Reading section 37

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[Footnote 1: _Abhâva_ (negation) as dependent on bhâva (position) is mentioned in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_. Later Nyâya writers such as Udayana include _abhâva_ as a separate category, but S'rîdhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhâva was not counted by Pras'astapâda as it was dependent on bhâva--"_abhâvasya prthaganupades'a@h bhâvapâratantryât na tvabhâvât_." _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 6, and _Lak@sa@nâvalî_, p. 2.]

[Footnote 2: "_Tattvato jñâte@su bâhyâdhyâtmike@su vi@saye@su do@sadars'anât viraktasya samîhâniv@rttau âtmajñasya tadarthâni karmânyakurvatah tatparityâgasâdhanâni s'rutism@rtyuditâni asa@nkalpitaphalâni upâdadânasya âtmajñânamabhyasyata@h prak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati paripakvâtmajñânasyâtyantikas'arîraviyogasya bhâvât._" _Ibid._ p. 7.]

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whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but Nyâya-Vais'e@sika would collect "all whiteness" under the name of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l]. They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate entities or categories.

The six Padârthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sâmânya, Vis'e@sa, Samavâya.

Of the six classes of entities or categories (_padârtha_) we have already given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (_gu@na_) the first one called _rûpa_ (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (_citra_). Colours are found only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (_nitya_}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heat is applied, and this, S'rîdhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rûpa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus _rûpatva_ (colourness), and the rûpa gu@na (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rûpa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye.

The second is _rasa_ (taste), that quality of things which can be apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent (_ka@tu_), astringent (ka@sâya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and ap have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like rûpa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are apprehended by the tongue.

The third is _gandha_ (odour), that quality which can be apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Water

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[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautrântika Buddhism, "yo yo vruddhâdhyâsavân nâsâveka@h." See Pa@n@ditâs'oka's _Avayavinirâkarana, Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts_.

[Footnote 2: The word "padârtha" literally means denotations of words.]

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or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence of earth materials.

The fourth is _spars'a_ (touch), that quality which can be apprehended only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold, hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, and vâyu. The fifth _s'abda_ (sound) is an attribute of âkâs'a. Had there been no âkâs'a there would have been no sound.

The sixth is sa@mkhyâ (number), that entity of quality belonging to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three, etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative oscillatory state of the mind (_apek@sâbuddhi_); thus when there are two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion--This is one jug and that is another jug. This is called apek@sâbuddhi; then in the two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (_dvitva_) and then an indeterminate perception (_nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na_) of dvitva in us and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs. The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a similar manner [Footnote ref 1].

The seventh is _parimiti_ (measure), that entity of quality in things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is called _parima@n@dala parimâ@na_; it is eternal, and it cannot generate the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely; when two atoms generate a dyad (_dvya@nuka_) it is not the measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) and the _hrasva_ (small) measure of the dyad molecule (_dvya@nuka_), for then the size (_parimâ@na_) of it would have been still smaller than the measure of the atom (_parima@n@dala_), whereas the measure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely the small (_hrasva_) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but then the number (sa@mkhyâ) of the atom should be regarded as bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (_hrasva_) measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka) compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure "small"

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[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced by Pras'astapâda. Nyâya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkara Mis'ra's _Upaskâra_, VII. ii. 8.]

[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms as eternal as in "paramâ@nus" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. The parima@n@dala parimâ@na is thus a variety of a@nuparimâ@na. The a@nuparimâ@na and the hrasvaparimâ@na represent the two dimensions of the measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and dîrgha are with reference to trya@nukas. See _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 133.]

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(_hrasva_) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (_mahat_) of the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these gross trya@nukas we find that the "great" measure of the trya@nukas is the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by them. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so much bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukas of mahat parimâ@na makes things of still more mahat parimâ@na. The measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahat but also as dîrgha (long) and this dîrgha parimâ@na has to be admitted as coexisting with mahat parimâ@na but not identical, for things not only appear as great but also as long (_dîrgha_). Here we find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulation of "great" (_mahat_) and "long" (_dîrgha_) parimâ@na, and hence the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater and longer than the individual atoms which composed them. Now the hrasva parimâ@na of the dyads is not regarded as having a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct type of measure which is called small (_hrasva_). As accumulation of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness, grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the hrasva (small) parim_a@na ought to generate still more hrasva parim_a@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of the dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, the trya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also if the atomic and circular (_parima@n@dala_) size of the atoms is regarded as generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas, then the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomic than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness and the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect. But since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen to be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the measure of their effects, but it is their _number_ which is the cause

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of the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparimâ@na, hrasva parimâ@na, mahat parimâ@na, and dîrgha parimâ@na. The parimâ@na of âkâs'a, kâla, dik and âtman which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimâ@nas of the atoms, âkâs'a, kâla, dik, manas, and âtman are regarded as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parimâ@nas as belonging to non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.

The eighth is _p@rthaktva_ (mutual difference or separateness of things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation such as this jug is not this pot.

The ninth is _sa@myoga_ (connection), that entity of gu@na by virtue of which things appear to us as connected.

The tenth is _vibhâga_ (separation), that entity of gu@na which destroys the connection or contact of things.

The eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, _paratva_ and _aparatva_, give rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote and near.

The other gu@nas such as _buddhi_(knowledge),_sukha_ (happiness), _du@hkha_ (sorrow), _icchâ_ (will), _dve@sa_ (antipathy or hatred) and _yatna_ (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of _gurutva_ (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The gu@na of _sneha_ (oiliness) belongs to water. The gu@na of _sa@mskâra_ is of three kinds, (i) _vega_ (velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, (2) _sthiti-sthâpaka_ (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) _bhâvanâ_ is that quality of âtman by which things are constantly practised or by which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l]. _Dharma_ is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. _Adharma_ is

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[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda says that bhâvanâ is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the sa@mskâra becomes particularly strong. See _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 167. Ka@nâda however is silent on these points. He only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@mskâra, memory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]

[Footnote 2: Pras'astapâda speaks of _dharma_ (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (_nakarmasâmarthyam_). Sacrifice etc. cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action is destroyed its power (_sâmarthya_) cannot last. So dharma is to be admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith (_s'raddhâ_), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods, fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by Pras'astapâda as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the _yamas_ and _niyamas_ (cf. Patañjali's Yoga) and attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padârthas attains a dharma which brings liberation (_mok@sa_). S'rîdhara refers to the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga account of the method of attaining salvation (_Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 272-280). See also Vallabha's _Nyâyalilâvatî_, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]

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the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a man to suffer. _Ad@r@s@ta_ or destiny is that unknown quality of things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with their merits or demerits.

_Karma_ means movement; it is the third thing which must be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. There are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction, (4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of karmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause the things to which they belong to move.

_Sâmânya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as _sat_ or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na, and karma. This sameness is called _sâmânya_ or _jâti_, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or karma. This highest genus _sattâ_ (being) is called _parajâti_ (highest universal), the other intermediate jâtis are called aparajâti (lower universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or still more intermediate jâtis such as _gotvâjâti_ (the genus cow), _nîlatvajâti_ (the genus blue). The intermediate jâtis or genera sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as _pas'utva_ (animal jâti) and _gotva_ (the cow jâti); here however gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jâti. The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jâti which from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

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This jâti or _sâmânya_ thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent reality of sâmânya, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Sâmânya has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object [Footnote ref l]. This jâti is eternal or non-destructible, for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jâti, the latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].

Through _vis'e@sa_ things are perceived as diverse. No single sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves. The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it

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[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditâs'oka says that there is no single thing running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the sâmânya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish jâti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent (_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). Sâmânya is such, therefore sâmânya is non existent. No sâmânya can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no sâmânya can be pointed out as being externally perceptible --_Sâmânyadûsanadikprasaritâ_--in _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_. The Vedanta also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jâti as a separate substance. So it discards jâti. See _Vedântaparibhâsâ_, _Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabhâ_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's _Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]

[Footnote 2: Similarity (sâdrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhûyodharmavattvam_).]

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is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them.

_Samavâya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and sâmânya, karana (cause) and kârya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jâti in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I put my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavâya however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus a separate and independent category. This is not regarded as many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed but the samavâya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].

These six things are called the six padârthas or independent realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus

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[Footnote 1: The Vedânta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavâya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (_Brahma-sûtrabhâ@sya II. ii. 13_) that if a samavâya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samavâya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavasthâ_). Nyâya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of _anavasthâ_--_prâmâ@nikî_ (valid infinite, as in case of the question of the seed and the tree, or of the avidyâ and the passions), and another _aprâmâ@nikî anavasthâ_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]

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they admitted dravya, gu@na, karma and sâmânya, Vis'e@sa they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent before but was newly produced. This is what is called the doctrine of _asatkâryavâda_. This is just the opposite of the Sâ@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed _nâbhâvo vidyate sata@h_) and that the non-existent could never be produced (_nâsato vidyate bhâvah_). The objection to this view is that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anything that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].

It is held by Mîmâ@msâ that an unseen power resides in the cause which produces the effect. To this Nyâya objects that this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained by molecular movement (_parispanda_). There is nothing except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (_anyathâsiddhis'ûnyasya niyatâpûrvavarttitâ_). Unconditionality and invariability are indispensable for _kâryakâra@na-bhâva_ or cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional upon something else (_na svâtantrye@na_). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour

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[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamuñjari_, p. 494.]

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of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable antecedents or what enters into the production of their co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and âkâs'a (ether) as the substrate and vâyu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar), the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded as causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral, secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of energy. This test the Nyâya would accept only in the sense of an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (_parispanda eva bhautiko vyâpâra@h karotyartha@h atîndriyastu vyâparo nâsti._ Jayanta's Mañjari Âhnika I), but would emphatically reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious causal power or efficiency (_s'akti_) [Footnote ref 1]." With Nyâya all energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyâya--its insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations of the different causal conditions--that these operations are of the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely repudiates the Sâ@mkhya conception of power or productive