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But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has been pointed out by the Nyâya school in a very strong and emphatic manner. Even Sâ@mkhya did not try to prove that the existence of its transcendent puru@sa could be demonstrated in experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle towards virtue and emancipation. Sâ@mkhya had first supposed knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as puru@sa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by the inadequate analysis of consciousness (_buddhi_) as being non-intelligent and incessantly changing.

Nyâya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality, and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-conscious

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thought. Of course it is true that Sâ@mkhya had approached nearer to this view than Nyâya, but it had separated the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this could not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift--a transcendent illusion running on from beginningless time. These difficulties occurred because Sâ@mkhya soared to a region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common sense experience. The Nyâya position is of course much worse as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common sense experience that substances are different from qualities and actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is, to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and an account of experience should be given according to its verdict. No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction is ushered in by the Mîmâ@msâ system. The _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ were written by Jaimini and the commentary (_bhâ@sya_) on it was written by S'abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made by Kumârila, who preceded the great S'a@nkarâcârya, and a disciple of Kumârila, Prabhâkara.

The Mîmâ@msâ Literature.

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in India in the Brâhma@nas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition

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had it, and this it seems gave rise to the sm@rti literature. Discussions and doubts became more common about the many intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and priests. These represent the beginnings of Mîmâ@msâ (lit. attempts at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ (which are with us the foundations of Mîmâ@msâ) are only a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from the references he gives to the views in different matters of other preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work of the Mîmâ@msâ system. Commentaries were written on it by various persons such as Bhart@rmitra (alluded to in _Nyâyaratnâkara_ verse 10 of _S'lokavârttika_), Bhavadâsa {_Pratijñasûtra_ 63}, Hari and Upavar@sa (mentioned in _S'âstradîpikâ_). It is probable that at least some of these preceded S'abara, the writer of the famous commentary known as the _S'abara-bhâ@sya_. It is difficult to say anything about the time in which he flourished. Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current verse which speaks of King Vikramâditya as being the son of S'abarasvâmin by a K@sattriya wife. This bhâ@sya of S'abara is the basis of the later Mîmâ@msâ works. It was commented upon by an unknown person alluded to as Vârttikakâra by Prabhâkara and merely referred to as "yathâhu@h" (as they say) by Kumârila. Dr Ga@nganâtha Jhâ says that Prabhâkara's commentary _B@rhatî_ on the _S'abara-bhâ@sya_ was based upon the work of this Vârttikakâra. This _B@rhatî_ of Prabhâkara had another commentary on it--_@Rjuvimâlâ_ by S'alikanâtha Mis'ra, who also wrote a compendium on the Prabhâkara interpretation of Mîmâ@msâ called _Prakara@napañcikâ_. Tradition says that Prabhâkara (often referred to as Nibandhakâra), whose views are often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of Kumârila. Kumârila Bha@t@ta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary of S'a@nkara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent

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exposition of S'abara's bhâ@sya in three parts known as _S'lokavârttika_ (dealing only with the philosophical portion of S'abara's work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as Tarkapâda), _Tantravârttika_ (dealing with the remaining three chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and _@Tup@tîkâ_ (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books) [Footnote ref 1]. Kumârila is referred to by his later followers as Bha@t@ta, Bha@t@tapâda, and Vârttikakâra. The next great Mîmâ@msâ scholar and follower of Kumârila was Ma@n@dana Mis'ra, the author of _Vidhiviveka, Mîmâ@msânukrama@nî_ and the commentator of _Tantravârttika,_ who became later on converted by S'a@nkara to Vedantism. Pârthasârathi Mis'ra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his _S'âstradîpikâ, Tantraratna,_ and _Nyâyaratnamâlâ_ following the footprints of Kumârila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumârila, the names of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of _Kâs'ikâ_ and Somes'vara the author of _Nyâyasudhâ_ deserve special notice. Râmak@r@s@na Bha@t@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the _Tarkapâda_ of _S'âstradîpikâ_ called the _Yuktisnehapûra@nî-siddhânta-candrikâ_ and Somanâtha wrote his _Mayûkhamâlikâ_ on the remaining chapters of _S'âstradîpikâ_. Other important current Mîmâ@msâ works which deserve notice are such as _Nyâyamâlâvistara_ of Mâdhava, _Subodhinî, Mîmâ@msâbâlaprakâs'a_ of S'a@nkara Bha@t@ta, _Nyâyaka@nikâ_ of Vâcaspati Mis'ra, _Mîmâ@msâparibhâ@sa_ by K@r@s@nayajvan, _Mîmâ@msânyâyaprakâs'a_ by Anantadeva, Gâgâ Bha@t@ta's _Bha@t@tacintâma@ni,_ etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the Mîmâ@msâ literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all Vedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the sm@rti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained by them. The legal side of the sm@rtis consisting of inheritance, proprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even under the British administration is explained according to the Mîmâ@msâ maxims. Its relations to the Vedânta philosophy will be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with Nyâya-Vais'e@sika have also been pointed out in various places of this chapter. The views of the two schools of Mîmâ@msâ as propounded by Prabhâkara and Kumârila on all the important topics have

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[Footnote 1: Mahâmahopadhyâya Haraprasâda S'âstrî says, in his introduction to _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_, that "Kumârila preceded Sa@nkara by two generations."]

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also been pointed out. Prabhâkara's views however could not win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that he was regarded by Kumârila as a very strong rival [Footnote ref 1]. Hardly any new contribution has been made to the Mîmâ@msâ philosophy after Kumârila and Prabhâkara. The _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ deal mostly with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be gleaned out of them. S'abara's contributions are also slight and vague. Vârttikakâra's views also can only be gathered from the references to them by Kumârila and Prabhâkara. What we know of Mîmâ@msâ philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone. It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do not know of any work on Mîmâ@msâ written in English except the excellent one by Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ on the Prabhâkara Mîmâ@msâ to which I have frequently referred.

The Parata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Nyâya and the Svata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Mîmâ@msâ.

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mîmâ@msâ philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude of truth. The Mîmâ@msâ philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering (_sm@rti_) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. But Nyâya holds that this self-validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation. It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge

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[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumârila, not being able to convert Prabhâkara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhâkara whether his burial rites should be performed according to Kumârila's views or Prabhâkara's. Prabhâkara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by him only to rouse up Kumârila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumârila's views were the right ones. Kumârila then rose up and said that Prabhâkara was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But this has of course no historic value.]

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it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we should never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow the directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity, which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception with what we find later on in practical experience. Again, every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations, and as such depends upon them for its production, and hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else. It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (_arthakriyâjñâna_ or _phalajñâna_) just as perception or knowledge represented them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of knowledge (_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_), but validity is ascertained by _sa@mvâda_ or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnote ref l].

It is easy to see that this Nyâya objection is based on the supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 160-173.]

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only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations; we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted by experience; knowledge only photographs the objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is what is said to be the self-validity (_svata@h-prâmâ@ya_) of knowledge in its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent

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of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well (_svakâryakara@ne svata@h prâmâ@nya@m jñânasya_). Whenever there is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work (_prav@rtti_} according to its direction. There is no indecision in our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper of mind. This is what Mîmâ@msa means when it says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other data (_jñânasya prâ@mâ@nyam svata@h aprâmâ@nya@m parata@h_). Knowledge attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory experience (_bâdhakajñâna_) comes in or when our organs etc. are known to be faulty and defective (_kara@nado@sajñâna). It is from these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself.

The place of sense organs in perception.

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in

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face of the Nyâya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mîmâ@msâ probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore accepted the Nyâya view of sense-contact as a condition of knowledge with slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of svata@h-prâmâ@nya. It does not appear to have been conscious of a conflict between these two different principles of the production of knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked at it was that the fact that there were the senses and contacts of them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by virtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us a matter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge are never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, but when the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses must have acted. The only case where knowledge is found to be dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one knowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or knowledge as in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence of the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the physical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be operating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only inferred later on in accordance with the nature and characteristic of knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledge which is directly experienced from which we may proceed later on to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it. Thus it is that though contact of the senses with the objects may later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet the rise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us as original, underived, immediate, and first-hand.

Prabhâkara gives us a sketch as to how the existence of the senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects are phenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen always in the same manner, for these vary differently at different moments; the cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thus be regarded as the material cause (_samavâyikâra@na_); but there must be some such movements or other specific associations (_asamavâyikâra@na_) which render the production of this or that specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsist either in the cause of the material cause (e.g. in the case of the colouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which

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is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which form the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself (e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put in the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is eternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that the immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must inhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again accepting the Nyâya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities in an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some other substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul acquires would naturally require the contact of such substances. Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in other substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are three eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and space being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them. Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise of different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul. This atom may be called _manas_ (mind). This manas alone by itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized by these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must be one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light, and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye--for the cognition of colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the âkâs'ic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of touch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have to be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas