Reading section 36

The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of sa@mskâra (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyâya. The _Nyâya sûtras_ give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of sa@mskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais'e@sika does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three classifications as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and samânyatod@r@s@ta, but no definition. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyâpti (concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _sâdhya_ (probandum)) which became so important in later Nyâya has never been properly formulated either in the _Nyâya sûtras_ or in the Vais'e@sika. _Vais'e@sika sutra_, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (_prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya_),

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[Footnote 1: _J.A.S.B._ 1905.]

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but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of the term _prasiddhipûrvakatva_ of Vais'e@sika seems to be more loose than the term _vyâpti_ as we know it in the later Nyâya. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not count scriptures (_s'abda_) as a separate pramâ@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With _Nyâya sûtras_ s'abda as a pramâ@na applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds _@r@si, ârya_ and _mleccha_ (foreigners). Upamâna which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even referred to in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_. The _Nyâya sûtras_ know of other pramâ@nas, such as _arthâpatti, sambhava_ and _aitihya_, but include them within the pramâ@nas admitted by them, but the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ believe in the perception of negation (abhâva) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). The _Nyâya sûtras_ (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ about the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The _Nyâya sûtras_ say nothing about the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma, vis'e@sa_ and _samavâya_ which form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The _Nyâya sûtras_ take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not mention the name of "Îs'vara," whereas the _Nyâya sûtras_ try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the _Nyâya sûtras_ are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

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[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramâ@nas is Caraka. But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyâya and calls _arthâpatti arthaprâpti_ (_Caraka_ III. viii.).]

[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vâtsyâyana's commentary.]

[Footnote 3: The _Nyâya sûtra_ no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jâti as "_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h_" (II. ii. 71).]

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Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyâya and the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ admit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika are absent there. The Vai'se@sika calls salvation _ni@hs'reyasa_ or _mok@sa_ and the Nyâya _apavarga_. Mok@sa with Vais'e@sika is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyâya is cessation of pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between the Vais'e@sika and Nyâya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness--apek@sâbuddhi--notion of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two things); again, the doctrine of pilupâka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyâya held) was held by Vais'e@sika, which the Naiyâyikas did not admit [Footnote ref 2]. But as the _Nyâya sûtras_ are silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyâya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of Vais'e@sika and the later interpreters of Nyâya. The Vais'e@sika as we find it in the commentary of Pras'astapâda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyâya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.

The Vais'e@sika and Nyâya Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ by Ka@nâda, also called Aulûkya the son of Ulûka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

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[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha quotes a passage from _Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya_, XVI. 68-69 in _J.A.S.B._, 1905, and another passage from a Nyâya writer Bhâsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in _J.A.S.B._, 1914, to show that the old Naiyâyikas considered that there was an element of happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyâya or the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, unless the cessation of pain with Nyâya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss or happiness.]

[Footnote 2: See Mâdhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aulûkyadars'ana_.]

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appears from the _Vâyu purâna_ that he was born in Prabhâsa near Dvârakâ, and was the disciple of Somas'armâ. The time of Pras'astapâda who wrote a bhâ@sya (commentary) of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity of Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya is this that unlike other bhâ@syas (which first give brief explanations of the text of the sûtras and then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining the first brief comments), it does not follow the sûtras but is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote ref 1]. There were two other bhâ@syas on the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, namely _Râva@na-bhâ@sya_ and _Bharâdvâja-v@rtti_, but these are now probably lost. References to the former are found in _Kira@nâvalîbhâskara_ of Padmanâbha Mis'ra and also in _Ratnaprabhâ_ 2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhâ@sya, namely _Vyomavatî_ by Vyomas'ekharâcârya, _Nyâyakandalî_ by S'ridhara, _Kira@nâvalî_ by Udayana (984 A.D.) and _Lîlâvatî_ S'rîvatsâcârya. In addition to these Jagadîs'a Bha@t@tâcârya of Navadvîpa and S'a@nkara Mis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the _Pras'astapâda-bhâsya_, namely _Bhâsyasûkti_ and _Ka@nâda-rahasya_. S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ called the _Upaskâra_. Of these _Nyâya-kandalî_ of S'rîdhara on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of Vais'e@sika. Its author was a native of the village of Bhûris@r@s@ti in Bengal (Râ@dha). His father's name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokâ and he wrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes at the end of his work.

The _Nyâya sûtra_ was written by Ak@sapâda or Gautama, and the earliest commentary on it written by Vâtsyâyana is known as the _Vâtsyâyana-bhâ@sya_. The date of Vâtsyâyana has not

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[Footnote 1: The bhâ@sya of Pras'astapâda can hardly he called a bhâ@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories (_Padârthadharmasa@mgraha_). He takes the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa_ and _samavâya_ in order and without raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupâka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first time as the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to us after Ka@nâda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D.]

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been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a _Vârttika_ on Vâtsyâyana's bhâ@sya to establish the Nyâya views and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnâga (about 500 A.D.) in his _Pramâ@nasamuccaya_. Vâcaspatimis'ra (840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the _Nyâyavârttika_ of Udyotakara called _Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ_ in order to make clear the right meanings of Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ which was sinking in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings (_dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnânâm_). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the _Tâtparya@tîkâ_ called _Tâtparya@tîkâparis'uddhi_. Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the _Nyâyanibandhaprakâs'a_. Padmanâbha wrote a sub-commentary on that called _Varddhamânendu_ and S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the _Nyâyatâtparyama@n@dana_. In the seventeenth century Vis'vanâtha wrote an independent short commentary known as _Vis'vanâthav@rtti_, on the _Nyâya sûtra_, and Râdhâmohana wrote a separate commentary on the _Nyâya sûtras_ known as _Nyâyasûtravivara@na_. In addition to these works on the _Nyâya sûtras_ many other independent works of great philosophical value have been written on the Nyâya system. The most important of these in medieval times is the _Nyâyamañjari_ of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished shortly after Vâcaspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of the _Nyâya sûtras_ for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyâya views quite independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vâcaspati's _Tâtparya@tîkâ_, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another important work is Udayana's _Kusumâñjali_ in which he tries to prove the existence of Îs'vara (God). This work ought to be read with its commentary _Prakâs'a_ by Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) and its sub-commentary _Makaranda_ by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's _Âtmatattvaviveka_ is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in which he tries to establish the Nyâya doctrine of soul. In addition to these we have a number of useful works on Nyâya in later times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection with the present work. _Bhâ@sâpariccheda_ by Vis'vanâtha with its commentaries _Muktâvalî, Dinakarî_ and _Râmarudrî, Tarkasamgraha_ with _Nyâyanir@naya, Tarkabkâ@sâ_ of Kes'ava Mis'ra with

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the commentary _Nyâyapradîpa, Saptapadârthî_ of S'ivâditya, _Târkikarak@sâ_ of Varadarâja with the commentary _Ni@ska@n@taka_ of Mallinâtha, _Nyâyasâra_ of Mâdhava Deva of the city of Dhâra and _Nyâyasiddhântamañjarî_ of Jânakinâtha Bha@t@tâcarya with the _Nyâyamanjarisara_ by Yâdavâcârya, and _Nyâyasiddhântadîpa_ of S'a@sadhara with _Prabhâ_ by S'e@sânantâcârya.

The new school of Nyâya philosophy known as Navya-Nyâya began with Ga@nges'a Upâdhyâya of Mithilâ, about 1200 A.D. Ga@nges'a wrote only on the four pramâ@nas admitted by the Nyâya, viz. pratyak@sa, anumâna, upamâna, and s'abda, and not on any of the topics of Nyâya metaphysics. But it so happened that his discussions on anumâna (inference) attracted unusually great attention in Navadvîpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumâna portion of his work _Tattvacintâma@ni, and many independent treatises on sabda and anumâna were also written by the scholars of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home of Nyâya studies. The commentaries of Raghunâtha S'iroma@ni (1500 A.D.), Mathurâ Bha@t@tâcârya (1580 A.D.), Gadâdhara Bha@t@tâcârya (1650 A.D.) and Jagadîsa Bha@t@tâcârya (1590 A.D.), commentaries on S'iroma@ni's commentary on _Tattvacintâmani, had been very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyâya became the most important study in Navadvîpa and there appeared a series of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject [Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote ref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic thinking and the development of a system of highly technical

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[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyâya was started in Mithilâ (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyâya studies. See Mr Cakravarttî's paper, _J. A.S.B._ 1915. I am indebted to it for some of the dates mentioned in this section.]

[Footnote 2: _Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunatha as well as his _Padârthatattvanirûpa@na_ are, however, notable exceptions.]

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expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that so far as the logical portion of the Nyâya system is concerned, though Ak@sapâda was the first to write a comprehensive account of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyâya account of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic _Das'avaikâlikaniryukti_ of Bhadrabâhu (357 B.C.), Umâsvâti's _Tattvârthâdhigama sûtra_, _Nyâyâvatâra_ of Siddhasena Divâkara (533 A.D.) Mâ@nikya Nandi's (800 A.D.) _Parîk@sâmukha sûtra_, and _Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra_ of Deva Sûri (1159 A.D.) and _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da_ of Prabhâcandra deserve special notice. _Pramâ@nasamuccaya_ and _Nyâyapraves'a_ of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.), _Pramâ@nayârttika kârikâ_ and _Nyâyabindu_ of Dharmakîrtti (650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l]. The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the present volume.

It is interesting to notice that between the _Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya_ and the Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ no Hindu work on logic of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnâga's criticism of Hindu Nyâya that roused Udyotakara to write the _Vârttika_. The Buddhist and the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we come to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of importance on Nyâya in the Buddhist style namely _Nyâyasâra_ of Bhâsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of

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[Footnote 1: See _Indian Logic Medieval School_, by Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]

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inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyâya interest [Footnote ref 1].

The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing.

As the Nyâya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience and on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sâ@mkhya cosmology, but accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (_bhûtas_), earth (_k@siti_), water (_ap_), fire (_tejas_), and air (_marut_). These atoms are eternal; the fifth substance (_âkâs'a_) is all pervasive and eternal. It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf man though he has the âkâs'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense organ [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence of time (_kâla_) as extending from the past through the present to the

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[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyâya and Vais'e@sika referred to have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyâya in Bengal," by Mr. Cakravarttî in _J.A.S.B._ 1915.]

[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyâya and Vais'e@sika as the same system. Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already been treated.]

[Footnote 3: See _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 59-64.]

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endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sâ@mkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit of kâla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kâla as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi _(buddhinirmâ@na) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But kâla in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing by itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself as past, present, and future. Sâ@mkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution _(adhvan)_. The astronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika conception of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless substance which appears as many in association with the changes related to it [Footnote ref l].

The seventh substance is relative space _(dik)_. It is that substance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kâla like dik is also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth substance is the soul _(âtman)_ which is all-pervading. There are separate âtmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to _âtman_. Manas (mind) is the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory; all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 64-66, and _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 136-139. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]

[Footnote 2: See _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 66-69, and _Nyayamañjarî_, p. 140.]

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of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas the other things such as quality (_gu@na_), action (_karma_), sameness or generality (_sâmânya_), speciality or specific individuality (_vis'e@sa_) and the relation of inherence (_samavâya_) cannot show themselves without the help of substance (_dravya_). Dravya is thus the place of rest (_âs'rayâ_) on which all the others depend (_âs'@rta_). Dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa, and samavâya are the six original entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1]. When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref 2]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types or categories (_padârtha_), and held that the notion of each type was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in number--dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus call the book a substance (_dravya_); dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (_dravyatva_). So also gu@na and karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with Sâ@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say