Reading section 20

Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From _apekshábuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the production of duality (_dvitva_), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity; next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (_dvitvatva_) arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the destruction of _apekshábuddhi_; next from the destruction of _apekshábuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of imagination (_samskára_), the destruction of the knowledge of the quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the knowledge of the substances.

The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another, and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are the subjects of the discussion _are_ successively destroyed by the rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary duration.[180] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate action taking place simultaneously with the rise of _apekshábuddhi_, there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united influence of both.[181]

_Apekshábuddhi_ is to be considered as that operation of the mind which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (_i.e._, destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[182]

Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the destruction of the compound of two atoms (the _dvyanuka_), another compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First, the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of steps commencing with the contact of fire;[183] secondly, from the conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black, &c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[184] in the atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly, there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms; ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (_i.e._, the atoms) are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (_i.e._, the _dvyanuka_). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The other two series,[185] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments, are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if we hold (with the Vaiseshikas) that the baking process takes place in the atoms of the jar.[186] The Naiyáyikas, however, maintain that the baking process takes place in the jar.

"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,--that produced by the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause [_i.e._, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.

It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the [material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect [_i.e._, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and, again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[187] without there having previously been the origination of that disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction of the pot, according to the principle, _cessante causâ cessat effectus_. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half, initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to produce it.[188]

But the second kind is as follows:--As action which arises in the hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact, initiates a disjunction[189] from the points of space in which the original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect] and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause[190] which causes the second disjunction of the body and the points of space.

But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p. 147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different opinions maintained on this point,--thus (_a._) the Bhátta Mímámsakas and the Vedántins hold that darkness is a substance; (_b._) Srídhara Áchárya[191] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus darkness will be a quality]; (_c._) some of the Prábhákara Mímámsakas hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (_d._) the Naiyáyikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we assert that as for the first alleged opinion (_a._) it is quite out of the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of the nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,[192] or some different one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed of the dark blue of the tamála blossom?" We reply, that this is merely an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[193] (_b._) Hence it follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum to receive it;[194] and again, we cannot conceive the eye as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause, the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression independent of the eye [_i.e._, produced by the internal sense, mind], because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain that "absence or non-existence (_abháva_[195]) is incapable of being expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we _do_ use such phrases as _tenebræ oriuntur_, darkness cannot be a mere non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse, destruction, inattention,[196] &c. [and yet we all know that men do speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all are cases of _abháva_]. (_c._) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is the mind which perceives cognitions].[197] Hence we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness _is_ attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert that "this absence of light must be the

object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour,[198] as we see in the case of a jar's absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and _this_ will require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides, else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[199] Hence, having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kanáda uttered his aphorism [as an _ipse dixit_ to settle the question]: "_Dravya-guna-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyád abhávas tamas_" (_Vais. Sút._ v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions." The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness is perceived by the eye[200] [without light, whereas all substances, if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the eye to be visible].

Non-existence (_abháva_) is considered to be the seventh category, as established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that which, itself not having intimate relation, is _not_ intimate relation;[201] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[202] and "reciprocal non-existence."

The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and "absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence which abides in its own counter-entity;[203] "reciprocal non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet no defined limit [_i.e._, no _terminus ad quem_ nor _terminus a quo_, as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].

If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence" is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."[204] Nor need you here raise the objection that "_abháva_ can never be a means of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his _summum bonum_, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the category of _abháva_].

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 154: The Vaiseshikas are called Aulúkyáh in Hemachandra's _Abhidhána-chintámani_; in the Váyu-purána (quoted in Aufrecht's _Catal_. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshapáda, Kanáda, Ulúka, and Vatsa are called the sons of Siva.]

[Footnote 155: He is here called by his synonym Kanabhaksha.]

[Footnote 156: It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact, &c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and the three causes.]

[Footnote 157: For this extract from the old _bháshya_ of Vátsyáyana, see Colebrooke's _Essays_ (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.]

[Footnote 158: Cf. _Bháshá-parichchheda_, sloka 14.]

[Footnote 159: "Particularity" (_visesha_) resides by "intimate relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.]

[Footnote 160: This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "duality" and "conjunction."]

[Footnote 161: This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "existence" (_sattá_), which is the _summum genus_, to which substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.]

[Footnote 162: Existence (_sattá_) is the genus of _dravya_, _guna_, and _kriyâ_. _Dravya_ alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and disjunction. _Some_ qualities (as _samyoga_, _rúpa_, &c.) may be mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the essence of _guna_, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.]

[Footnote 163: As all karmas are transitory, _karmatva_ is only found in the _anitya_. I correct in p. 105, line 20, _nityá-samavetatva_; this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library.]

[Footnote 164: _I.e._, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility, however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore, the former clause of the definition is added.]

[Footnote 165: "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiseshika) is not "individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"--but it is the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth, water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the _ne plus ultra_, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated _visesha_ as "ultimate difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has _visesha_.]

[Footnote 166: Mutual non-existence (_anyonyábháva_) exists between two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;" but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.]

[Footnote 167: "_Samaváyasambandábhávát samaváyo na játih_," Siddh. Mukt. (_Samyoga_ being a _guna_ has _gunatva_ existing in it with intimate relation).]

[Footnote 168: The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union with fire" (Bháshá-parichchheda, _sl._ 103, 104).]

[Footnote 169: The organ of touch is an aërial integument.--_Colebrooke._]

[Footnote 170: Sound is twofold,--"produced from contact," as the _first_ sound, and "produced from sound," as the _second_. _Janya_ is added to exclude God's knowledge, while _samyogájanya_ excludes the soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind and the senses, &c.]

[Footnote 171: The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time with some body, &c., existing in time,--this latter is the intimate cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read _adhikaranam_.]

[Footnote 172: _Paratva_ being of two kinds, _daisika_ and _kálika_.]

[Footnote 173: Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the last, however, is not pervading but atomic.]

[Footnote 174: The three other _padárthas_, beside soul, which are _amúrtta_,--time, ether, and space,--are not genera.]

[Footnote 175: All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial, _i.e._, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things themselves--each being _one_; and they only become two, &c., by our choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.]

[Footnote 176: _Samskára_ is here the idea conceived by the mind--created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)]

[Footnote 177: Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.]

[Footnote 178: Every cause must be either _jñápaka_ or _janaka_; _apekshábuddhi_, not being the former, must be the latter.]

[Footnote 179: _Apekshábuddhi_ apprehends "this is one," "this is one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of these, but in _both_ together.]

[Footnote 180: The Vaiseshikas held that the jívátman and space are each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion has not. Dr. Röer, in his version of the Bháshá-Parichchheda, has mistranslated an important Sútra which bears on this point. It is said in Sútra 26--

_----athákásasarírinam, avyápyavrittih kshaniko visesha-guna ishyate,_

which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special qualities of ether and soul (_i.e._, sound, knowledge, &c.) are limited to different portions and of momentary duration."]

[Footnote 181: The author here mentions two other causes of the destruction of _dvitva_ besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14 (_apekshábuddhi-nása_), viz., _ásrayanása_, and the united action of _both_:--

1. Ekatva-jñána |Avayava-kriyá | . . . 2. Apekshábuddhi |Avayava-vibhága |Avayava-kriyá. 3. Dvitvotpatti and |Avayava-samyoga-nása |Avayava-vibhága. ekatva-jñána-nása | | 4. Dvitvatvajñána |Dvitvádhárasya |Avayava-samyoga-nása. |(_i.e._, | |avayavinah) násah | 5. Dvitvaguna-buddhi|Dvitva-nása |Ádhára-nása and |of avayavin). (_i.e._, | apekshábuddhi-nása |(of avayavin). | 6. Dvitva-nása and | . . . |Dvitva-nása. dravya-buddhi | |

The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the course of the six steps of _ekatvajñána_, &c., one of the two parts is itself divided either at the _first_ or the _second_ moment. In the first case, the _dvitva_ of the whole is destroyed in the fifth moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding _dvitvádhára-nása_, or, as Mádhava calls it, _ásrayanivritti_. In the second case, the _nása_ arrives at the same moment simultaneously by both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united action of two causes, _apekshábuddhi-nása_ and _ádhára-nása_. Any _kriyá_ which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would be unimportant, as the _nása_ of the _dvitva_ of the whole would take place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and in this way it would be too late to affect that result.]

[Footnote 182: _I.e._, from the destruction of _apekshábuddhi_ follows the destruction of _dvitva_; but the other destructions previously described were followed by some production,--thus the knowledge of _dvitvatva_ arose from the destruction of _ekatvajñána_, &c. (cf. Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.]

[Footnote 183: From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another; thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black (or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two atoms.]

[Footnote 184: _I.e._, a kind of initiative tendency.]

[Footnote 185: These are explained at full length in the Siddhánta Muktávalí, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have--1. the destruction of the _dvyanuka_ and simultaneously a disjunction from the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the destruction of the black colour in the _dvyanuka_, and the simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the _dvyanuka_ with that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.]

[Footnote 186: The Vaiseshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old black jar is _destroyed_, its several compounds of two atoms, &c., being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of the Nyáya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes not the jar but its colour, &c.,--it is still the same jar, only it is red, not black.]

[Footnote 187: In p. 109, line 14, I read _gaganavibhágakartritvasya_.]

[Footnote 188: The Siddhánta Muktávalí, p. 112, describes the series of steps:--1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5. by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the pot.]

[Footnote 189: The original has a plural _vibhágán_, _i.e._, disjunctions from the several points.]

[Footnote 190: _I.e._, the disjunction of the hand and the points of space.]

[Footnote 191: The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gítá.]

[Footnote 192: For _dravyádi_ read _prithivyádi_.]

[Footnote 193: I am not sure that it would not be better to read _viddhavevidhayá_, rewounding the wounded, instead of _vriddhavívadhayá_.]

[Footnote 194: Unless you _see_ the rope you cannot mistake it for a serpent.]