Reading section 28

[Footnote 1: Weber's _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n.]

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the commentator of _Caraka,_ who belonged to the eleventh century A.D. Thus Cakrapâ@ni says that he adores the Ahipati (mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech and body by his _Pâtañjala mahâbhâ@sya_ and the revision of _Caraka._ Bhoja says: "Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign Ra@nara@nigamalla who by composing his grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patañjala and by producing a treatise on medicine called _Râjam@rgâ@nka_ has like the lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech, mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyâsa (which is considered to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion between the three Patañjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor, and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as _Pâtañjalatantra,_ and who has been quoted by S'ivadâsa in his commentary on _Cakradatta_ in connection with the heating of metals.

Professor J.H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great commentators of the grammar school such as Bhart@rhari, Kaiyya@ta, Vâmana, Jayâditya, Nâges'a, etc. are silent on this point. This is indeed a point against the identification of the two Patañjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later age. And if other proofs are available which go against such an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the Yoga writer to be the same person.

Let us now see if Patañjali's grammatical work contains anything which may lead us to think that he was not the same person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the philosophic concept of substance (_dravya_) of the two Patañjalis differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that dravya is described in _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ in one place as being the unity of species and qualities (_sâmânyavis'e@sâtmaka_), whereas the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by

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Vyâ@di and Vâjapyâyana (Vyâ@di holding that words denoted qualities or dravya and Vâjapyâyana holding that words denoted species [Footnote ref 1]). Even Pâ@nini had these two different ideas in "_jâtyâkhyâyâmekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyâm_" and "_sarûpânamekas'e@samekavibhaktau_," and Patañjali the writer of the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ only combined these two views. This does not show that he opposes the view of _Vyâsabhâ@sya_, though we must remember that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard to the writer of the sûtras. Moreover, when we read that dravya is spoken of in the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ as that object which is the specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.--"_yat sâsnâlâ@ngulakakudakhuravi@sâ@nyartharûpam_," we are reminded of its similarity with "_ayutasiddhâvayavabhedânugata@h samûha@h dravyam_" (a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the _Vyâsabhâsya_. So far as I have examined the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ I have not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us in holding that the two Patañjalis cannot be identified. There are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable for us to judge anything about the personal views of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the writer of the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ knew most of the important points of the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer to the gu@na theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sâ@mkhya dictum of ex nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of change _vikâra_ as production of new qualities _gu@nântarâdhâna_ (5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133). We may add to it that the _Mahâbhâ@sya_ agrees with the Yoga view as regards the Spho@tavâda, which is not held in common by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin their works in a similar manner (_atha yogânus'âsanam_ and _athas'âbdânus'âsanam_)--"now begins the compilation of the instructions on Yoga" (_Yoga sûtrâ_)--and "now begins the compilation of the instructions of words" (_Mahâbhâ@sya_).

It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments

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[Footnote 1: Patañjali's _Mahâbhâ@sya,_ 1. 2. 64.]

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which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the _Yoga sûtra_ between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive, as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patañjalis cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed Buddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which, as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they were written by Patañjali it cannot be inferred that because Vâcaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijñâna-vâdi type, we are to infer that the sûtras refer to Vasubandhu or even to Nâgârjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sûtras had been developing long before the time of Nâgârjuna.

Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two Patañjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative critical study of the _Yoga sûtras_ and the text of the _Mahâbhâ@sya,_ which can lead us to say that the writer of the _Yoga sûtras_ flourished at a later date than the other Patañjali.

Postponing our views about the time of Patañjali the Yoga editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing the other work _Kitâb Pâtanjal_, of which Alberuni speaks, for our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous one and he translates it along with another book called _Sânka_ (Sâ@mkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that this book was not the present _Yoga sûtra_ of Patañjali, though it had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation. The book was called by Alberuni _Kitâb Pâtanjal_, which is to be translated as the book of Pâtañjala, because in another place, speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when translated stands as "the author of the book of Pâtanjal." It had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes many extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in the _Yoga sûtra_, but the manner in which these are described (so

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[Footnote 1: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist reference _naraika-cittatantram vastu tadapramâ@nakam tadâ kim syât_ (IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vyâsabhâ@sya, as Bhoja, who had consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count it as sûtra.]

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far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change from what we find in the _Yoga sûtra_. Following the idea of God in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption with him and beatitude is obtained [Footnote ref 1].

The idea of soul is the same as we find in the _Yoga sûtra._ The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation corresponding to the four stages we have as in the _Yoga sûtra._ He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation, of which the first is the _abhyâsa_ (habit) of Patañjali, and the object of this abhyâsa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The second stands for vairâgya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. _Yoga sûtra,_ I. 23 and I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasâyana or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the same as in the _Yoga sûtra,_ II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an _urddhvamûla avâks'âkha as'vattha_ (a tree with roots upwards and branches below), after the Upani@sad fashion, the upper root is pure Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the

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[Footnote 1: Cf. _Yoga sûtra_ I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The _Yoga sûtras_ speak of Is'vâra (God) as an eternally emancipated puru@sa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of concentration. The commentator Vyâsa notes that he is the best object, for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No argument is given in the _Yoga sûtras_ of the existence of God.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]

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object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the roots.

The difference of this system from that of the _Yoga sûtra_ is: (1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] and the niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any connection with God as we find in the _Yoga sûtra_ has been lost sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in God; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significance of Yoga as control of mental states (_citta@rttinirodha_) is lost sight of, and (7) rasâyana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the means of salvation.

From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patañjali's _Yoga sûtra_ in the direction of Vedânta and Tantra, and as such it probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga doctrine of the sûtras entered into a new channel in such a way that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments of Vedânta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the author mentions rasâyana as a means of salvation, it is very probable that he flourished after Nâgarjuna and was probably the same person who wrote _Pâtañjala tantra_, who has been quoted by S'ivadâsa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of by Nâges'a as "_Carake_ Patañjali@h." We can also assume with some degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that Cakrapa@ni and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with the writer of the _Mahâbhâ@sya. It is also very probable that Cakrapâ@ni by his line "_pâtañjalamahâbhâ@syacarakapratisa@msk@rtai@h_" refers to this work which was called "Pâtañjala." The commentator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvîpas and the sâgaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the _Vyâsabhâ@sya_, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably written at a time when the _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ was not written or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni

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[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sâ@mkhya, gives a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. the account of _Pâs'upatadars'ana_ in _Sarvadas'anasa@mgraha_.]

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also described the book as being very famous at the time, and Bhoja and Cakrapâ@ni also probably confused him with Patañjali the grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this book of Patañjali was probably written by some other Patañjali within the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not be improbable that when _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ quotes in III. 44 as "_iti_ Patañjali@h," he refers to this Patañjali.

The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrâya@na Upani@sad consisted of six a@ngas or accessories, namely prâ@nâyâma, pratyâhâra, dhyâna, dhara@nâ, tarka and samâdhi [Footnote ref 1]. Comparing this list with that of the list in the _Yoga sûtras_ we find that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been replaced by âsana. Now from the account of the sixty-two heresies given in the _Brahmajâla sutta_ we know that there were people who either from meditation of three degrees or through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samâdhi or Dhyâna school as belonging to one class of thinkers called s'âs'vatavâda, and from the inclusion of tarka as an a@nga in samâdhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the a@ngas given in Maitrâya@nî Upani@sad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine, when the Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being grafted on each other, and when the Sa@mkhya method of discussion did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The substitution of âsana for tarka in the list of Patañjali shows that the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sa@mkhya. The introduction of ahi@msâ (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha (want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santo@sa (contentment) as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is deemed impossible (for the first time in the sûtras), probably marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrî, karu@nâ, muditâ, upek@sâ is also equally significant, as we do not find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation. Beginning from the _Âcârâ@ngasûtra, Uttarâdhyayanasûtra_,

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[Footnote 1: _prâ@nâyâmah pratyâhârah dhyânam dhara@nâ tarkah samâdhih sa@da@nga ityucyate yoga_ (Maitr. 6 8).]

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the _Sûtrak@rtâ@ngasûtra,_ etc., and passing through Umâsvati's _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_ to Hemacandra's _Yogas'âstra_ we find that the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the opinion expressed in Alberuni's _Pâtanjal_ that these cannot give salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the path to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics of the sa@msâra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination, decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism. Avidyâ is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidyâ should not be confused with the Vedânta avidyâ of S'a@nkara, as it is an avidyâ of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidyâ is the ignorance of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sûtra "_anityâs'ucidu@hkhânâtmasu nityas'ucidu@hkhâtmakhyâtiravidyâ_" (II. 5).

The ground of our existing is our will to live (_abhinives'a_). "This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts off being for us at least [Footnote ref 2]." This is true as much of Buddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used in the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things in this section is to show that the _Yoga sûtras_ proper (first three chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such

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[Footnote 1: _Yoga sûtra,_ II. 15, 16. 17. _Yathâcikitsâs'âstra@m caturvyûha@m rogo rogahetuh ârogya@m bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapi s'âstram caturvyûhameva; tadyathâ sa@msâra@h, sa@msârahetu@h mok@sa@h mok@sopâya@h; duhkhabahula@h sa@msâro heya@h, pradhânapuru@sayo@h sa@myogo heyahetu@h, sa@myogasyâtyantikî niv@rttirhâna@m hanopâya@h samyagdar`sanam, Vyâsabhâ@sya_, II. 15]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Buddhism_ [Footnote ref 1].]

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a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another. As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed to think that the date of the first three chapters of the _Yoga sûtras_ must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the grammarian Patañjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may take them as being identical [Footnote ref 1].

The Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Puru@sa.

The Sâ@mkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls and _prak@rti_, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are many, and had it not been so (the Sâ@mkhya argues) with the birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one all would have died [Footnote ref 2].

The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly grasp in order to understand the Sâ@mkhya philosophy. Unlike the Jaina soul possessing _anantajñâna, anantadars'ana, anantasukha_, and _anantavîryya_, the Sâ@mkhya soul is described as being devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute pure consciousness (_cit_). The Sâ@mkhya view differs from the Vedânta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (_ânanda_) [Footnote ref 3]. Bliss with Sâ@mkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it belongs to prak@rti and does not constitute the nature of soul; secondly, according to Vedânta the individual souls (_Jîva_) are

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[Footnote 1: See S.N. Das Gupta, _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought,_ ch. II. The most important point in favour of this identification seems to be that both the Patañjalis as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of _spho@ta_ which was denied even by Sâ@mkhya. On the doctrine of Spho@ta see my _Study of Patanjali_, Appendix I.]

[Footnote 2: _Kârikâ_, 18.]

[Footnote 3: See Citsukha's _Tattvapradîpikâ,_ IV.]

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but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the Brahman, but according to Sâ@mkhya they are all real and many.

The most interesting feature of Sâ@mkhya as of Vedânta is the analysis of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya holds that our knowledge of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind, the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go, they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things, and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest. These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious, if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted as the experience of a person [Footnote ref 1]. We know that the Upani@sads consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas, and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes. The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self" but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other things, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The Jains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the veil. Sâ@mkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image of knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle matter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance, and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves, the pictures appear one by one before the light and arc illuminated. So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would be blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and

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[Footnote 1: _Tattakaumudî_ 5; _Yogavârttika_, IV. 22; _Vijñânâm@rtabhâ@sya_, p. 74; _Yogavârttika_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_, I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; _Vyâsabhâ@sya,_ I. 6, 7.]

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so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious. This principle of consciousness (_cit_) cannot indeed be separately perceived _per se_, but the presence of this principle in all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference. This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality, no impurity [Footnote ref 1]. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes place in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it, and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is but a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the principle of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge carries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness, it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness. Knowledge-revelation is not just the unveiling or revelation of a particular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation of the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening, pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind knowledge-stuff.