Reading section 50

[Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad aparâ/s/ritam evâvatish/th/ate tâv ayutasiddhau yathâvayavâvayavinau.]

[Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavâya.]

[Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavâya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions.]

[Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion.]

[Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into sa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]

[Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyâkarsha/n/e yatra sambandhyantarâkarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu sâvayavânâ/m/ jatukâsh/th/âdînâ/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ sâvayâvânâm, ato dvya/n/ukasya sâvayavasya niravayavena paramâ/n/unâ sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyâbh.]

[Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for.]

[Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c.]

[Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]

[Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.]

[Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhâshya, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.--The Nihilists are the Mádhyamikas; the Idealists are the Yogâ/k/âras; the Sautrântikas and the Vaibháshikas together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.--Buddhasya hi mâdhyamika-yogá/k/âra-sautrântika-vaibhâshikasamj/ñ/akâs /k/atvâra/h/ /s/ishyâ/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yân prati sarva/m/ /s/ûnyam ity upadish/t/a/m/ te màdhyamikâs te hi guru/n/â yathokta/m/ tathaiva /s/raddhayâ g/ri/hîtavanta iti k/ri/tvâ nâpak/ri/sh/t/â/h/ puna/s/ /k/a taduktasyârthasya buddhyanusâre/n/âkshepasyâk/ri/tatvân notk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti mâdhyamikâ/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/â sarva/s/ûnyatva upadish/t/e j/ñ/ânâtiriktasya sarvasya /s/ûnyatvam astu nâmeti gurûktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhâshitopetâ/h/ tad upari /k/a j/ñ/ânasya tu /s/ûnyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathâtve jagadândhyaprasa@ngât sûnyasiddher apy asa/m/bhavâ/k/ /k/eti buddhamate â/k/âratvena paribhâshita âkshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yogâ/k/ârâ/h/ vij/ñ/ânamâtrâstitvavâdina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/ pratîtisiddhasya katha/m/ /s/ûnyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/ñ/ânavad vâhyârthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathâ@ngîk/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamatim anus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sûtra/m/ bhavishyatîti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am atas te sautrântikâ/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratîtibalâd vâhyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasyâ eva pratîter aparokshatvât sa katha/m/ parokshos'to vâhyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhâshâ viruddhety âkshipann atas te vaibhâshikâ/h/.]

[Footnote 385: The rûpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity âlayavj/ñ/ânapravâha/h/), according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/ânasamj/ñ/itam).-- The vedanâskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samj/ñ/âskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va ityâdi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, Ân. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/ nâmavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. Ân.; sa/m/j/ñ/â yaj/ñ/adattâdipadatadullekhî savikalpapratyayo vâ, dvitîyapakshe vij/ñ/ânapadena savikalpapratyayo na grâhy/h/, Brahmavidyâbh.). The sa/m/skâraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and adharma.--Compare also the Bhâmatî.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha is /k/itta, the other skandhas /k/aitta.]

[Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvâstitvavâdins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]

[Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]

[Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]

[Footnote 389: The Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a explains the last clause--from ksha/n/ikatvâ/k/ /k/a--somewhat differently: Api /k/a paramâ/n/ûnâm api ksha/n/ikatvâbhyupagamân melana/m/ na sambhavati, paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ melana/m/ paramâ/n/ukriyâdhînam, tathâ /k/a svakriyâ/m/ prati paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/atvât kriyâpûraksha/n/e paramâ/n/ubhir bhâvyam kriyâ /s/rayatayâ kriyâksha/n/eszpi teshâm avasthânam apekshitam eva/m/ melanakshaneszpi, nahi melanâ/s/rayasyâbhâve melanarûpâ prav/ri/ttir upapadyate, tathâ /k/a sthiraparamâ/n/usâdhyâ melanarûpâ prav/ri/tti/h/ katha/m/ teshâm ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.--Ânanda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.]

[Footnote 390: The kâra/n/atvât of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvât of the Sûtra; kârya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]

[Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c.--Impression (affection, sa/m/skâra) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vij/ñ/âna) is the self-consciousness (aham ity âlayavij/ñ/ânasya v/ri/ttilâbha/h/) springing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or bubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six (sha/d/âyatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (spar/s/a) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedaná) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire (t/ri/sh/n/â) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.--Activity (upâdâna) is the effort resulting from desire,--Birth is the passing out from the uterus.--Species (jâti) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay (jarâ).--Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumûrshâ).--Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that account.--Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.]

[Footnote 392: Ânanda Giri and Go. Ânanda explain: Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.--The Brahrma-vidyâbhara/n/a says: Nityeshv â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamâneshu bhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv ity asyopakâryopakârakabhâvaprâpteshv ity artha/h/.--And with regard to the subsequent â/s/rayâ/s/rayi/s/ûnyeshu: â/s/rayâ/s/rayitva/s/ûnyeshu, aya/m/ bhâva/h/, sthireshu paramâ/n/ushu yadanvaye paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ sa/m/ghâtâpatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakârakam upakâryâ/h/ paramâ/n/ava/h/ yena tatk/ri/to bhoga/h/ prârthyate sa tatra karteti grahîtu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu anvayavyatirekagrahasyânekaksha/n/asâdhyasyâsa/m/bhavân nopakâryopakârakabhâvo nirdhârayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.--Ananda Giri remarks on the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayakârt/ri/râhityam âhâ/s/rayeti. Another reading appears to be â/s/ayâ/s/raya/s/ûnyeshu.]

[Footnote 393: Bauddhânâ/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/âdir eva padârtho vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nâma hâlosti. Brahmâvidyâbh.]

[Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c.?]

[Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakâripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (âlambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshurádirûpam utpannasya j/ñ/ânasya rûpâdivishayatâ/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyâmaka/s/ /k/a lokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakârî âloka/h/. Samanantarapratyaya/h/pûrvaj/ñ/ânam, bauddhamate hi ksha/n/ikaj/ñ/anasa/m/tatau pûrvaj/ñ/ânam uttaraj/ñ/âsya kârana/m/ tad eva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Âlambana/m/ gha/t/âdi/h/. Etân hetûn pratîya prâpya /k/akshurâdijanyam ity âdi.]

[Footnote 396: Sa/m/skâra iti, tanmate pûrvaksha/n/a eva hetubhûta/h/ sa/m/skâro vâsaneti /k/a vyavahriyate kârya/m/ tu tadvishayatayâ karmavyutpattyâ sa/m/skâra/h/, tathâ /k/a kâryakâra/n/âtmaka/m/ sarva/m/ bhâvarûpa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/ñ/ârtha/h/. Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.]

[Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.]

[Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.--Viparîta iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/âdînâ/m/ yuktyâ sâdhyamânoku/s/alair avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sûkshmo vinâ/s/opratisa/m/khyânirodha/h/. Brahmâv.]

[Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since the Bauddhas define the sattâ of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]

[Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.--Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.]

[Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]

[Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is âvara/n/âbhâva in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore is something real.]

[Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is capable.--Cp. on this point the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.]

[Footnote 405: According to the vij/ñ/ânavâdin the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhâsa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is power is mâna, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramât/ri/, knowing subject.]

[Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.]

[Footnote 407: Avayavâvayavirûpo vâhyosrtho nâsti /k/en mâ bhûd jâtivyaktyâdirûpas tu syâd ity â/s/rankyâha evam iti. Jâtyâdînâ/m/ vyaktyâdînâm /k/âtyantabhinnatve svâtantryaprasa@ngâd atyantâbhinnatve tadvadevâtadbhâvâd bhinnâbhinnatvasya viruddhatvâd avayavâvayavibhedavaj gâtivyaktyâdibhedosxpi nâstîty artha/h/.]

[Footnote 408: Vâsanâ, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea.]

[Footnote 409: For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in addition to the transitory ideas.]

[Footnote 410: The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises vij/ñ/ânas of two different kinds, the âlayavij/ñ/âna and the prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna. The âlayavij/ñ/âna comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego; the prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class.]

[Footnote 411: Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent.]

[Footnote 412: Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of their enjoyment; âsrava is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects; sa/m/vara is the restraint of the activity of the senses; nirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.--For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the Ârhata chapter of the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 413: Cp. translation of Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha, p. 59.]

[Footnote 414: And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.]

[Footnote 415: Cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha translation, p. 58.]

[Footnote 416: The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like its final size.]

[Footnote 417: The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and the pradhâna and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world considered as the effect of the pradhâna acted upon by the Lord; for that the world is the effect of the pradhâna is a point which the Vedântins do not accept as proved.]

[Footnote 418: I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows its measure.]