Reading section 33

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from the root _nî_ is sometimes explained as that by which sentences and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered into combination) were called Nyâya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on the strength of Kau@tilya's enumeration of the _vidyâ_ (sciences) as Ânvîk@sikî (the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge by further scrutiny), _trayî_ (the three Vedas), _vârttâ_ (the sciences of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and _da@n@danîti_ (polity), and the enumeration of the philosophies as Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Lokâyata and Ânvîk@sikî, supposes that the _Nyâya sûtra_ was not in existence in Kau@tilya's time 300 B.C.) [Footnote ref 2]. Kau@tilya's reference to Nyâya as Ânvîk@sikî only suggests that the word Nyâya was not a familiar name for Ânvîk@sikî in Kau@tilya's time. He seems to misunderstand Vâtsyâyana in thinking that Vâtsyâyana distinguishes Nyâya from the Ânvîk@sikî in holding that while the latter only means the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics. What appears from Vâtsyâyana's statement in _Nyâya sûtra_ I.i. 1 is this that he points out that the science which was known in his time as Nyâya was the same as was referred to as Ânvîk@sikî by Kau@tilya. He distinctly identifies Nyâyavidyâ with Ânvîk@sikî, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories such as _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt) etc., though these were already contained within the first two terms _pramâ@na_ (means of cognition) and _prameya_ (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its special and separate branches (_p@rthakprasthâna_) were treated, Nyâyavidyâ would simply become metaphysics (_adhyâtmavidyâ_) like the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Nyâya as the means of determining the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon by Vâtsyâyana and is sanctioned by Vâcaspati in his _Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ_ I.i. 1). He compares the meaning of the word Nyâya (_pramâ@nairarthaparîk@sa@nam_--to scrutinize an object by means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word ânvîk@sikî (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception and scriptures). Vâtsyâyana of course points out that so far as this logical side of Nyâya is concerned it has the widest scope for

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[Footnote 1: Kâlidâsa's _Kumârasambhava "Udghâto pra@navayâsâm nyâyaistribhirudîra@nam_," also Mallinâtha's gloss on it.]

[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi's "_The early history of Indian Philosophy," Indian Antiquary_, 1918.]

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itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences [Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Nyâya is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vâtsyâyana himself designates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasthâna (separate branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vâtsyâyana or Kau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made after Kau@tilya. Vâtsyâyana has no doubt put more stress on the importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or _adhyâtmavidyâ_ was acknowledged by all. But the importance of the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of the dharmas'âstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend any support to it, and Vâtsyâyana had to seek the support of Kau@tilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau@tilya was not satisfied by counting Ânvîk@sikî as one of the four vidyâs but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with Sâ@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kau@tilya's time Nyâya was composed of two branches, one as adhyâtmavidyâ and another as a science of logic or rather of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external, and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might not attract sufficient attention. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda S'âstrî in an article in the _Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society_ 1905 says that as Vâcaspati made two attempts to collect the _Nyâya sûtras_, one as _Nyâyasûci_ and the other as _Nyâyasûtroddhâra_, it seems that even in Vâcaspati's time he was not certain as to the authenticity of many of the _Nyâya sûtras_. He further points out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sûtras were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyâya and Yoga. He also

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[Footnote 1: _Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam_ (that by which one is led to act is called _prayojanam_); _yamartham abhîpsan jihâsan vâ karma ârabhate tenânena sarve prâ@nina@h sarvâ@ni karmâ@ni sarvâs'ca vidyâ@h vyâptâ@h tadâs'rayâs'ca nyâya@h pravarttate_ (all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana, and all these depend on Nyâya). _Vâtsyâyana bhâs'ya_, I.i. 1.]

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thinks that the sûtras underwent two additions, one at the hands of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs of the interpolation of many of the sûtras makes the fixing of the date of the original part of the _Nyâya sûtras_ still more difficult, for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the _Nyâya sûtras_ on the basis of references to S'ûnyavâda naturally loses its value, except on the supposition that all references to S'ûnyavâda must be later than Nâgârjuna, which is not correct, since the _Mahâyâna sûtras_ written before Nâgârjuna also held the S'ûnyavâda doctrine.

The late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na in _J.R.A.S._ 1918 thinks that the earlier part of Nyâya was written by Gautama about 550 B.C. whereas the _Nyâya sûtras_ of Ak@sapâda were written about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyâya in the sense of logic in _Mahâbhârata_ I.I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment of the subject that the fixing of the date of Ak@sapâda was made to fit in somehow with his idea that Ak@sapâda wrote his _Nyâya sûtras_ under the influence of Aristotle--a supposition which does not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part of the Nyâya. Goldstücker says that both Patañjali (140 B.C.) and Kâtyâyana (fourth century B.C.) knew the _Nyâya sûtras_ [Footnote ref 1]. We know that Kau@tilya knew the Nyâya in some form as Ânvîk@sikî in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say that the Nyâya existed in some form as early as the fourth century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think that at least some of the present sûtras were written some time in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Bâdarâya@na's sûtras make allusions to the Vais'e@sika doctrines and not to Nyâya. On this ground he thinks that _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ were written before Bâdarâyana's _Brahma-sûtras_, whereas the Nyâya sûtras were written later. Candrakânta Tarkâla@mkâra also contends in his

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[Footnote 1: Goldstücker's _Pâ@nini_, p. 157.]

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edition of Vais'e@sika that the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ were earlier than the Nyâya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes one of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the Vais`e@sika physics [Footnote ref 1]. The _La@nkâvatâra sûtra_ (which as it was quoted by As'vagho@sa is earlier than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing that the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ are probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2].

It is certain that even the logical part of the present _Nyâya sûtras_ was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which the sûtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (_avayava_) Vâtsyâyana says that this sûtra was written to refute the views of those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ also give us some of the earliest types of inference, which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyâya doctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].

Does Vais'e@sika represent an Old School of Mîmâ@msâ?

The Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Nyâya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ, older than that represented in the _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras._ But a closer inspection of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a _Vais'e@sika sûtra._ An examination of Caraka's _Sûtrasthâna_ (I.35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of the _Bhâ@sâpariccheda_ before him. _Caraka sûtra_ or _kârikâ_ (I.i. 36) says that the gu@nas are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the gu@na "_para_" (universality) and end with "_prayatna_" (effort) together with the sense-qualities (_sârthâ_). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found in the _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gu@nas,

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[Footnote 1: _Caraka, S'ârîra_, 39.]

[Footnote 2: See the next section.]

[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana's Bhâ@sya on the _Nyâya sûtras,_ I.i.32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in _Das'avaikâlikaniryukti_ as noted before.]

[Footnote 4: _Nyâya sûtra_ I.i. 5, and _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]

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heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness(_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@mskâra_), merit (_dharma_) and demerit (_adharma_); in one part of the sûtra the enumeration begins with "para" (universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's sûtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the Vais'e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. _Bhâ@sâpariccheda_ (a later Vais'e@sika compendium), is a compilation from some very old kârikâs which are referred to by Vis'vanâtha as being collected from "_atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h_"--(from very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of sâmânya and vis'e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ that sâmânya (generality) and vi'se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's sûtras were therefore probably written at a time when the Vais'e@sika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.

The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mîmâ@msâ doctrines and occasionally to Sâ@mkhya. There is no reason to suppose that the Mîmâ@msâ doctrines referred to allude to the _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ of Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyâya phraseology of "_pûrvavat_" and "_s'e@savat_" was not known. _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vetâs'vatara Upani@sad refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the

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[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha's article in _J.A.S.B._, 1908.]

[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that sâmânya is that which produces unity and vis'e@sa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Sâmânya and vis'e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]

[Footnote 3: _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]

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systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these sûtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic.

The _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ begins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, "dharma" This is we know the manifest duty of Mîmâ@msâ and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins his _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ by defining "dharma". This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'e@sika, viz, the description of the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (_nihsreyasa_) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3]. The fact that the Vais'e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the _ad@r@s@ta_ (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows that Ka@nâda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The

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[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara I.i.2]

[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the _Kalâpa Vyâkara@na_, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Ka@nâda in his _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himâlaya).

"_Dnarma@m vyâkhyâtukâmasya @sa@tpadârthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukâmasya sâgaragamanopamam_."]

[Footnote 3: The sutra "_Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmâ@nyam_ (I.i.3 and X.ii.9) has been explained by _Upaskâra_ as meaning "The Veda being the word of Îs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of Îs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyâya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of VI.ii.1.]

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description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in _Upaskara_) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Ka@nâda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to this, Ka@nâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (_snana_), fasting, holy student life (_brahmacarya_), remaining at the house of the teacher (_gurukulavasa_), retired forest life (_vanaprastha_), sacrifice (_yajña_), gifts (_dana_), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how

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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@nâda is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mîmâ@msâ will show that the later Mîmâ@msâ writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mîmâ@msâ differs from Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no Îs'vara is mentioned, and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with Mîmâ@msâ. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the _Vais`e@sika sûtras._ It is probable that Ka@nâda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mîmâ@msâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras,_ the view was probably what is represented in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras._ As there is no reference to Îs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâ@msâ philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and the Mîmâ@msâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@nâda gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâ@msâ view as we know from the later Mîmâ@msâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is

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[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his _Upaskâra_ (II. ii. 36 by adding an "_api_" to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as sâ@mkhya and bhava instead of sâ@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyâya Vais'e@sika view.]

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that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (_âgama_). To this the final Vais'e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as "I" (_aham_), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (_aham_) (III. ii. 10-18, also IX. i. 11).

These considerations lead me to think that the Vais'e@sika represented a school of Mîmâ@msâ thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.

Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sûtras.

The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (_dharma_) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (_abhyudaya_) and salvation (_ni@hs'reyasa_) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sûtra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (_dravya_), quality (_gu@na_), class concept (_sâmdânya_), particularity (_vis'e@sa_), and inherence (_samavâyay_) [Footnote ref 1]. The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The gu@nas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to species [Footnote ref 2]. Action (_karma_) means upward movement