Reading section 20

[Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the offering of the prayâjas is to the dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place.]

[Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering (titikshâ), attention and concentration of the mind (samâdhâna), and faith (/s/raddhâ).]

[Footnote 56: According to Pâ/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.]

[Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grâma/m/ ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and result coincide.]

[Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the Brahma-mîmâ/m/sâ, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief attributes.]

[Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the Nyâya, the Sâ@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.]

[Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in the beginning,' &c.]

[Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to Ân. Gi. and Go.; the Bhâ. proposes another less plausible division.]

[Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhâvavikârâ/h/ are: origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.]

[Footnote 63: The pradhâna, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal matter of the world in the /S/â@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhâna has been left untranslated. Cp. Sâ@nkhya Kârikâ 3.]

[Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sâri/n/am evâgamâj jagaddhetum â/k/akshate. Ânanada Giri.]

[Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.]

[Footnote 66: Âtmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical connection (vâkya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ.]

[Footnote 68: The so-called sâkshâtkâra of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.]

[Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial post.']

[Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/âstras were not of a different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/âstras; if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.]

[Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the third that is independent of either.]

[Footnote 72: Ânanda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is: p/ri/thagjij/ñ/âsâvishayatvâ/k/ /k/a dharmâdyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/ brahma/n/o yuktam ityâha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapâ/th/e dharmâdyasparse karmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetûk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows Govindânanda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvâd ity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan nâmâlpe vastuny âlambane sâmânyena kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampâdanam. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both.]

[Footnote 75: Adhyâsa/h/ /s/âstratoitasmi/m/s taddhî/h/. Sampadi sampâdyamânasya prâdhânyenânudhyânam, adhyâse tu âlambanasyeti vi/s/esha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/ sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vâyau prâ/n/e /k/a da/s/â/s/âgata/m/ jagad dar/s/ayati yathâ jîvâtmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyayâ brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvâyaphalâyakalpata iti. Bhâmati.]

[Footnote 77: The butter used in the upâ/ms/uyâja is ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman.]

[Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from the two preceding hypotheses.]

[Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/ karoti), things to be obtained (grâma/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrîhîn prokshati).]

[Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.]

[Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.]

[Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established?]

[Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural motives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.]

[Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.]

[Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, 'a Brâhma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean 'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brâhma/n/a is to be formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression 'a non-Brâhma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word 'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.]

[Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.]

[Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.]

[Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.]

[Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.]

[Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhâna.]

[Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.]

[Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle independent of Sattva.]

[Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktânupapatlim nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthâbhâvât pratyayârthâbhâvâd vâ brahma/n/o sarvaj/ñ/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti. Prathama/m/ pratyâha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvârâ viyz/rin/oti anityatve hîti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/ñ/âneti. Svato nityasyâpi j/ñ/ânasya tattadarthâva/kkh/innasya kâryatvât tatra svâtantryam pratyayârtho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatîty âha.--The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the verbal affix in 'jânâti' indicating the particularity of the act.]

[Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapâ/th/aka of the Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.]

[Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three passages.]

[Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.]

[Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.]

[Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.]

[Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.]

[Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jîvâtman is conversant with the names and forms of individual things.]

[Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are one.]

[Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the heart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.]

[Footnote 103: Ânanda Giri reads âvish/t/asya for âvishk/ri/tasya.]

[Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c. only the sattâ, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.]

[Footnote 105: Ânanda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sûtrak/ri/to api matam ity âha, evam iti, /s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/âstre dvairûpyam brahma/n/o bhavati; tatra sopâdhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmâdhikara/n/am udâharati âdityeti; uktanyâya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasârayati evam iti; sopâdhikopade/s/avan nirupâdhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityâdinâ, âtmaj/ñ/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam âha pareti; annamayâdyupâdhidvârokasya katham paravidyâvishayatva/m/ tatrâha upâdhîti; nir/n/ayakramam âha vâkyeti, uktârtham adhikara/n/a/m/ kvâstîty âsa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.]

[Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.]

[Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.]

[Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.]

[Footnote 109: Yadi labdhâ na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramâtmano vastutobhinnena jîvâtmanâ paramâtmâ labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhâmatî.]

[Footnote 110: Yathâ paramesvarâd bhinno jîvâtmâ drash/t/â na bhavaty evam gîvâtmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti, jîvasyânirvâ/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirvâ/k/ya/h/ syâd ity ata âha parame/s/varas tv avidyâkalpitâd iti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 111: The explanation of the ânandamaya given hitherto is here recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is attributed by Go. Ân. to the v/ri/ttikâra.]

[Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word ânandamaya must be taken if understood to denote Brahman.]

[Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.]