Reading section 6

8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being, we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth] proof, comparison (_upamána_).

9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative, if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[49] and so on."

We reply as follows:--As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative proofs,--this is untenable, because there _are_ proofs, as inference, &c., which _do_ establish[50] his existence. Thus any soul will become omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away. Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will, when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it, just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of darkness, &c., are removed. Now there _is_ such a soul, which has its hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things; for otherwise the Mímámsist could not maintain that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the authoritative injunction of a text,[51]--nor could there otherwise be the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Nyáya will grant that universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the Púrva Mímámsá accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and prohibitions, as is said [by Sabara in his commentary on the Sútras, i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future, the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." Nor can you say that "it is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three ["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior assaults of argument can be put to flight.

But the Naiyáyika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence, which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated," like other liberated persons,--since the use of the term "liberated" necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.? according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or (iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?

Not _the first_, because it would apply too widely, as it would include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in contact with the parts of other things;] nor _the second_, because it would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor _the third_, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much disputed as the one directly in question;[52] nor _the fourth_, because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following alternative:--Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to itself,--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its existence.

Nor can _the fifth_ alternative be allowed, because this would reach too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged to be not an effect.[53] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not all-pervading].

And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?

In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would be superfluous. As it has been said in the _Vítarágastuti_, or "Praise of Jina"--

1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading, independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions, whose teacher art _thou_."

And again--

2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use of yourself or all the artisans, if Íswara fabricates the three worlds?"

Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.

Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &c., are impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,--because this universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such faults as _Anyonyásrayatá_,[54] &c., because we accept an eternal succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So much for this preliminary discussion.

The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are thus described in the _Paramágamasára_ (which is devoted to the exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)--"Right intuition, right knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been thus explained by Yogadeva:--

(_a._) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute faith in the teaching, _i.e._, the entire absence of any contrary idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the _Tattvártha-sútra_, "Faith in the predicaments[55] is right 'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction." "Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.

(_b._) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul, &c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or doubt; as it has been said--

"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the wise."

This knowledge is fivefold as divided into _mati_, _sruta_, _avadhi_, _manas-paryáya_, and _kevala_; as it has been said, "_Mati_, _s_ruta, _avadhi_, _manas-paryáya_, and _kevala_, these are knowledge." The meaning of this is as follows:--

1. _Mati_ is that by which one cognises an object through the operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge being abolished.

2. _Sruta_ is the clear knowledge produced by _mati_, all the obstructions of knowledge being abolished.

3. _Avadhi_ is the knowledge of special objects caused by the abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition," &c.[56]

4. _Manas-paryáya_ is the clear definite knowledge of another's thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of knowledge caused by the veil of envy.

5. _Kevala_ is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which ascetics practise various kinds of penance.

The first of these (_mati_) is not self-cognised, the other four are. Thus it has been said--

"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two ways."

But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.

(_c._) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by the Arhat--

1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as the 'five vows,' _ahimsá_, _súnrita_, _asteya_, _brahmacharyá_, and _aparigraha_.[57]

2. "The 'vow' of _ahimsá_ is the avoidance of injuring life by any act of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.

3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of _súnrita_. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to others and prejudicial.

4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of _asteya_; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.

5. "The 'vow' of _brahmacharyá_ (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the abandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word, and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by one's causing another to act.

6. "The 'vow' of _aparigraha_ is the renouncing of all delusive interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.

7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order, these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."

The full account of the five states of mind (_bhávaná_) has been given in the following passage [of which we only quote one sloka]--

"Let him carry out the 'vow' of _súnrita_ uninterruptedly by the abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the deliberate avoidance of speech,"[59]--and so forth.

These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce the elixir's effect, but not severally.

Here we may say concisely that the _tattvas_ or predicaments are two, _jíva_ and _ajíva_; the soul, _jíva_, is pure intelligence; the non-soul, _ajíva_, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus said--

"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;' 'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to be pursued, which is defined as _upayoga_."

_Upayoga_ [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of _pradesa_ and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces [between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than these."[61]

Intelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real nature of the soul viewed as _parinata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself]; but by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ it appears in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness, &c.[63] As has been said by Váchakáchárya [in a sútra]--

"The _aupasamika_, the _Ksháyika_, and the 'mixed' states are the nature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _Párinámika_."

1. The _aupasamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant,[64] &c.

2. The _Ksháyika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of actions and their effects, as in final liberation.

3. The "mixed" (_misra_) state combines both these, as when water is partly pure.

4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent influence on the future]. The _Párinámika_ state is the soul's innate condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sútra quoted above.

This has been explained in the _Svarúpa-sambodhana_--

"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some way both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last; such is the soul described to be."

If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the advocates of the _Syád-váda_) it is perfectly notorious that all things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.

Others lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned above, _jíva_ and _ajíva_; they hold that there are five _astikáyas_ or categories,--_jíva_, _ákása_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_. To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (_asti_),[67] as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly apply the idea of "body" (_káya_),[68] from their occupying several parts of space.

The _jívas_ (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the "released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (_samanaska_), and those destitute of it (_amanaska_). The former possesses _samjñá_, _i.e._, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are also divided into two, as "locomotive" (_trasa_), or "immovable" (_sthávara_).

The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are earth, water, fire, air, and trees.[69] But here a distinction must be made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &c., are aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies, are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &c., and the "bodies of earth," &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[70] These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of passing into any other state of existence.

_Dharma_, _adharma_, and _ákása_ are singular categories [and not generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are the causes of a substance's change of place.

_Dharma_, "merit," and _adharma_, "demerit," are well known. They assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally extended[71] sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called Lokákása; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of _ákása_ is seen when one thing enters into the space previously occupied by another.

_Pudgala_, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[72] the compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called _pudgalas_, because they "fill" (_púr_), and "dissolve" (_gal_). Although "time" is not properly an _astikáya_, because it does not occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition], still it is a _dravya_ [or _tattva_], as the definition will hold; "substance" (_dravya_) possesses "qualities and action."[73] Qualities reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the _jíva_, form, &c., of the body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit," "demerit," and _ákása_. "Action" (_paryáya_) has thus been defined; the actions (_paryáyáh_) of a substance are, as has been said, its existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its course to the end, as, _e.g._, in the _jíva_, the knowledge of objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the _pudgala_, the lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or _tattvas_ [_i.e._, the five above mentioned and "time"].

Others reckon the _tattvas_ as seven, as has been said--

"The _tattvas_ are _jíva_, _ajíva_, _ásrava_, _bandha_, _samvara_, _nirjará_, and _moksha_." _Jíva_ and _ajíva_ have been already described. _Ásrava_ is described as the movement of the soul called _yoga_,[74] through its participation in the movement of its various bodies, _audárika_, &c. As a door opening into the water is called _ásrava_, because it causes the stream to descend through it,[75] so this _yoga_ is called _ásrava_, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions which are brought to it by _yoga_. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the _jíva_, heated by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought by _yoga_. _Kasháya_ ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts" (_kash_) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger, pride, delusion, and lust. _Ásrava_ is twofold, as good or evil. Thus abstaining from doing injury is a good _yoga_ of the body; speaking what is true, measured, and profitable is a good _yoga_ of the speech.

These various subdivisions of _ásrava_ have been described at length in several _Sútras_. "_Ásrava_ is the impulse to action with body, speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or demerit," &c. Others, however, explain it thus:--"_Ásrava_ is the action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects; the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form, &c."[76]

_Bandha_, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (_kasháya_), and also by the force of _yoga_, assumes various bodies occupying many parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said--

"Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"