Reading section 16

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The Sarvâstivâdins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the case of composite things (_sa@mprayukta hetu_) and in the case of

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[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kumârajîva's Chinese version of Âryyadeva's commentary on the _Mâdhyamika s'âstra_ (chapter XX. Kârikâ 9).]

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the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum of "vijñâna" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and the aggregate of the five senses (_indriyas_) is called the perceiver. It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a substratum formed of them.

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of appearance (_sa@msthâna_) of long, short, round, square, high, low, straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (_kâyendriya_) has for its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other energies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse thought (_vijñâna_); each of the five senses is an agent without which none of the five vijñânas would become capable of perceiving an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal senses consists of a combination of paramâ@nus, which are extremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed on our person which is designated as avijñapti rûpa. It is called rûpa because it is a result or effect of rûpa-contact; it is called avijñapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered as twofold, namely, that as thought (_cetana karma_) and that as activity (_caitasika karma_). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.

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that due to body-motion (_kâyika karma_) and speech (_vâcika karma_). Both these may again be latent (_avijñapti_) and patent (_vijñapti_), giving us the kâyika-vijnñpti karma, kâyikâvijñapti karma, vâcika-vijñapti karma and vâcikâvijñapti karma. Avijñapti rûpa and avijñapti karma are what we should call in modern phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but are similar to those which are known, they are called avijñapti.

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it wills (_cetati_), manas because it thinks (_manvate_) and vijñâna because it discriminates (_nirdis'ati_). The discrimination may be of three kinds: (1) svabhâva nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination), (2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present, past and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination referring only to the past). The senses only possess the _svabhâva nirdes'a_, the other two belong exclusively to manovijñâna. Each of the vijñânas as associated with its specific sense discriminates its particular object and perceives its general characteristics; the six vijñânas combine to form what is known as the Vijñânaskandha, which is presided over by mind (_mano_). There are forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rta dharmas âkâs'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance (_nîrûpâkhya_, non-rûpa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhyâ nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because they are non-existent but because the conditions which would have made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rta dharma, pratisa@mkhyâ nirodha, is the final deliverance from bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These are called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negation they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1].

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[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hînayâna thinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nâgârjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]

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Mahâyânism.

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahâyânism took its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahâsa@nghikas separated themselves from the Theravâdins probably some time in 400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be labelled as Mahâyâna were gradually on the way to taking their first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works which are regarded as various Mahâyâna sûtras, some of which are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others as late as 300 or 400 A.D.[Footnote ref 1]. These Mahâyânasûtras, also called the Vaipulyasûtras, are generally all in the form of instructions given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravâda school.

The word Hînayâna refers to the schools of Theravâda, and as such it is contrasted with Mahâyâna. The words are generally translated as small vehicle (_hîna_ = small, _yâna_ = vehicle) and great vehicle (_mahâ_ = great, _yâna_ = vehicle). But this translation by no means expresses what is meant by Mahâyâna and Hînayâna [Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A.D.) in his _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_ gives

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[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these sûtras are found in Candrakîrtti's commentary on the _Mâdhyamîka kârikâs_ of Nâgârjuna; some of these are the following: _A@s@tasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ_ (translated into Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ, Gaganagañja, Samâdhisûtra, Tathâgataguhyasûtra, D@r@dhâdhyâs'ayasañcodanâsûtra, Dhyâyitamu@s@tisûtra, Pitâputrasamâgamasûtra, Mahâyânasûtra, Mâradamanasûtra, Ratnakû@tasûtra, Ratnacû@dâparip@rcchâsûtra, Ratnameghasûtra, Ratnarâs`isûtra, Ratnâkarasûtra, Râ@s@trapâlaparip@rcchâsûtra, La@nkâvatârasûtra, Lalitavistarasûtra, Vajracchedikâsûtra, Vimalakîrttinirdes'asûtra, S'âlistambhasûtra, Samâdhirajasutra, Sukhâvatîvyûha, Suvar@naprabhâsasûtra, Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255), Amitâyurdhyânasûtra, Hastikâkhyasûtra, etc.]

[Footnote 2: The word Yâna is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle (_Lalitavistara_, pp. 25, 38; _Prajñâpâramitâ_, pp. 24, 319; _Samâdhirâjasûtra_, p. 1; _Karu@nâpu@ndarîka_, p. 67; _La@nkâvatârasûtra_, pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yâna is as old as the Upani@sads where we read of Devayâna and Pit@ryâna. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in _La@nkâvatâra_ of S'râvakayâna (career of the S'râvakas or the Theravâdin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayâna (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha yâna (career of the Buddhas), Ekayâna (one career), Devayâna (career of the gods), Brahmayâna (career of becoming a Brahmâ), Tathâgatayâna (career of a Tathâgata). In one place _Lankâvatâra_ says that ordinarily distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (_Lankâvatâra_, p. 68).]

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us the reason why one school was called Hînayâna whereas the other, which he professed, was called Mahâyâna. He says that, considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion, the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hînayâna occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Mahâ (great) Yâna, and hence it is branded as Hîna (small, or low). This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction between Hînayâna and Mahâyâna. The ultimate good of an adherent of the Hînayâna is to attain his own nirvâ@na or salvation, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahâyâna creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the salvation of all beings. So the Hînayâna goal was lower, and in consequence of that the instructions that its followers received, the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were narrower than that of the Mahâyâna adherents. A Hînayâna man had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahâyâna adherent was prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain salvation. So the Hînayana adherents required only a short period of work and may from that point of view also be called _hîna,_ or lower.

This point, though important from the point of view of the difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mahâyânists which distinguishes them from the Hînayânists from the philosophical point of view. The Mahâyânists believed that all things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and void at bottom, whereas the Hînayânists only believed in the impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than that.

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nâgârjuna first preached the doctrine of S'ûnyavâda (essencelessness or voidness of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahâyâna sûtras either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we take some of those sûtras which were in all probability earlier than Nâgârjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nâgârjuna expounded

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with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhûti saying to the Buddha that vedanâ (feeling), samjñâ (concepts) and the sa@mskâras (conformations) are all mâyâ (illusion) [Footnote ref 1]. All the skandhas, dhätus (elements) and âyatanas are void and absolute cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void is not different from the skandhas, dhâtus and âyatanas, and this absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge (_prajñâpâramitâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void there is in reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (_s'âs'vata_) nor non-eternal (_as'âs'vata_) but pure void. It should be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness" (_tathatâ_) and consider all things as void. The saint (_bodhisattva_) has to establish himself in all the virtues (_pâramitâ_), benevolence (_dânapâramitâ_), the virtue of character (_s'îlapâramitâ_), the virtue of forbearance (_k@sântipâramitâ_), the virtue of tenacity and strength (_vîryyapâramitâ_) and the virtue of meditation (_dhyânapâramitâ_). The saint (_bodhisattva_) is firmly determined that he will help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvâ@na. In reality, however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his work on the strength of his pâramitâs, though in reality there is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who is to help him to attain it [Footnote ref 3]. The true prajñapâramitâ is the absolute cessation of all appearance (_ya@h anupalambha@h sarvadharmâ@nâm sa prajñâpâramitâ ityucyate_) [Footnote ref 4].

The Mahâyâna doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that of S'ûnyavâda or the Mâdhyamika doctrine and Vijñânavâda. The difference between S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda (the theory that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness) is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But while the S'ûnyavâdins were more busy in showing this indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijñânavâdins, tacitly accepting

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[Footnote 1: _A@s@tesâhasiihâprajñâpâramita_, p. 16.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid p. 177.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid p. 21.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid p. 177.]

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the truth preached by the S'ûnyavâdins, interested themselves in explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (_vâsanâ_).

As'vagho@sa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher of a new type of idealism (_vijñânavâda_) known as the Tathatâ philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in As'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpâdas'âstra_ as being made from _La@nkâvatârasûtra_, we should think of the _La@nkâvatârasûtra_ as being one of the early works of the Vijñânavâdins [Footnote ref 1]. The greatest later writer of the Vijñânavâda school was Asa@nga (400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the _Saptadas'abhûmi sûtra, Mahâyâna sûtra, Upades'a, Mahâyânasamparigraha s'âstra, Yogâcârabhûmi s'âstra_ and _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_. None of these works excepting the last one is available to readers who have no access to the Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are in all probability lost. The Vijñânavâda school is known to Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogâcâra, and it does not seem an improbable supposition that Asa@nga's _Yogâcârabhûmi s'âstra_ was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu, a younger brother of Asa@nga, was, as Paramârtha (499-569) tells us, at first a liberal Sarvâstivâdin, but was converted to Vijñânavâda, late in his life, by Asa@nga. Thus Vasubandhu, who wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvâstivâdins, _Abhidharmakos'a_, devoted himself in his later life to Vijñânavâda [Footnote ref 2]. He is said to have commented upon a number of Mahâyâna sûtras, such as _Avata@msaka, Nirvâ@na, Saddharmapu@n@darîka, Prajñâpâramitâ, Vimalakîrtti_ and _S'rîmâlâsi@mhanâda_, and compiled some Mahâyâna sûtras, such as _Vijñânamâtrasiddhi, Ratnatraya_, etc. The school of Vijñânavâda continued for at least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.

We have already noticed that the S'ûnyavâda formed the fundamental principle of all schools of Mahâyâna. The most powerful exponent of this doctrine was Nâgârjuna (1OO A.D.), a brief account of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nâgârjuna's kârikâs (verses) were commented upon by Âryyadeva, a disciple of his, Kumârajîva (383 A.D.). Buddhapâlita and Candrakîrtti (550 A.D.). Âryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at

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[Footnote 1: Dr S.C. Vidyâbhûshana thinks that _Lankâvatâna_ belongs to about 300 A.D.]

[Footnote 2: Takakusu's "A study of the Paramârtha's life of Vasubandhu," _J.R.A.S_. 1905.]

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least three other books, viz. _Catu@hs'ataka, Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_ and _Cittavis`uddhiprakara@na_ [Footnote ref 1]. In the small work called _Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_ Âryyadeva says that whatever depends for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory; all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal appearances. In his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_ he says that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination (_vikalpa_). In reality the mind (_citta_) without a touch of imagination (_kalpanâ_) in it is the pure reality.

It does not seem however that the S'ûnyavâdins could produce any great writers after Candrakîrtti. References to S'ûnyavâda show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers until the time of the great Mîmâ@msâ authority Kumârila who flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the S'ûnyavâdins were no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.

The Tathataâ Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.) [Footnote ref 2].

As'vagho@sa was the son of a Brahmin named Sai@mhaguhya who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably converted to Buddhism by Pâr@sva who was an important person in the third Buddhist Council promoted, according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere and according to other authorities by Pu@nyayas'as [Footnote ref 3].

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[Footnote 1: Âryyadeva's _Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_ has been reclaimed by Dr. F.W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_ were published by Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda s'âstrî in the Bengal Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.]

[Footnote 2: The above section is based on the _Awakening of Faith_, an English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of _S'raddhotpâdas`âstra_ by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of which appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence to show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska.]

[Footnote 3: Târanâtha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple of Nâgârjuna, _Geschichte des Buddhismus_, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's _Awakening of Faith_, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrote the _Buddhacaritakâvya_, of great poetical excellence, and the _Mahâla@mkâras'âstra_. He was also a musician and had invented a musical instrument called Râstavara that he might by that means convert the people of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-âtmanness of life." Suzuki, p. 35.]

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He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished --the aspect as thatness (_bhûtatathatâ_) and the aspect as the cycle of birth and death (_sa@msâra_). The soul as bhûtatathatâ means the oneness of the totality of all things (_dharmadhâtu_). Its essential nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (_sm@rti_) appear under the forms of individuation [Footnote ref 1]. If we could overcome this sm@rti "the signs of individuation would disappear and there would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They possess absolute sameness (_samatâ_). They are subject neither to transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul" --thatness (_bhûtatathatâ_). This "thatness" has no attribute and it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness." As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This bhûtatathatâ is neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence; it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call it negation, "s'ûnyatâ," in this sense. The truth is that which

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[Footnote 1: I have ventured to translate "_sm@rti_" in the sense of vâsanâ in preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because sm@rti in the sense of vâsanâ is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works as _La@nkâvatâra_. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.]

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subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (_s'ûnyatâ_) is also void (_s'ûnya_) in its nature, that neither that which is negated nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it, because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory (_sm@rti_) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the truth--the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.

"The soul as birth and death (_sa@msâra_) comes forth from the Tathâgata womb (_tathâgatagarbha_), the ultimate reality. But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation it is called the all-conserving mind (_âlayavijñâna_). It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient memory (_sm@rti_). It penetrates all and is the unity of all (_dharmadhâtu_). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakâya of all Tathâgatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence--a mere imaginary creation of the perceivers under the influence of the delusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (_bahujana_) are said to be lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (_avidyâ_) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of sm@rti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested of this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation, viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation with the one soul, for they are not self-existent.