Reading section 32

The karmas performed in the present life will generally accumulate, and when the time for giving their fruits comes, such a life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for him according to the evolution of prak@rti as shall make it possible for him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the

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[Footnote 1: _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_, II. 3-9.]

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present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth (as this or that animal or man), the period of life (_âyu@s_) and the painful or pleasurable experiences (_bhoga_) destined for that life. Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often produce their effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has done certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which he requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which he requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain in abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first and then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his good actions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions, all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot again be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those karmas which have already ripened. This is the _jîvanmukti_ stage, when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering mundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already ripened (_ti@s@thati sa@mskâravas'ât cakrabhramivaddh@rtas'arîra@h_).

Citta.

The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patañjali in his _Yoga sûtra_ in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration may be brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against a mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct. The citta which has the concentration of the former type is called _k@sipta_ (wild) and of the latter type _pramû@dha_ (ignorant). There is another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in which concentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining steady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to another thing and so on. This is called the _vik@sipta_ (unsteady) stage of mind (_cittabhûmi_). As distinguished from these there is an advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily on an object for a long time. This is the _ekâgra_ (one-pointed) stage. There is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processes are absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti, and is called the _nirodha_ (cessation) state of citta. The purpose of Yoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta.

The cittas have five processes (_v@rtti_), (1) _pramâ@na_ [Footnote ref 1] (valid

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[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any cognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not on correspondence with external facts or objects (_svata@h prâmâ@nya@m svata@h aprâmâ@nya@m_). The contribution of Sâ@mkhya to the doctrine of inference is not definitely known. What little Vâcaspati says on the subject has been borrowed from Vâtsyâyana such as the _pûrvavat, s'e@savat_ and _sâmânyatodr@s@ta_ types of inference, and these may better be consulted in our chapter on Nyâya or in the Tâtparya@tîkâ_ of Vâcaspati. Sâ@mkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds of inference "_mâtrânimittasa@myogivirodhisahacâribhi@h. Svasvâmibadhyaghâtâdyai@h sâ@mkhyânâ@m saptadhânumâ_" (_Tâtparya@tîkâ_, p. 109). Sâ@mkhya definition of inference as given by Udyotakara (I.I. V) is "_sambandhâdekasmât pratyak@sacche@sasiddhiranumânam_."]

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cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference and scriptural testimony), (2) _viparyaya_ (false knowledge, illusion, etc.), (3) _vikalpa_ (abstraction, construction and different kinds of imagination), (4) _nidrâ_ (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which tamas tends to predominate), (5) _sm@rti_ (memory).

These states of mind (_v@rtti_) comprise our inner experience. When they lead us towards sâ@msara into the course of passions and their satisfactions, they are said to be _kli@s@ta_ (afflicted or leading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, they are called _akli@s@ta_ (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards sa@msara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of mind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states, and whichever state should tend towards our final good (liberation) must be regarded as good.

This draws attention to that important characteristic of citta, that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and sometimes towards bad (sâ@msara). It is like a river, as the _Vyâsabhâ@sya says, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the good. The teleology of prak@rti requires that it should produce in man the sâ@msara as well as the liberation tendency.

Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts, and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows that our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation [Footnote ref 1]. Removal of pains

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[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction of three kinds of sorrows, _âdhyâtmika_ (generated internally by the illness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind), _âdhibhautika_ (generated externally by the injuries inflicted by other men, beasts, etc.) and _âdhidaivika_ (generated by the injuries inflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours (_puru@sârtha_).]

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is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible tendency of the mind. Man has power (_s'akti_) stored up in his citta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may gradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the other. He must succeed in this, since prak@rti wants liberation for her final realization [Footnote ref 1].

Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).

The purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind on the gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation, so that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and more weakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mind can be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should be purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yogin should practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (_ahi@msâ_), absolute and strict truthfulness (_satya_), non-stealing (_asteya_), absolute sexual restraint (_brahmacarya_) and the acceptance of nothing but that which is absolutely necessary (_aparigraha_). These are collectively called _yama_. Again side by side with these abstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablutions and inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, the habit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping the body unmoved and remaining silent in speech (_tapas_), the study of philosophy (_svâdhyâya_) and meditation on Îs'vara (_Îs'varapra@nidhâna_). These are collectively called _niyamas_. To these are also to be added certain other moral disciplines such as _pratipak@sa-bhâvanâ, maitrî, karu@nâ, muditâ_ and _upek@sâ_. Pratipak@sa-bhâvanâ means that whenever a bad thought (e.g. selfish motive) may come one should practise the opposite good thought (self-sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope. Most of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relations with our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mere abstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one should habituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations with our fellow-beings. The practice of maitrî means to think of all beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves to think this, we can never be displeased with them. So too one should practise karu@nâ or kindly feeling for sufferers, muditâ

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[Footnote 1: See my "_Yoga Psychology_," _Quest_, October, 1921.]

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or a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upek@sâ or a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others. The last one indicates that the yogin should not take any note of the vices of vicious men.

When the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures (_vairâgya_) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the performances of Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its dross and made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin may attain liberation by a constant practice (_abhyâsa_) attended with faith, confidence (_s'raddhâ_), strength of purpose and execution (_vîrya_) arid wisdom (_prajñâ_) attained at each advance.

The Yoga Meditation.

When the mind has become pure the chances of its being ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (_âsana_) and fixes his mind on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should fix it on Îs'vara, for in that case Îs'vara being pleased removes many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for him to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice, and can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration (_samâdhi_) of his mind. There are four states of this unifying concentration namely _vitarka, vicâra, ânanda_ and _asmitâ_. Of these vitarka and vicâra have each two varieties, _savitarka, nirvitarka, savicâra, nirvicâra_ [Footnote ref 1]. When the mind concentrates on objects, remembering their names and qualities, it is called the savitarka stage; when on the five tanmâtras with a remembrance of their qualities it is called savicâra, and when it is one with the tanmâtras without any notion of their qualities it is called nirvicâra. Higher than these are the ânanda and the asmitâ states. In the ânanda state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its functions of the senses causing pleasure. In the asmitâ stage buddhi concentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifications. In all these stages there are objects on which the mind consciously concentrates, these are therefore called the _samprajñâta_ (with knowledge of objects) types of samâdhi. Next to this comes the last stage of samâdhi called the _asamprajñâta_ or nirodha samâdhi, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining

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[Footnote 1: Vâcaspati, however, thinks that ânanda and asmitâ have also two other varieties, which is denied by Bhik@su.]

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long in this stage the old potencies (sa@mskâras) or impressions due to the continued experience of worldly events tending towards the objective world or towards any process of experiencing inner thinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of the nirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when the buddhi becomes as pure as the puru@sa, and after that the citta not being able to bind the puru@sa any longer returns back to prak@rti.

In order to practise this concentration one has to see that there may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select a quiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstacles is, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. This has to be stopped by the practice of _prâ@nâyâma_. Prâ@nâyâma consists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and then giving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily for hours, days, months and even years. When there is no need of taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retained steady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed.

The process of practising concentration is begun by sitting in a steady posture, holding the breath by prâ@nâyâma, excluding all other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (_dhâra@nâ_). At first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the same thought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is called _dhyâna._ After sufficient practice in dhyâna the mind attains the power of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes one with its object and there is no change or repetition. There is no consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mind becomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is called _samâdhi_ [Footnote ref 1]. We have already described the six stages of samâdhi. As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of samâdhi, he passes on to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwards he attains miraculous powers (_vibhûti_) and his faith and hope in the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with them many temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and even though the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax. His wisdom (_prajñâ_) also increases at each step. Prajñâ knowledge is as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to

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[Footnote 1: It should be noted that the word _samâdhi_ cannot properly be translated either by "concentration" or by "meditation." It means that peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes one with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing states.]

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certain gross things and certain gross qualities [Footnote ref 1] prajñâ has no such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, the tanmâtras, the gu@nas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all their subtle conditions and qualities [Footnote ref 2]. As the potencies (_sa@mskâra_) of the prajñâ wisdom grow in strength the potencies of ordinary knowledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remain always in his prajñâ wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this prajñâ that it leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to sa@msâra. The final prajñâs which lead to liberation are of seven kinds, namely, (1) I have known the world, the object of suffering and misery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds and roots of sa@msâra have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more of it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact of direct cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge in the shape of a discrimination of puru@sa from prak@rti has been understood. The other three are not psychological but are rather metaphysical processes associated with the situation. They are as follows: (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience and emancipation (_bhoga_ and _apavarga_) has been realized. (6) The strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gu@nas drives them into prak@rti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops. (7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the gu@nas become merged in the prak@rti and remain there for ever. The puru@sa having passed beyond the bondage of the gu@nas shines forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness in this Sâ@mkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prak@rti. It is thus a state of pure intelligence. What the Sâ@mkhya tries to achieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected discipline of the will and psychological control of the mental states.

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[Footnote 1: The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the _Kârikâ_ as follows: Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky), extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ (e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object (e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight), being mixed up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown into a lake).]

[Footnote 2: Though all things are but the modifications of gu@nas yet the real nature of the gu@nas is never revealed by the sense knowledge. What appears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic (mâyâ):

"_Gunânâ@m parama@m rûpam na d@r@s@tipatham@rcchati Yattu d@rs@tipatham prâptam tanmâyeva sutucchakam._"

_Vyâsabhâ@sya_, IV. 13.

The real nature of the gu@nas is thus revealed only by _prajñâ._]

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CHAPTER VIII

THE NYÂYA-VAIS'E@SIKA PHILOSOPHY

Criticism of Buddhism and Sâ@mkhya from the Nyâya standpoint.

The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary; each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to another group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation representing milk generates the collocation of curd it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming the cause-collocation and the _modus operandi_ is unintelligible; the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment. The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness, blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience. Moreover there would be no difference between material (_upâdâna_, e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (_nimitta_ and _sahakâri_, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental causes, as such.

Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its

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effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the moment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is that causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we perceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as future and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.

The Sâ@mkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is already existent even before the causal movement for the production of the effect, is also baseless. Sâ@mkhya says that the oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of clay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never carry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug. What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest or actual? What does potential state mean? The potential state of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state of the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Sâ@mkhya that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again Sâ@mkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different

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from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss that the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puru@sa and then again on buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul (_âtman_) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why Sâ@mkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge, feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double reflection. Again Sâ@mkhya prak@rti is non-intelligent, and where is the guarantee that she (prak@rti) will not bind the wise again and will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puru@sa become bound down? Prak@rti is being utilized for enjoyment by the infinite number of puru@sas, and she is no delicate girl (as Sâ@mkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puru@sa ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure (_sukha_), sorrow (_du@hkha_) and a blinding feeling through ignorance (_moha_) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what impudence could Sâ@mkhya think of these as material substances? Again their cosmology of a mahat, aha@mkâra, the tanmâtras, is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders. The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction in the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other systems. (See _Nyâyamañjarî,_ pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)

Nyâya and Vais'e@sika sûtras.

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyâya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in the days of the Upani@sads, and the art of disputation was regarded even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by the name _vâkovâkya_. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Âpastamba who according to Bühler lived before the third century B.C. used the word Nyâya in the sense of Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. The word Nyâya derived

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[Footnote 1 _Âpastamba,_ trans. by Bühler, Introduction, p. XXVII., and Bodas's article on the _Historical Survey of Indian Logic_ in the Bombay Branch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.]