Reading section 19

"Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all sacred texts;

"One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore there is and must be life."

And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents of the doctrine of Vishnu-svámin maintain the eternity of the body of Vishnu half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the Sákára-siddhi--

"I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vishnu-svámin,

"Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and inconceivably perfect beatitude."

If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real existence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of proof: (1.) by the intuition of Sanaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts such as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Puránic texts such as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other like predicates are affirmed also by Sríkánta-misra, the devoted adherent of Vishnu-svámin. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus been said--

"What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying, immortal,

"The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches, pleasure, liberation?"

It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as it is said--

"Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying and imperishable."

Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Rasárnava--

"From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from merely remembering it,

"From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it, appear its six virtues.

"Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from seeing all the phallic emblems

"On earth, those at Kedára, and all others whatsoever."

In another place we read--

"The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific than the worship of all the phallic emblems at Kási and elsewhere,

"Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health, exemption from decay, and immortality."

The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out--

"The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged should recall quicksilver to mind.

"He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his blasphemy for ever filled with sin."

The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the practice of union ([Greek: henôsis]) after the acquisition of a divine body in the manner we have described. Thereafter--

"The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain men of holy vision,

"Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun:

"Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof is luminousness, undifferenced,

"From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable, tranquil, self-recognised:

"Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,

"The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his bondage to works annulled."

A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained this he becomes beatitude.

Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the supreme self--

"May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,

"Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,

"Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the soul awakes,

"Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines forth by itself from itself."

A. E. G.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 153: Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yogís in Colonel Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. _Párada-pána_ is one of the practices of the Siddhopásakas in the Sankara-digvijaya, § 49, to obviate _apamrityu_, _akálamrityu_, &c.]

CHAPTER X.

THE VAISESHIKA OR AULÚKYA DARSANA.[154]

Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to know the means of such escape,--learns that the knowledge of the Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such passages as these (_Svetásvatara Upan_. vi. 20)--

"When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,

"Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of Siva."

Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing (_sravana_), thought (_manana_), and reflection (_bhávaná_), as it has been said--

"By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated meditation,--

"By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the highest union (_yoga_)."

Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the knowledge of the _vyápti_ (or universal proposition), and the knowledge of the _vyápti_ follows the right understanding of the categories,--hence the saint Kanáda[155] establishes the six categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now, therefore, we shall explain duty."

In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first _áhnika_ he defines those which possess "genus" (_játi_), in the second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the first _áhnika_ the characteristics of the five elements, and in the second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the first _áhnika_, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first _áhnika_, and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates action; in the first _áhnika_ he considers action as connected with the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he examines merit and demerit as revealed in Sruti; in the first _áhnika_ he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first _áhnika_ he considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception, and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of inference.[156]

The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation," "definition," and "investigation."[157] "But," it may be objected, "ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold, not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and intimate relation are the only six positive categories,--this is an example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:--Since "substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in its generic character in all substances [though different substances have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with "substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"[158] then "generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity," inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"[159] lastly, "intimate relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.

If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since 'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories, _i.e._, as being the objects of conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so, if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite number) deny it to be one of the six _positive_ categories,--and if others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a _seventh_ category. But enough of this long discussion.

Substantiality, &c. (_dravyatvádi_), _i.e._, the genera of substance, quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance, quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (_dravyatva_) is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the (eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[160] and does not exist with intimate relation in smell.[161]

The genus of quality (_gunatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[162] The genus of action (_karmatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything eternal.[163] Generality (or genus, _sámánya_) is that which is found in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the counter-entity to emergent non-existence.[164] Particularity[165] (_visesha_) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[166] Intimate relation (_samaváya_) is that connection which itself has not intimate relation.[167] Such are the definitions of the six categories.

Substance is ninefold,--earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (_prithivítva_), are the definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same subject with colour produced by baking.[168]

The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the skin.[169]

As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is found in the same subject with the non-eternal (_janya_) special quality which is not produced by contact.[170]

Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the mediate cause[171] of that idea of remoteness (_paratva_) which is not found with intimate relation in space;[172] while space is that pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is not time.[173] The general terms _átmatva_ and _manastva_ are the respective definitions of soul (_átman_) and mind (_manas_). The general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[174] (_amúrtta_). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned directly in Kanáda's Sútras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word "_and_," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit, and sound. Their respective genera (_rúpatva_, &c.) are their several definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.

"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going: revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation cannot be divided,--in the former case in consequence of the infinite number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.

There is a popular proverb--

"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by disjunction,--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true Vaiseshika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the production of duality, &c.

There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object; thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the distinguishing perception _apekshábuddhi_ [by which we apprehend "this is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, _dvitva_ (in the object);[175] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality (_dvitvatva_); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it exists in the two things; then imagination[176] (_samskára_).[177]

But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus produced from _apekshábuddhi_? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained that _apekshábuddhi_ must be the producer of duality, &c., because duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we cannot hold _apekshábuddhi_ as the cause only of its being known [and therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being produced[178]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however, maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c., cannot be held to be made known (_jñápya_) by that non-eternal apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (_i.e._, _apekshábuddhi_), because these are qualities which reside in a plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[179]] just as "severalty" does [and, therefore, as _apekshábuddhi_ is not their _jñápaka_, it must be their _janaka_].