Reading section 49

Notes:

[Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhâna. Sâ. Kâ. 12, 13.]

[Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sâ. Kâ. 3.]

[Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sâ. Kâ. 15: Sâ. Sûtras I, 189 ff.]

[Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter.]

[Footnote 318: As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhâna.]

[Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.]

[Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also.' Bhâ.]

[Footnote 321: Sa/m/sargapûrvakatvaprasa@nga iti gu/n/ânâ/m/ sa/m/s/ri/sh/t/ânekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]

[Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).]

[Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of perception.--Pratyakshatvâbhâve katham âtmasiddhir ity âsa@nkya anumânâd ity âha, prav/ri/ttîti. Anumânasiddhasya /k/etanasya na pravr/i/ttyâ/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakâra/h/. Katham anumânam ity apekshâyâ/m/ tatprakâra/m/; sû/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/ prâ/n/âdimattvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.--Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sâdhyavati pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyâpy upalaksha/n/am, anpanyâso na vyabhi/k/ârabhûmin ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.]

[Footnote 327: Anâdheyâti/s/ayasya sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâti/s/aya/s/ûnyasyety artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhâna aims--ex hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]

[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.]

[Footnote 330: T/ri/tîyes'pi katipaya/s/abdâdyupalabdhir vâ samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye sarveshâm ekadaiva mukti/h/ syâd iti manvâno dvitîya/m/ pratyâha ubhayârthateti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ânanda Giri omit sa/m/sârânu/kkh/edât; the Bhâmatî's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edât.]

[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhâna's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhâna acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]

[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpâdâyoga/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]

[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, aha@nkâra, and manas.]

[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.]

[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedântin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.]

[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.]

[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedântin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavahârika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]

[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.]

[Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sâ@nkhya dogma of the soul's essential purity.]

[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]

[Footnote 343: Âtmanas tapte sattve pratibîmitatvâd yuktâ taptir iti /s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.]

[Footnote 345: The Sâ@nkhya Pûrvapakshin had objected to the Vedânta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.--The Vedântin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sâ@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.]

[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.]

[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which--according to the Sâ@nkhya also--release depends.]

[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and pradhâna may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]

[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.]

[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 20.]

[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.]

[Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]

[Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]

[Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those atoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity which make them enter into conjunction.]

[Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]

[Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]

[Footnote 358: The first of the three Sûtras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vai/s/eshika-sûtras, only the following words, 'Kâra/n/abahutvâ/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sûtra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.--According to the Vai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.--The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to pra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskâra on Vai/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 9; 10.]

[Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedântin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non-intelligent world.]

[Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts.]

[Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.--Ad/ri/sh/t/âpeksham ad/ri/sh/t/avatkshetraj/ñ/asa/my/ogâpeksham iti yâvat. Ãn. Gi.]

[Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul is joined to an internal organ.]

[Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]

[Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because sa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by samavâya.]

[Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction.]

[Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavâya and sa/m/yoga from the terms which they connect.]

[Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavâya relation to their substrates.]

[Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sûtras read 'pratishedhabhâva/h/;' but as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhâbhâva/h/' I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Ânandagiri's explanation: Kâryam anityam iti kârye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syâd yadi kâra/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/ânâ/m/ nityateti sûtrârtha/h/.]

[Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary aggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima perceptibilia.]

[Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or destroyed.]

[Footnote 371: This according to the Vedânta view. If atoms existed they might have originated from avidyâ by a mere pari/n/âma and might again be dissolved into avidyâ, without either disintegration or destruction of their cause taking place.]

[Footnote 372: The Sâ@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as being the pradhâna in various forms.--There is no need of assuming with Govindânanda that by the Sâ@nkhya of the text we have to understand the Vedânta.]