Reading section 26

Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _sphota_, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be a _sphota_ by means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _sphota_ is an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphutyate_) or revealed by the letters," hence it is called _sphota_, as revealed by the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called _sphota_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is the word '_cow_' _gauh_? It is that word by which, when pronounced, there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyata in the passage commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we wished]," and ending, "The _Vákyapadíya_ has established at length that it is the _sphota_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]

Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say that the _sphota_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphota_ is supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., that _sphota_ conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphota_." This has been said by Bhatta in his Mímámsá-sloka-várttika--

"The grammarian who holds that _sphota_ is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single difficulty."

The truth is, that, as Pánini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sút. ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _díná_ as in _nadí_, in _mára_ as in _ráma_, in _rája_ as in _jára_, &c., these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said by Tautátita--

"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will be the meaning which they convey."

Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate thing called _sphota_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant].

All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328] could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term "aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting" power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of _sphota_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called _sphota_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, reveals the invisible _sphota_, and each successive letter makes this _sphota_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter." Therefore, since Bhartrihari has shown in his first book that the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to assume the existence[330] of an indivisible _sphota_ as a distinct category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this has been established in the discussion (in the Mahábháshya) on "genus" (_játi_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331] (Brahman).

"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said--

"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination."

"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting."

All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is variously cognised through its connection with different things, as severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have the following authoritative testimony--

"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as possessing that colour."

And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (Pánini v. 1, 119).

"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows, horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and _asvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning of the stem-word (_prátipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as that which expresses _bháva_;[333] now, as _bháva_ is "existence," the meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriyá_); but here again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this "action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the line--

"Others say that action (_kriyá_) is a genus, residing in many individuals."

So, too, if we accept Pánini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we speak of the nature (_bháva_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _tá_ [as _asvatva_ and _asvatá_] are used in the sense of _bháva_, that they do express "existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul." Such is the meaning of Hari's two _kárikás_ quoted above. So, too, it is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word Substance.

"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea [without owners] is expressed."[336]

So, too, the author of the Mahábháshya, when explaining the Várttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed," in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of horse," &c.]

According to the opinion of Vájapyáyana, who maintains that all words mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c., denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.," we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _pathati_, "he reads," &c., since we find here a meaning common to all who read.

In the doctrine of Vyádi, who maintained that words meant individual things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied [as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of "indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Pánini; since in i. 2, 58, he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that "when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Bráhman is to be honoured," which may equally run, "Bráhmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2, 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means Ráma and Ráma, and the plural means Ráma, and Ráma and Ráma; but we retain only one, adding a dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised. Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.

As it has been said--

"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."

Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the nature of this true meaning--

"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who know the end of the three Vedas."

So too in his description of substance, he says--

"_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of modification, as the gold remains under the form of the earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they call the Supreme Nature."

The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.

"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two souls."[344]

The meaning of this Káriká is that Brahman is the one object denoted by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the power of "concealment"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedánta lore tell us--

"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a development of illusion likewise."

When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the Supreme Brahman."[346] And thus we establish the fact that the "exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.

Thus it has been said--

"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the science of sciences."[347]

And so again--

"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the travellers to emancipation."

Therefore our final conclusion is that the Sástra of grammar should be studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 307: Mádhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted and fully developed the idea of the Púrva-Mímámsá school that sound is eternal. He therefore treats of _sphota_ here, and not in his Jaimini chapter.]

[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.]

[Footnote 309: _Sabdánusásana_, if judged by the apparent sense of Pánini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so, because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were an agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as _ácháryena_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _áscharyo godoho sikshitena gopálena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither can we say _áscharyo gavám doho' sikshitasya gopálasya_ (as it would violate ii. 3, 66).]

[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayaprápti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a _bahuvríhi_ agreeing with _kriti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Pánini.]

[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to Pánini, ii. 2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.]

[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_ (_i.e._, _shashthí-sambandha_).]

[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.]

[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in Pánini's own sútras (i. 4, 30, and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as _shashthí seshe_.]

[Footnote 315: The very word _sabda_ in _sabdánusásanam_ implies the Veda, since this is pre-eminently _sabda_.]

[Footnote 316: Compare Max Müller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is quoted as from the Veda in the Mahábháshya.]

[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _danda_ in line 3 after _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _sabdánám_.]

[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.]

[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mahábháshya_, pp. 12, 64.]

[Footnote 320: _Achíkramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form of the frequentative of _kram_ for _achankramyata_.]

[Footnote 321: Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the lines of Bhartrihari which immediately follow.]

[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _sabdasya_ after _sámyam_, but the Mahábháshya has _nah sámyam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).]

[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.]

[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachaníyas_ imply a verb other than the one expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced by this understood verb. Thus in the example, _Sákalyasamhitám anu právarshat_, "he rained after the Sákalya hymns," _anu_ implies an understood verb _nisamya_, "having heard," and this verb shows that there is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This _anu_ is said to determine this relation.]

[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.]

[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might mean _kramena_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.]

[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read _kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.]