Reading section 33

[Footnote 422: _Ini_ and _than_, which respectively leave _in_ and _ika_; thus _danda_ gives _dandin_ and _dandika_. The line is quoted by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Pán. v. 2, 115, and is explained in the _Kásiká_, _ad loc_. The different prohibitions are illustrated by the examples:--(1.) _svaván_, _khaván_; (2.) _kárakaván_; (3.) _vyághraván_, _simhaván_; (4.) _dandavatí sálá_ (_i.e._, _dandá asyám santi_).]

[Footnote 423: By iii. 3, 56.]

[Footnote 424: It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.]

[Footnote 425: See the _Kásiká_ on Pán. v. 2, 115. For _vivakshártha_ (meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Pán. ii. 2, 27. The edition in the Benares _Pandit_ reads _vishayaniyamártha_.]

[Footnote 426: _i.e._, Thus _nirodha_ is not _vritter abhávah_, but _abhávasyásryah_.]

[Footnote 427: I read in p. 168, last line, _prakásapravrittiniyamarúpa_, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.]

[Footnote 428: See Kásiká, ii. 3, 36.]

[Footnote 429: This passage probably occurs in the _Yájñavalkya-gítá_ of Yogi-yájñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145, note.]

[Footnote 430: Mímámsá Sútras, ii. 1, 35-37.]

[Footnote 431: The tantras are not properly concerned with what is _nitya_ or _naimittika_; they are _kámya_.]

[Footnote 432: The _víja_ of air is the syllable _jam_.]

[Footnote 433: The _víja_ of water is the syllable _bam_.]

[Footnote 434: _Hrím._]

[Footnote 435: _Srím._]

[Footnote 436: _Tándava_ is the frantic dance of the god. Siva and his votaries.]

[Footnote 437: Literally "they take severally in order the gender of one of the two." Cf. "Thebæ ipsæ quod Boeotiæ caput est," _Livy_, xlii. 44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem," _Cic._, _Legg_, i. 7.]

[Footnote 438: I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's translation of the Sáhitya-darpana.]

[Footnote 439: Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of longevity.]

[Footnote 440: _I.e._, an hour, a _ghatiká_ being twenty-four minutes.]

[Footnote 441: The _nádís_ or tubular vessels are generally reckoned to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal _nádís_. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.]

[Footnote 442: Mádhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the passage in the Aitareya Bráhmana (iii. 29), where the relation of the vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a waterwheel (_ghatíyantravat_); hence the seasons never pause in their course."]

[Footnote 443: This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism, that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra, as their sound expresses the word _so'ham_ (i.e., _hamsah_), "I am he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours; it is called the _ajapámantra_, _i.e._, the mantra uttered without voluntary muttering.]

[Footnote 444: _I.e._, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled breath.]

[Footnote 445: I cannot explain this. We might read _guruvarnánám_ for _gunavarnánám_, as the time spent in uttering a _guruvarna_ is a _vipala_, sixty of which make a _pala_, and two and a half _palas_ make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the fifth act of the _Málatímádhava_.]

[Footnote 446: Sixty _palas_ make a _ghatiká_ (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10 = 150, _i.e._, the _palas_ in two and a half _ghatikás_ or one hour).]

[Footnote 447: Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.]

[Footnote 448: Literally "the being ever more."]

[Footnote 449: For these colours cf. _Chhándogya Up._, viii. 6; _Maitri Up._, vi. 30.]

[Footnote 450: This is an anonymous quotation in Vyása's Comm.]

[Footnote 451: This seems a variation of Sloka 7 of the _Amrita-náda Up._ See Weber, _Indische Stud._, ix. 26.]

[Footnote 452: This is defined in the Yoga Sút., iii. 4, as consisting of the united operation towards one object of contemplation, attention, and meditation.]

[Footnote 453: _I.e._, the internal organ (_chitta_).]

[Footnote 454: This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the reading of the Bombay edition of the Purána (only reading in line 3 _chalátmanám_).]

[Footnote 455: Vishnu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The "perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.]

[Footnote 456: The old name for the central part of Bengal.]

[Footnote 457: A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it is the [Greek: Larikê] of Ptolemy.]

[Footnote 458: In p. 178, l. 2, _infra_, read _pravritta_ for _pravritti_. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyása's Comm.)]

[Footnote 459: Read _vikaranabhávah_; Váchaspati explains it as "_videhánám indriyánám karanabhávah_."]

[Footnote 460: Vyása has _karanapañchakarúpajaya_; Váchaspati explains _rúpa_ by _grahanádi_ (cf. iii. 47).]

[Footnote 461: I read in p. 179, l. 11, _vyava-sáyavyavaseyátmakánám_, from Vyása's Comm.]

[Footnote 462: _I.e._, as past, present, or future.]

[Footnote 463: _Visoká._]

[Footnote 464: This is explained by Váchaspati, "The latent impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called _vyutthána_ (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or 'darkness,' iii. 9) and _nirodha_ (when it is chiefly characterised by the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself; this in 'egoism' (_asmitá_); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable' (_i.e._, _buddhi_); and _buddhi_ into the 'irresolvable' (_i.e._, _prakriti_)." _Prakriti_ consists of the three 'qualities' in equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another becomes predominant.]

[Footnote 465: This curious passage occurs in the Taittiríya-Áranyaka i. 11, 5. Mádhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and quotes the Svetásv. Up., iii. 19. Mádhava here takes _avindat_ as "he pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the Comm.]

[Footnote 466: This is taken from Váchaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii. 15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.]

[Footnote 467: This probably refers to the Pañchadasí. A Calcutta Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivarana-sangraha (cf. Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatádhyáya-bráhmana, p. x), but, if this is the same as the vivarana-prameya-sangraha, it is by Bháratítírthavidyáranya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p. 88).]

APPENDIX.

ON THE UPÁDHI (cf. _supra_, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).

[As the _upádhi_ or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of the sections in the Bháshá-parichchheda and the Siddhánta-muktávalí, which treat of it.]

cxxxvii. _That which always accompanies the major term (sádhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu), is called the Condition (upádhi); its examination is now set forth._

Our author now proceeds to define the _upádhi_ or condition,[468] which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as laid down by another person;--"that which always accompanies," &c. The meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being produced from wet fuel," as an _upádhi_, since "wet fuel" is necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as _e.g._, in a red-hot iron ball.]

"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not follow that (_a_) in the case of the too wide middle term in the argument, 'This [second] son of Mitrá's, whom I have not seen, must be dark because he is Mitrá's son,' we could not allege 'the being produced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'--inasmuch as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (_b_) Again, in the argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense] is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably accompany perceptibility]. (_c_) Again, in the argument,'Destruction is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of existence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called "emergent," _dvamsábháva_], inasmuch as perishability is found in antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be included in any positive category of existence."

We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the definition is simply this,--that whatever fact or mark we take to determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition is not invariably to accompany. Thus (_a_) the "being produced from feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as determined by the fact that it is Mitrá's son, whose dark colour is discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (_b_) Again, "possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term "the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472] (_c_) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence" invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance, "antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends that this is produced at all.]

But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid middle terms, _i.e._, there is nothing _there_ which invariably accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark, and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined. This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term which is too general, the required general rule consists in the constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz., that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but excluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475]

cxxxviii. _All true Conditions reside in the same subjects with their major terms;[476] and, their subjects being thus common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general in regard to the Condition and the major term._[477]

cxxxix. _It is in order to prove faulty generality in a middle term that the Condition has to be employed._

The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of having a condition at all. (_a._) Thus, where the condition invariably accompanies an unlimited[478] major term, we infer that the middle term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too general for that which is invariably accompanied. (_b._) But where we take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which the condition is invariably to accompany,--there it is from the middle term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument, "B is dark because he is Mitrá's son," the middle term "the fact of being Mitrá's son" is too general in regard to the _sádhya_, "dark colour," because it is too general in regard to the _upádhi_, "feeding on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrá's second son [Mitrá's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitrá herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his birth].

[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,' since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed to overthrow the contrary argument].

But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition, [and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in "the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot,[479] [thus the _upádhi_ here is a means of overthrowing the false argument].

Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480] But "the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules of logical controversy.[481]