Reading section 23

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[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu âtmâ ca indriyam...anupahatacak@surâdides'e@su eva âtmana@h karmak@sayopas'amaslenâsthagitagavâk@satulyâni cak@surâdîni upakara@nâni. Jaina-Vâttika-V@rtti,_ II. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number of senses they possess. (See _Pramâ@namîmâ@msâ._ See also _Tattvârthâ-dhigamasûtra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the veil which as observing it is removed.]

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that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials were necessary for the development of determinate perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. The determinate stage with them is the result of the application of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence does not truly represent the presentative part [Footnote ref 1].

Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge (_parok@sa_) differs from pratyak@sa in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. Parok@sa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively _pratijñâ, hetu, drs@tânta, upanaya_ and _nigamana_, except for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process (_Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 108, 109). When we make an

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[Footnote 1 _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 8-11.]

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inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabhâva_) or as invariable antecedence (_kramabhâva_) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference [Footnote ref 1].

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance [Footnote ref 2].

Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

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[Footnote 1: As regards concomitance (_vyâpti_) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer _antarvyâpti_ (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyâptî (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svârthânumâna for one's own self and _parârthânumâna_ for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabâhu in his Das'avaikâlikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (1) _Pratijñâ_ (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) _Pratijñâvibhakti_ (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) _Vipak@sa_ (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) _Vipak@sa prati@sedha_ (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) _D@r@s@ânta_ (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) _Âs'a@nkâ (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) _Âs'a@nkâprati@sedha_ (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_ (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian Logic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vâtsyâyana in his _Nyâyasûtrabhâ@sya_, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jainatarkavârttika_, and _Parîk@sâmukhasûtrav@rtti_, and _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism.]

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which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect they supposed that there was a succession of different units of effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary. The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes every moment and that new things are being renewed at each succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence associated with change--_paryâya_ (acquirement of new qualities and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one particular standpoint (_naya_) whereas they alone carefully weigh experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva_ the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable abstract speculations which went directly against experience. Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge

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in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it. The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment. Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious and an unconscious element in knowledge as Sâ@mkhya does. Nor should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it reveals, as the Sautrântikas think, for then by copying the materiality of the object, knowledge would itself become material. Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mîmâ@msâ view that the validity (_prâmâ@nya_) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself _svata@hprâmâ@nya_) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence (sa@mvâda) with facts. But in those cases where by previous knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without reference to objective facts (_prâmâ@nyamutpattau parata eva jñaptau svakârye ca svata@h paratas'ca. abhyâsânabhyâsâpek@sayâ_) [Footnote ref 1]. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.

The Jîvas.

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be divided into the living (_jîva_) and the non-living (_ajîva_). The principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property of the body [Footnote ref 2] It is on account of this life-principle that the body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or

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[Footnote 1: _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 38-43.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina Vârttika,_ p. 60.]

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a description. This is directly against the view of the great Mîmâ@msa authority Prabhâkara [Footnote ref 1]. The soul in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (_ananta-dars'ana_), infinite knowledge (_ananta-jñâna_), infinite bliss (_ananta-sukha_) and infinite power (_ananta-vîrya_) [Footnote ref 2]. It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with the exception of a few released pure souls (_mukta-jîva_) all the other jîvas (_sa@msârin_) have all their purity and power covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number. They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable space-points in our mundane world (_lokâkâs`a_), have a limited size (_madhyama-parimâ@na_) and are neither all-pervasive (_vibhu_) nor atomic (_anu_); it is on account of this that _jîva_ is called _Jivâstikâya_. The word _astikâya_ means anything that occupies space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The Jains divide the jîvas according to the number of sense-organs they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell. The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these an inner sense-organ namely _manas_ by virtue of which they are

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[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamârta@nda,_ p. 33.]

[Footnote 2: The Jains distinguish between _dars'ana_ and _jñâna_. Dars'ana is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. Jñâna means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars'ana and then jñâna. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.]

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called rational (_sa@mjñin_) while the lower animals have no reason and are called _asamjnin_.

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animated by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; they live and die and are born again in another elementary body. These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants. Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. The whole universe is full of minute beings called _nigodas_; they are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters, having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with them like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply of souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But an infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all the souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to the present. Thus it is evident the sa@msâra will never be empty of living beings. Those of the _nigodas_ who long for development come out and continue their course of progress through successive stages [Footnote ref 1].

Karma Theory.

It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jîvas are born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already noticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter. Those which obscure right knowledge of details (_jñâna_) are called _jñânâvara@nîya_, those which obscure right perception (_dars'ana_) as in sleep are called _dars'anâvaranîya_, those which

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._, and _Lokaprakâs'a_, VI. pp. 31 ff.]

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obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and pain are _vedanîya_, and those which obscure the right attitude of the soul towards faith and right conduct _mohanîya_ [Footnote ref 1]. In addition to these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma which determine (1) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nationality, caste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called (1) _âyu@ska karma_, (2) _nâma karma_, (3) _gotra karma_, (4) _antarâya karma_. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are continually producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first instance is called _bhâva karma_, which transforms itself into _dravya karma_ and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming into contact with the passions (_ka@sâya_) of the soul. These act like viscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are called the _les'yâs_. The feelings generated by the accumulation of the karma-matter are called _bhâva-les'yâ_ and the actual coloration of the soul by it is called _dravya-les'yâ_. According as any karma matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the knowledge that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc., is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All knowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be generating them all being but mere coexistent external conditions.

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[Footnote 1: The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) _matijñâna_ (ordinary cognition), (2) _s'ruti_ (testimony), (3) _avadhi_ (supernatural cognition), (4) _mana@hparyâya_ (thought-reading), (5) _kevala-jñâna_ (omniscience).]

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After the effect of a particular karma matter (_karma-varga@nâ_) is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul. This process of purging off the karmas is called _nirjarâ_. If no new karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging off of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as it is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma matter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and binding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and rebirth. After the death of each individual his soul, together with its karmic body (_kârma@nas'arîra_), goes in a few moments to the place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.

In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its proper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the _audayika_ state. By proper efforts karma may however be prevented from taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and this is said to be the _aupas'amika_ state of the soul. When karma is not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul is said to be in the _k@sâyika_ state, and it is from this state that Mok@sa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary good men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized, and some active (_k@sâyopas'amika_) [Footnote ref 1].

Karma, Âsrava and Nirjarâ.

It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all the experiences of this world process, including births and rebirths in diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects. The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter (_karma-varga@nâ_}. The influx of these karma particles into the soul is called âsrava in Jainism. These karmas are produced by body, mind, and speech. The âsravas represent the channels or modes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like the channels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jains distinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually

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[Footnote 1: The stages through which a developing soul passes are technically called _gu@nasthânas_ which are fourteen in number. The first three stages represent the growth of faith in Jainism, the next five stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, in the next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his karmas, at the thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but he still practises yoga and at the fourteenth stage he attains liberation (see Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti, 13th verse).]

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enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds of âsravas, bhâvâsrava and karmâsrava. Bhâvâsrava means the thought activities of the soul through which or on account of which the karma particles enter the soul [Footnote ref 1]. Thus Nemicandra says that bhâvâsrava is that kind of change in the soul (which is the contrary to what can destroy the karmâsrava), by which the karmas enter the soul [Footnote ref 2]. Karmâsrava, however, means the actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These bhâvâsravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion (_mithyâtva_), want of control (_avirati_), inadvertence (_pramâda_), the activities of body, mind and speech (_yoga_) and the passions (_ka@sâyas_). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely _ekânta_ (a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed), _viparîta_ (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), _vinaya_ (retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit), _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt as to right or wrong) and _ajñâna_ (want of any belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers). Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (_hi@msâ_), falsehood (_an@rta_), stealing (_cauryya_), incontinence (_abrahma_), and desire to have things which one does not already possess (_parigrahâkâ@nk@sâ_). Pramâda or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation (_vikathâ_), passions (_ka@sâya_), bad use of the five senses (_indriya_), sleep (_nidrâ_), attachment (_râga_) [Footnote ref 3].

Coming to dravyâsrava we find that it means that actual influx of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight different kinds, namely jñânâvara@nîya, dars'anâvara@nîya, vedanîya, mohanîya, âyu, nâma, gotra and antarâya. These actual influxes take place only as a result of the bhâvâsrava or the reprehensible thought activities, or changes (_pari@nâma_) of the soul. The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas is called bhâvabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called dravyabandha. It is on account of bhâvabandha that the actual connection between the karmas and the soul can take place [Footnote ref 4]. The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking