Reading section 25

[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwamsa_ of sound, in the latter its _prágabháva_.]

[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _samápohi_, _i.e._, the passive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _úh_.]

[Footnote 278: I do not know this legend. Tála and Betála are the two demons who carry Vikramáditya on their shoulders in the Simhásan-battísí. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating how one answer can suffice for two opponents.]

[Footnote 279: This is probably a work by Bhásarvajña (see Dr. Hall's _Bibl. Index_, p. 26).]

[Footnote 280: _Dhvani_, or our "articulate noise," produces the vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into a definite speech by our various articulations. I take _samskrita_ here as equivalent to _abhivyakta_.]

[Footnote 281: I read in p. 131, line 15, _samskárakasamskáryabhávábhávánumánam_.]

[Footnote 282: It would be a case of _vyabhichára_. The Naiyáyika argument would seem to be something as follows:--Sound is not thus manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not manifested by the species. But the Mímámsá rejoins that this would equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not sure that I rightly understand the argument.]

[Footnote 283: Here begins a long _púrva-paksha_, from p. 131, line 18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 _infra_.]

[Footnote 284: This is Prabhákara's view (see Siddh. Muktáv., p. 118). The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (_prámánya_), which resides in it as its characteristic.]

[Footnote 285: Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities, and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause and therefore a substance.]

[Footnote 286: The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.]

[Footnote 287: The first three categories "substance," "quality," and "action," are called _játis_ or species; the last four, "genus," "_visesha_," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called _upádhis_ or "general characteristics."]

[Footnote 288: The Púrva Mímámsá denies that recollection is right knowledge.]

[Footnote 289: Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these _together with a "defect,"_ as biliousness, distance &c.]

[Footnote 290: _Scil._ if there be _doshábháva_ there is _pramá_; if not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read _doshábhávatvena_ for _doshábhávasahakritatvena_.]

[Footnote 291: _Anyathásiddhatvam_ means _niyatapúrvavartitve sati anávasyakatvam_.]

[Footnote 292: _Scil._ or the absence of "defect," _doshábháva_.]

[Footnote 293: Wrong knowledge has _doshábháva_ or the presence of a "defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.]

[Footnote 294: Wrongness of knowledge (_apramátva_) can only reside in knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes than those of knowledge (as, _e.g._, the potter's stick, &c.), but it is not produced by these other causes _in combination_ with being also produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster. The jar is not produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while- at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.]

[Footnote 295: I suppose this is the argument given at the close of the previous long púrva-paksha.]

[Footnote 296: These words "and is other than defect" (_dosha-vyatirikta_) are, of course, meaningless as far as right knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by the causes of knowledge _plus_ "defect;" right knowledge by the former alone.]

[Footnote 297: The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a "defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a _guna_ or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a true object), or by the absence of a "defect."]

[Footnote 298: The _guna_ (or [Greek: beltistê hexis]) of an organ is not properly a cause of _pramá_ but rather _doshábháva-bodhaka_.]

[Footnote 299: _Scil._ "doubtful" (_sandigdha_) and "ascertained non-authoritativeness" (_nischitáprámánya_).]

[Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.]

[Footnote 301: The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth of the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _prámánya_.]

[Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).]

[Footnote 303: I read _tat-práchuryam_ for _tatpráchurye_ in p. 134, line 7.]

[Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the Mímámsá school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)]

[Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _sakti_; _siddhe_ means _ghatádau_.]

[Footnote 306: These are the two great Mímámsá schools. The former, called _abhihitánvaya-vádinah_, hold (like the Naiyáyika school) that words by themselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidhá_ or "denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter, called _anvitábhidhána-vádinah_, hold that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected with an action. In _gám ánaya_, _gám_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but _ánayanánvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with "bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, and _vice versâ_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative Philology_, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words. But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."]

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PÁNINI-DARSANA.[307]

If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great Commentary," is "_atha sabdánusásanam_," "Now comes the exposition of words." The particle _atha_ ("now") is used here as implying a new topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is meant the system of grammar put forth by Pánini. Now a doubt might here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such doubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion of everything else.

The word "exposition" (_anusásana_), as here used, implies that thereby Vaidic words, such as those in the line _sam no devír abhishtaye_,[308] &c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for "cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of the exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix. We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of the object [_sabdánusásanam_ standing for _sabdasyánusásanam_], and as there is a rule of Pánini (_karmani cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the phrase _sabdánusásanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised compound.

Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the alleged rule of Pánini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in connection with a word ending with a _krit_ affix, there the object alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this limitation arising from our taking _ubhayaprápti_ in the sútra as a _bahuvríhi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in the Kásiká Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the teacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended relates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once understood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object and the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence, this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in connection with a word ending with a krit affix, is to be put in the genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_ compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to such recognised forms as _idhma-pravraschana_, _palása-sátana_, &c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this _shashthítatpurusha_ is one of the class called "residual," in accordance with Pánini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used in the residuum," [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for by special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and hence Bhartrihari in his _Vákyapadíya_ has shown that these rules are mainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamána--

"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,

"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be employed.

"Thus have they explained the meaning of Pánini's sútras, since

"He himself uses such phrases as _janikartuh_ and _tatprayojakah_."[314]

Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question (of the _Mahábháshya_) is that "it is to be understood that the rules of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition concerning words' are now commenced."

"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,' as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since the employment of such a word as _sabdánusásanam_, the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a subordinate study (_anga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any (special) end,"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction, it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end is mentioned which will establish that it is an _anga_ of the Veda. Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in haste to say--

"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by common life,

"And therefore grammar is useless?"

Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an _anga_ of the Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that grammar is an _anga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswatí." Now it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _anga_ of the Veda that he uses the words _atha sabdánusásanam_ and not _atha vyákaranam_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction concerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided into proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that Brihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by word,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was Brihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is rendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding, practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word. And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus, for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karmani_, the affix _an_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with it; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhakára_, "a potter," _kándaláva_, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special rule (iii. 2, 3), _áto 'nupasarge kah_, directing that the affix _ka_ is to be used after a root that ends in long _á_ when there is no _upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be [since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. "But since there are other _angas_, why do you single out grammar as the one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six _angas_ the principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the

principal is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said--

"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious austerities,

"The wise have called grammar the first _anga_ of the Veda."

Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c., of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the great Commentary [quoting a Várttika], "the end (or motive) is preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319] Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus Kátyáyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word according to the _sástra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow." Thus (they say)--

"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;

"But those who use such false forms as _achíkramata_ must trudge thither on foot."[320]

Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?" since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god. For the Sruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet" mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the tense-affixes, _lat_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the "manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull" (_vrishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varshana_), _i.e._, from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars," _i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the great god enters mortals,"--the "great god," _i.e._, speech,--enters mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.

The eternal word, called _sphota_, without parts, and the cause of the world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartrihari in the part of his book called the Brahmakánda--

"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,

"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation of the world."

"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this, too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakírnaka--

"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a fivefold,

"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the like."

Helárája interprets the fivefold division as including _karmapravachaníyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachaníyas_ distinguish a connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions (_upasargas_).[324]

"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called _sphota_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception.