IX (17).--/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the aparâ vidyâ, while Râmânuja continues the description of the utkrânti of his vidvân.--The jîva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the body by means of the ná/d/is; the vidvân by means of the nâ/d/i called sushum/n/â, the avidvân by means of some other nâ/d/î.

Adhik. X (18, 19).--The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.

Adhik. XI (20, 21).--Also that vidvân who dies during the dakshi/n/âyana reaches Brahman.

PÂDA III.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvân up to Brahman.

Adhik. IV (4-6)--By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead the soul on.

The remaining part of the pâda is by /S/a@nkara divided into two adhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (kârya) or qualified (/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sûtras 7-11 by Bâdari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sûtra 14. In Sûtras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to which the soul of the vidvân goes to the highest Brahman, not to the kâryam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part of the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere pûrvapaksha, while Bâdari's opinion represents the siddhânta.--The latter of the two adhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pâda; 15, 16) records the opinion of Bâdarâya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a pratîka form.

According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which the views of Bâdari and of Jaimini represent two pûrvapakshas, while Bâdarâya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhânta. The question is whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the effected Brahman, i.e. Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from Prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagâtmâna/m/ prak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmâtmakam upâsate).--The first view is maintained by Bâdari in Sûtra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as such omnipresent Brahman.--The explanation of Sûtra 9 is similar to that of /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if Hira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a mânava/h/ sa etân brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etân brahmâ/n/am gamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.--The explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also of l2-l4.--The siddhânta view is established in Sûtra 13, 'It is the opinion of Bâdarâya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratîka, i.e. those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the individual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratîkas. For both views--that of Jaimini as well as that of Bâdari--are faulty.' The kârya view contradicts such passages as 'asmâ/k/ charîrât samutthâya para/m/ jyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those who know the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, are also led up to Brahman.

PÂDA IV.

Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the parâ vidyâ, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Râmânuja is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvân whose going to Brahman had been described in the preceding pâda.

Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhâga, non-separation. This, on /S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According to Râmânuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhûta) from Brahman, or as non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat tvam asi and the like.[22]

Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapâpmatva, satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to Bâdarâyana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul vyavahârâpekshayâ).

Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the aparâ vidyâ, and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former alternative is accepted--According to Râmânuja the adhikara/n/a simply continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa (it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive him.'

Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied according to their wish and will.

Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate several bodies at the same time.--Sûtra 12 gives, according to /S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the state of deep sleep (svâpyaya = sushupti), or to the fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Râmânuja explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti = mata/n/am according to 'vân manasi sampadyate,' &c.).

Adhik. VII (17-21).--The released jîvas participate in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of embodied existence.

After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the contents of the Brahma-sûtras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as well as Râmânuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two modes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely approximates to the true meaning of the Sûtras. That few of the Sûtras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above; but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.

We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous discrepancies,--of which only the more important ones have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,--the two commentators are at one as to the general drift of the Sûtras and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sûtras. This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the meaning of the Sûtras on which the bulk of the interpretations of /S/a@nkara as well as of Râmânuja are based.

But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja diverge more or less widely, and that the Sûtras affected thereby are, most of them, especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the Vedânta system. The question then remains which of the two interpretations is entitled to preference.

Regarding a small number of Sûtras I have already (in the conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that Râmânuja's explanation appears to be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal meaning of a Sûtra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands. To exemplify this remark, I again direct attention to all those Sûtras which in clear terms represent the individual soul as something different from the highest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to have recourse to the plea of the Sûtra referring, not to what is true in the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that /S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the Sûtras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr. Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires convincing proofs before it can be allowed.--We have had, in the second place, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sûtras concerning whose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja disagree altogether; and we have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by the 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jîva, and where Râmânuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to /S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole adhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sûtras. The adhikara/n/a is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the question what kind of Vedânta is embodied in Bâdarâya/n/a's work.

But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a few detached Sûtras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the Vedânta-sûtras as a whole to the chief distinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Râmânuja. Such an attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the conclusion that the Sûtras do not teach particular doctrines found in them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.