Reading section 12

Author: Dasgupta, Surendranath

A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1. By Dasgupta, Surendranath. This historical English edition is listed by Project Gutenberg as public domain in the USA. Read the source text, search passages, and explore it with the reading assistant.

Contents
  1. Reading section 1
  2. Reading section 2
  3. Reading section 3
  4. Reading section 4
  5. Reading section 5
  6. Reading section 6
  7. Reading section 7
  8. Reading section 8
  9. Reading section 9
  10. Reading section 10
  11. Reading section 11
  12. Reading section 12
  13. Reading section 13
  14. Reading section 14
  15. Reading section 15
  16. Reading section 16
  17. Reading section 17
  18. Reading section 18
  19. Reading section 19
  20. Reading section 20
  21. Reading section 21
  22. Reading section 22
  23. Reading section 23
  24. Reading section 24
  25. Reading section 25
  26. Reading section 26
  27. Reading section 27
  28. Reading section 28
  29. Reading section 29
  30. Reading section 30
  31. Reading section 31
  32. Reading section 32
  33. Reading section 33
  34. Reading section 34
  35. Reading section 35
  36. Reading section 36
  37. Reading section 37
  38. Reading section 38
  39. Reading section 39
  40. Reading section 40
  41. Reading section 41
  42. Reading section 42
  43. Reading section 43
  44. Reading section 44
  45. Reading section 45
  46. Reading section 46
  47. Reading section 47
  48. Reading section 48
  49. Reading section 49
  50. Reading section 50
  51. Reading section 51
  52. Reading section 52
  53. Reading section 53
  54. Reading section 54
  55. Reading section 55
  56. Reading section 56

The vijñâna is indeed a direct product of the sa@mskâras and the sort of birth in which vijñâna should bring down (_nâmayati_) the new existence (_upapatti_) is determined by the sa@mskâras [Footnote ref 2], for in reality the happening of death (_mara@nabhava_) and the instillation of the vijñâna as the beginning of the new life (_upapattibhava_) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijñâna had not entered the womb then no nâmarûpa could have appeared [Footnote ref 3].

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This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus avidyâ and sa@mskâra of the past life produce the vijñâna, nâmarupa,

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[Footnote 1: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make your resolution, 'May I be a cakravarttî king in a next existence,'" _Sa@myutta_, IV. 303.]

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[Footnote 2: "_sa cedânandavijñâna@m mâtu@hkuk@sim nâvakrâmeta, na tat kalalam kalalatvâya sannivartteta_," _M. V._ 552. Compare _Caraka, S'ârîra_, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapîduka sattva" which connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births; character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the combination of many elements, so is the foetus.]

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[Footnote 3: _Madhyamaka v@riti_ (B.T.S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from _Dîgha_, II. 63, "si le vijñâna ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel la namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindânanda on S'a@nkara's commentary on the _Brahma-sûtras_ (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness (vijñâna) of the foetus is produced by the sa@mskâras of the previous birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nâma) and from that the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (_kalala-budbudâvasthâ_} is produced.]

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@sa@dâyatana, spars'a, vedanâ, t@r@s@nâ, upâdâna and the bhava (leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava produces the jâti and jarâmara@na of the next life [Footnote ref l].

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It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain extending in three sections over three lives are all but the manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally determine one another. Thus _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_ says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences of birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of the mind' have been taken into account, craving (_t@r@s@nâ_), grasping (_upâdâna_) and (_karma_) becoming (_bhava_) are implicitly accounted for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping and (_karma_) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also; and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are accounted for. And thus:

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Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit.'

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Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sa@nkhâra and viññâna, 2. vedanâ and tanhâ, 3. bhava and jâti) and the four groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) [Footnote ref 2]."

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These twelve interdependent links (_dvâdas'â@nga_) represent the pa@ticcasamuppâda (_pratâtyasamutpâda_) doctrines (dependent origination) [Footnote ref 3] which are themselves but sorrow and lead to cycles of sorrow. The term pa@ticcasamuppâda or pratîtyasamutpâda has been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature [Footnote ref 4].

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[Footnote 1: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pâli texts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in _Suma@ngalavilâsinî_ on _Mahânidâna suttanta_. We find it also in _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, VIII. 3. Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as tri@kâ@n@daka (having three branches) in _Abhidkarmakos'a_, III. 20-24. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "_sa pratîtyasamutpâdo dvâdas'â@ngastrikâ@n@daka@h pûrvâparântayordve dve madhye@s@tau_."]

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[Footnote 2: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, pp. 189-190.]

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[Footnote 3: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. 23 f., avijjâ and sa@nkhâra have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes not beyond."]

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[Footnote 4: _M. V._ p. 5 f.]

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Samutpâda means appearance or arising (_prâdurbhdâva_) and pratîtya means after getting (_prati+i+ya_); combining the two we find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijjâ is the paccaya of sa@nkhâra it is meant that avijjâ is the ground (_@thiti_) of the origin of the sa@nkhâras, is the ground of their movement, of the instrument through which they stand (_nimitta@t@thiti_), of their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause and of their function as the ground with reference to those which are determined by them. Avijjâ in all these nine ways is the ground of sa@nkhâra both in the past and also in the future, though avijjâ itself is determined in its turn by other grounds [Footnote ref 1]. When we take the betu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot think of anything else but succession, but when we take the paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the cause as ground. Thus when avijjâ is said to be the ground of the sa@nkhâras in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems reasonable to think that the sa@nkhâras were in some sense regarded as special manifestations of avijjâ [Footnote ref 2]. But as this point was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would be unwise to proceed further with it.

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The Khandhas.

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The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree and is generally used to mean group or aggregate [Footnote ref 3]. We have seen that Buddha said that there was no âtman (soul). He said that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us and are divided into five

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[Footnote 1: See _Pa@tisambhidâmagga_, vol. I.p. 50; see also _Majjhima Nikâya_, I. 67, _sa@nkhâra...avijjânidânâ avijjâsamudayâ avijjâjâtikâ avijjâpabhavâ_.]

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[Footnote 2: In the Yoga derivation of asmitâ (egoism), râga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidyâ we find also that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth of avidyâ (_pañcaparvî avidyâ_).]

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[Footnote 3: The word skandha is used in Chândogya, II. 23 (_trayo dharmaskandhâ@h yajña@h adhyayanam dânam_) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in Maitrî, VII. II.]

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classes: (1) rûpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense data, etc., (2) vedanâ (feeling--pleasurable, painful and indifferent), (3) saññâ (conceptual knowledge), (4) sa@nkhâra (synthetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts), (5) viññâna (consciousness) [Footnote ref 1].

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All these states rise depending one upon the other (_pa@ticcasamuppanna_) and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rûpa in rûpakhandha stands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense data [Footnote ref 2]. But "rûpa" is also used in the sense of pure organic affections or states of mind as we find in the _Khandha Yamaka_, I.p. 16, and also in _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86. Rûpaskandha according to _Dharmasa@mgraha_ means the aggregate of five senses, the five sensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense perceptions _vijñapti_).

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The elaborate discussion of _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ begins by defining rûpa as "_cattâro ca mahâbhûtâ catunnañca mahâbhntanam upâdâya rûpam_" (the four mahâbhûtas or elements and that proceeding from the grasping of that is called rûpa) [Footnote ref 3]. Buddhagho@sa explains it by saying that rûpa means the four mahâbhûtas and those which arise depending (_nissâya_) on them as a modification of them. In the rûpa the six senses including their affections are also included. In explaining why the four elements are called mahâbhûtas, Buddhagho@sa says: "Just as a magician (_mâyâkâra_) makes the water which is not hard appear as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold; just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves blue make themselves appear as blue (_nîlam upâdâ rûpam_), not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red or white (odâtam upâdârûpam), so on account of their similarity to the appearances created by the magician they are called mahâbhûta [Footnote ref 4]."

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In the _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ we find that the Buddha says, "O Bhikkhus it is called rûpam because it manifests (_rûpyati_); how

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[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86, etc.]

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[Footnote 2: _Abhidhammatthasangaha_, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]

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[Footnote 3: _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, pp. 124-179.]

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[Footnote 4: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 299.]

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does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rûpa [Footnote ref 1]."

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If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand what is meant by rûpa, I think we find that that which manifested itself to the senses and organs was called rûpa. No distinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations were "rûpa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sads nor in the Sâ@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and were therefore called rûpa; the forms of affection that appeared were also called rûpa; many other mental states or features which appeared with them were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 2]. The âyatanas or the senses were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 3]. The mahâbhûtas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they together with all that appeared in association with them were called rûpa and formed the rûpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials, sense-data, senses and sensations).

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In _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (III. 101) it is said that "the four mahâbhûtas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the rûpakkhandha (_rûpakkhandhassa paññâpanâya_). Contact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of feelings (_vedanâ_); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the saññâkkhandha; sense-contact is also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sa@nkhârakkhandha. But nâmarûpa is the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the viññânakkhandha." Thus not only feelings arise on account of the sense-contact but saññâ and sa@nkhâra also arise therefrom. Saññâ is that where specific knowing or

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[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86.]

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[Footnote 2: _Khandhayamaka_.]

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[Footnote 3: _Dhammasanga@ni_, p. 124 ff.]

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conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.

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Mrs. Rhys Davids writing on saññâ says: "In editing the second book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classification distinguishing between saññâ as cognitive assimilation on occasion of sense, and saññâ as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition (_patigha-saññâ_). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception on occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or name (_adhivachânâ-saññâ_) and is exercised by the _sensus communis_ (mano), when e.g. 'one is seated...and asks another who is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through his speech.' Thus there are two stages of saññâ-consciousness, 1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they are by naming [Footnote ref 1]."

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About sa@nkhâra we read in _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (III. 87) that it is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises (_abhisa@nkharonti_), it is that which conglomerated rûpa as rûpa, conglomerated saññâ as saññâ, sa@nkhâra as sa@nkhâra and consciousness (_viññâna_) as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises the conglomerated (_sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti_). It is thus a synthetic function which synthesises the passive rûpa, saññâ, sa@nkhâra and viññâna elements. The fact that we hear of 52 sa@nkhâra states and also that the sa@nkhâra exercises its synthetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show that probably the word sa@nkhâra is used in two senses, as mental states and as synthetic activity.

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Viññâna or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa, as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage at which the intellectual process started and also the final resulting consciousness.

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Buddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology says that "consciousness(_citta_)first comes into touch (_phassa_) with its object (_âramma@na_) and thereafter feeling, conception (_saññâ_) and volition (_cetanâ_) come in. This contact is like the pillars of a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it (_dabbasambhârasadisâ_). But it should not be thought that contact

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[Footnote 1: _Buddhist Psychology_, pp. 49, 50.]

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is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole consciousness (_ekacittasmi@m_) it cannot be said that this comes first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association with feeling (_vedanâ_), conceiving (_saññâ_) or volition (_cetanâ_); it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its _function_; or it has impact as its _essential property_ in the sense of attainment, owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. For it is said in the Commentary:--"contact in the four planes of existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.' But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the function of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of the union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its effect is feeling (_vedanâ_); though it is generated by the objects it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing (_anubhava_) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out

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[Footnote 1: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]

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whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or experience is its function [Footnote ref 1]."

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The special feature of saññâ is said to be the recognizing (_paccabhiññâ_) by means of a sign (_abhiññânena_). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality (of aspects)--_sabbasa@ngahikavasena_. The work of volition (_cetanâ_) is said to be coordination or binding together (_abhisandahana_). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said 'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2]." It seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkhâra was separately designated as cetanâ (volition).

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"When one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the pollen, so one could not say that the rûpa was 'I' or that the vedanâ was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I.' There is nowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'."

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