Reading section 49

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[Footnote 1: Compare in Nâgârjuna's first kârikâ the idea of _prapañcopas'amam s'ivam. Anirodhamanutpâdamanucchedamas'âs'vatam anekârthamanânârthamanâgamamanirgamam ya@h pratîtyasamutpâdam prapañcopas'amam s'ivam des'ayâmâva sambuddhastam vande vadatâmvaram_. Compare also Nâgârjuna's Chapter on _Nirvâ@naparîk@sâ, Pûrvopalambhopas'ama@h prapañcopas'ama@h s'iva@h na kvacit kasyacit kas'cit dharmmo buddhenades'ita@h_. So far as I know the Buddhists were the first to use the words _prapañcopas'aman s'ivam_.]

[Footnote 2: Compare Nâgârjuna's k@arikâ, "anirodhamanutpâdam" in _Mâdhyamikav@rtti, B.T.S._, p. 3.]

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of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (_advaya_) is false; it is only the oneness (_advayatâ_) that is good. There is no many, nor are things different or non-different (_na nânedam ...na p@rthag nâp@rthak_) [Footnote ref 1]. The sages who have transcended attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all appearance (nirvikalpa@h prapañcopas'ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 2].

In the third chapter Gau@dapâda says that truth is like the void(_âkâs'a_) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from âkâs'a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams (_svapna_) and mâyâ (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed upon the one (_advaita_) by mâyâ. The truth is immortal, it cannot therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition of mâyâ upon it [Footnote ref 3]. One mind appears as many in the dream, as also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless state, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everything to be misery (_du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya_) one should stop all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken the mind (_citta_) into its final dissolution (_laya_) and pacify it when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (_sukham_) and by wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction; when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (_sarvajña_).

In the fourth chapter, called the Alats'ânti, Gau@dapâda further

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[Footnote 1: Compare _Mâdhyamikakârikâ, _B.T.S._, p.3 _anekârtham anânârtham_, etc.]

[Footnote 2: Compare _Lankâvatârasûtra_, p.78, _Advayâsamsâraparinirvâ@nvatsarvadharmâ@h tasmât tarhi mahâmate S'unyatânutpâdâdvayani@hsvabhâvalak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h_; also 8,46, _Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tyânavabodhanât vijñânânâm svacittad@r@s@tyamâtrânavatâre@na mahâmate vâlaprthagjanâ@h bhâvâbhâvasvabhâvaparamârthad@r@s@tidvayvâdino bhavanti_.]

[Footnote 3: Compare Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, _B.T.S._ p. 196, _Âkâs'am s'as'as'@r@ngañca bandhyâyâ@h putra eva ca asantas'câbhivyajyante tathâbhâvena kalpanâ_, with Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, III. 28, _Asato mâyayâ janma tatvato naiva jâyate bandhyâputro na tattvena mâyâya vâpi jâyate_.]

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describes this final state [Footnote ref l]. All the dharmas (appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote: ref 2]. Gau@dapâda then follows a dialectical form of argument which reminds us of Nâgârjuna. Gau@dapâda continues thus: Those who regard kâra@na (cause) as the kâryya (effect in a potential form) cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (_aja_), for it suffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing? If it is said that things come into being from that which has no production, there is no example with which such a case may be illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a right conclusion about the _regressus ad infinitum_ of cause and effect (_hetu_ and _phala_)? Without reference to the effect there is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect. Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth, neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature (_svabhâvatah_), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot be said to have a production. All experience (_prajñapti_) is dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there would be none of the afflictions (_sa@mkles'a_) that we suffer. When we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (_citta_) does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest them, for since things do not exist they are not different from their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations. Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are really traversing the reason of vacuity (_khe_), for all production is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of

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[Footnote 1: The very name Alâta@sânti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, _B.T.S._, p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the _S'ataka_.]

[Footnote 2: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini, "Codanâlak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah." Dharma is determined by the injunctions of the Vedas.]

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production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like a magical or illusory elephant (_mâyâhastî_) and exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one knowledge (_vijñâna_) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness (_avastutva_), the cessation (s'ântam). As the movement of burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the movement (_spandita_) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it does not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore to be demonstrated as unthinkable (_acintya_). A thing (_dravya_) is the cause of a thing (_dravya_), and that which is not a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all the appearances are neither things nor those which are not things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind (_citta_) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of existence (_sa@msâra_), but when that notion ceases there is no sa@msâra. All things are regarded as being produced from a relative point of view only (_sa@mv@rti_), there is therefore nothing permanent (_s'âs'vata_). Again, no existent things are produced, hence there cannot be any destruction (_uccheda_). Appearances (_dharma_) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their coming into being is like mâyâ, and that mâyâ again does not exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible. As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all appearances. That which appears as existing from an imaginary relative point of view (_kalpita sa@mv@rti_) is not so in reality (_para-mârtha_), for the existence depending on others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.

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It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Mâdhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nâgârjuna's kârikâs and the Vijñânavâda doctrines, as found in _La@nkâvatâra_, that it is needless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dapâda assimilated all the Buddhist S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads. It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dapâda took the smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because he wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable vijñâna or vacuity would hold good of the highest âtman of the Upani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the Upani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sads guaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dapâda's views it was left for his disciple, the great S'a@nkara, to examine and explain.

Vedânta and S´a@nkara (788-820 A.D.).

Vedânta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upani@sads and summarized in the _Brahma-sûtras_ of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mîmâ@msâ or the Mîmâmsâ (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished from the Mîmâ@msâ of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brâhma@nas as incorporated in the _Pûrvamîmâ@msâ sûtras_ of Jaimini. Though these _Brahma-sûtras_ were differently interpreted by different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary on them now available, written by S'a@nkarâcârya, have attained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and deep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the illustrious personality of S'a@nkara. So great is the influence of the philosophy propounded by S´a@nkara and elaborated by his illustrious followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedânta philosophy we mean the philosophy that was propounded by S'a@nkara. If other expositions are intended the names of the exponents have to be mentioned (e.g. Râmânuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc.), In this

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chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedânta philosophy as elaborated by S'a@nkara and his followers. In S'a@nkara's work (the commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtra_ and the ten Upani@sads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as found in S'a@nkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are more intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore better to take up the Vedânta system, not as we find it in S'a@nkara, but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare that they are true to their master's philosophy.

For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sûtras (_Jaimini sûtra, Nyâya sûtra,_ etc.) are the only original treatises, and no foundation other than these is available. In the case of the Vedânta however the original source is the Upani@sads, and the sûtras are but an extremely condensed summary in a systematic form. S'a@nkara did not claim to be the inventor or expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sûtras and the Upani@sads in order to show that there existed a connected and systematic philosophy in the Upani@sads which was also enunciated in the sûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads were a part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the Hindus. If S'a@nkara could only show that his exposition of them was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most formidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were the Mîma@msists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any philosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be interpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or that action. They held that if the Upani@sads spoke of Brahman and demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere exaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing some kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form. S'a@nkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found in the Brâhma@nas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared by the Mîmâ@msâ, but he sought to prove that such could not be the purport of the Upani@sads, which spoke of the truest and the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise could attain salvation. He said that in the karmak@n@da--the (sacrificial injunctions) Brâhma@nas of the Vedas--the purport of the Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended for ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,

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and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute truth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for the wise who had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas were intended for two classes of persons. S'a@nkara thus did not begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and psychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show by textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by reference to the content of passages in the Upani@sads, that they were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was in favour of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. of the Sâ@mkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the Upani@sads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order to show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded it was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the Upani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and wrong. This he did not only in his bhâsya on the _Brahma-sûtras_ but also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with him had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the Upani@sad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted testimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth. His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted either in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that all the realistic categories which Nyâya and other systems had put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedânta epistemology, and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the mâyâ, the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant topics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which

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had been left out or slightly touched by S'a@nkara were discussed fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our faith in the truth revealed in the Upani@sads. The true work of logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting the instructions of the Upani@sads is logic gone astray. Many lives of S'a@nkarâcârya were written in Sanskrit such as the _S'a@nkaradigvijaya_, _S'a@nkara-vijaya-vilâsa_, _S'a@nkara-jaya_, etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700 and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S'ivaguru was a Yajurvedi Brâhmin of the Taittirîya branch. Many miracles are related of S'a@nkara, and he is believed to have been the incarnation of S'iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over to Benares and thence went to Badarikâs'rama. It is said that he wrote his illustrious bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtra_ in his twelfth year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upani@sads. He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to meet Kumârila, but Kumârila was then at the point of death, and he advised him to meet Kumârila's disciple. He defeated Ma@n@dana and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere he established his Vedânta philosophy, which from that time forth acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of India.

S'a@nkara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapâda and by writing commentaries on the ten Upani@sads and the _Brahma-sûtras_ tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which was intended to be preached in the Upani@sads and the _Brahma-sûtras_ [Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the _Brahma-sûtras_, there is ample evidence that he was contending against some other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held that the Upani@sads partly favoured the Sâ@mkhya cosmology

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[Footnote 1: The main works of S'a@nkara are his commentaries (bhâ@sya) on the ten Upani@sads (Îs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mu@ndaka, Mâ@n@dûkya, Aitareya, Taittirîya, B@rhadâra@nyaka, and Chândogya), and on the _Brahma-sûtra_.]

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of the existence of prak@rti. That these were actual textual interpretations of the _Brahma-sûtras_ is proved by the fact that S'a@nkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions were faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one place he says that others (referring according to Vâcaspati to the Mîmâ@msâ) and some of us (referring probably to those who interpreted the sûtras and the Upani@sads from the Vedânta point of view) think that the soul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity of the self (_âtmaikatva_) that this S'ârîraka commentary of mine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. Râmânuja, in the introductory portion of his bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtra,_ says that the views of Bodhâyana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the _Brahma-sûtra_ were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was following this Bodhâyana bhâ@sya in writing his commentary. In the _Vedârthasa@mgraha_ of Râmânuja mention is made of Bodhâyana, Tanka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bhâruci as Vedântic authorities, and Dravi@dâcâryya is referred to as the "bhâ@syakâra" commentator. In Chândogya III. x. 4, where the Upani@sad cosmology appeared to be different from the _Vi@s@nupurana_ cosmology, S'a@nkara refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom he calls "âcâryya" (_atrokta@h parihârah âcâryyaih_) and Ânandagiri says that "âcâryya" there refers to Dravi@dâcâryya. This Dravi@dâcâryya is known to us from Râmânuja's statement as being a commentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence here that he had written a commentary on the Chândogya Upani@sad.

A study of the extant commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtras_ of Bâdarâya@na by the adherents of different schools of thought leaves us convinced that these sûtras were regarded by all as condensations of the teachings of the Upani@sads. The differences of opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sûtras and the Upani@sad texts to which references were made by them in each particular case. The _Brahma-sûtra_ is divided into four adhyâyas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters or pâdas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion (_adhikara@na_) which are composed of a number of sûtras, which raise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and uncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour

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[Footnote 1: See note on p. 432.]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtras_, I. iii. 19.]

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a particular conclusion. As explained by S'a@nkara, most of these sûtras except the first four and the first two chapters of the second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the Upani@sad passages. S'a@nkara's method of explaining the absolutist Vedânta creed does not consist in proving the Vedânta to be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but in so interpreting the Upani@sad texts as to show that they all agree in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the only truth. In Chapter I of Book II S'a@nkara tries to answer some of the objections that may be made from the Sâ@mkhya point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute the Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Nyâya-Vais'e@sika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bhâgavata and S'aiva systems of thought. These two chapters and his commentaries on the first four sûtras contain the main points of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing that the conclusion of the sûtras was always in strict agreement with the Upani@sad doctrines. Reason with S'a@nkara never occupied the premier position; its value was considered only secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding of the revealed scriptures, the Upani@sads. The ultimate truth cannot be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater. So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found in the Upani@sads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport of the Upani@sads. From his own position S'a@nkara was not thus bound to vindicate the position of the Vedânta as a thoroughly rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on its rationality but on the authority of the Upani@sads. But what was true could not contradict experience. If therefore S'a@nkara's interpretation of the Upani@sads was true, then it would not contradict experience. S'a@nkara was therefore bound to show that his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience. If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation that was faithful to the Upani@sads, and that its apparent contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,